Schroeder v. Mabellos
| Decision Date | 17 June 1993 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 90-00475 HMF. |
| Citation | 823 F. Supp. 806 |
| Parties | Eric SCHROEDER, Plaintiff, v. Tranquillino MABELLOS, Tuiga Sialega, Lee Scruton, Ed Naong, Keith Chavis, Deanna Espinas, Quincy Choy Foo, George Iranon, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
Eric Schroeder, pro se.
Susan Barr, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert Marks, Atty. Gen., Honolulu, HI, for defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On April 15, 1993, Plaintiff Eric Schroeder, a pro se prisoner, filed objections to Magistrate Judge Kurren's recommendation that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.1
Schroeder, a renowned jailhouse lawyer at the Halawa Medium Security Facility state prison, worked in the law library at the prison. According to Schroeder, his duties included assisting other inmates with their legal problems. Schroeder's assistance allegedly included at least one instance where the law library supervisor asked Schroeder to serve process on the prison warden.
On February 15, 1990, inmate Steven Fisher approached Schroeder in the law library. Fisher told Schroeder that he had been unable to serve a summons and complaint on Defendant Tranquillino Mabellos, a staff education specialist at the prison. Fisher had named Mabellos as a defendant in a thenpending civil action in this court, Fisher v. Casey, Civil No. 89-00813. Schroeder agreed to serve Mabellos.
Mabellos worked in the learning center adjacent to the law library. Schroeder requested and received permission from the law library supervisor to go to the learning center to "give some papers" to Mabellos. (Fisher Decl. at 2.) En route to the learning center, Schroeder again received permission to speak to Mabellos from a guard.
Mabellos gave Schroeder permission to enter Mabellos' office. Schroeder handed the summons to Mabellos and told him that he was being served. Schroeder contends that Mabellos let go of the papers.2 Schroeder then placed the papers on Mabellos' desk. Mabellos repeatedly ordered Schroeder to retrieve the summons. Schroeder refused and walked away.
The following day, Defendant Deanna Espinas, the prison librarian, suspended Schroeder from his duties in the law library workline. Espinas told inmates that the suspension was to "protect ... good relations with the learning center personnel even though Schroeder had not broken any rules." Isom Decl. at 2.) As a result of the suspension from the law library workline, Schroeder lost his 25¢ per hour pay, and access to the law library for legal research.
On February 22, 1990, Mabellos filed a misconduct report against Schroeder. The report charged that:
Defendants Keith Chavis and Quincy Choy Foo investigated the charges and referred them to the Adjustment Committee.
Defendants Lee Scruton, Ed Naong, and Tuiga Sialega made up the Adjustment Committee. After a hearing, the committee found Schroeder guilty of disobeying Mabellos' order to recall the process but not guilty of the other two charges. The committee ordered Schroeder into disciplinary segregation for fourteen days. After Schroeder completed the segregation period, the prison placed him in the more restrictive module 1 housing unit rather than returning him to module 3.
On June 14, 1990, Schroeder filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. In addition to the above named defendants, Schroeder also named George Iranon, the director of the Department of Corrections. As amended, the complaint states the following causes of action.
Count I alleges that Mabellos retaliated against Schroeder's exercise of his rights of expression and association and his right to assist in civil rights litigation.
Count II alleges that Mabellos violated Schroeder's due process rights by punishing him for a lawful act.
Count III and IV allege that Mabellos, Sialega, Scruton, Naong, Chavis, and Choy Foo conspired to punish Schroeder for exercise of his constitutional rights.
Count V alleges that Mabellos and Espinas conspired to terminate Schroeder's law library position in retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights.
Count VI alleges that Espinas violated Schroeder's constitutional rights of expression and court access by restricting his law library access.
Count VII alleges that Espinas terminated Schroeder from the law library workline in retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights.
Count VIII alleges that Espinas violated Schroeder's due process rights by depriving him of a property interest in his law library position.
Count IX alleges that Iranon is liable as the Director for allowing constitutional violations.
In his findings and recommendations, the magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all counts. The court reviews the magistrate judge's findings and recommendation de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Local Rule 404-2.
The pivotal question in this case is whether Schroeder's attempt to serve process on a prison staff member was constitutionally protected. The magistrate judge did not consider the issue. Instead, he noted that the Ninth Circuit in Benny v. Pipes expressly reserved the question of whether reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions could be placed on inmate service of process. Findings at 3-4 (citing Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 494 n. 6 (9th Cir.1986), amended, 807 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870, 108 S.Ct. 198, 98 L.Ed.2d 149 (1987)). The Defendants contend that an inmate has no First Amendment right to serve process.
An inmate's right to assist others in litigation may be curtailed, however, when the "institution's officials, in the exercise of their informed discretion, reasonably conclude that such associations ... possess the likelihood of disruption of prison order or stability...." Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 132, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2541, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977).
Challenges to restrictions of first amendment rights must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the correctional institution in the preservation of internal order and discipline, maintenance of institutional security, and rehabilitation of prisoners. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1811, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974); Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.1981). However, the limitation must be no greater than is necessary to protect the particular governmental interest involved. Procunier v. Martinez, supra, 416 U.S. at 413, 94 S.Ct. at 1811.
Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.1985).
The service of process is an expressive act protected by the First Amendment. In Benny v. Pipes, a panel of the Ninth Circuit assumed this to be true without explicitly stating it. Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 494 n. 6 (9th Cir.1986), amended, 807 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870, 108 S.Ct. 198, 98 L.Ed.2d 149 (1987). In Benny, an inmate in an Arizona prison had personally served process upon two prison guards. The guards crumpled the papers and threw them away. After the district court had entered a default judgment against the guards, they attempted to set it aside by arguing that an inmate could not serve process under state law. Id. 799 F.2d at 493-94. Affirming the default judgment, the Benny court rejected the argument that state law could prohibit the service of federal process pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 in a federal lawsuit. Id. The court reserved the question, however, of whether state law "might validly impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on prisoner service of process on prison officials." Id. 799 F.2d at 494 n. 6. By noting the applicability of First Amendment "time, place, and manner" analysis,3 the Benny court recognized that the service of process enjoyed First Amendment protections.
Even without the Benny decision, the court would conclude that the service of process is protected by the First Amendment. Contrary to the Defendants' argument that service is merely a ministerial act, the service of process has two expressive, communicative functions: "notifying a defendant of the commencement of an action against him and providing a ritual that marks the court's assertion of jurisdiction over the lawsuit." Oklahoma Radio Assoc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 969 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir.1992) (). The summoning of a defendant to answer in a federal court is a communication that is an integral part of the judicial system. As such, it is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Although the service of process is protected by the constitution, a prison may still impose narrowly tailored restrictions upon it as necessary for the...
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Schroeder v. Mabellos
...employee. The district court denied appellants' qualified immunity defenses to Schroeder's constitutional claims. Schroeder v. Mabellos, 823 F.Supp. 806 (D.Haw.1993). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We reverse. I An order denying summary judgment generally is not appea......