Schroyer v. McNeal
| Decision Date | 01 September 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 35,35 |
| Citation | 84 Md.App. 649,581 A.2d 472 |
| Parties | Thomas Edward SCHROYER, et ux. v. Frances C. McNEAL. , |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
William M. Rudd (Anderson, Rudd & Donahue, on the brief) Cumberland, for appellee.
Submitted before MOYLAN, ROSALYN B. BELL and KARWACKI, JJ.
This case arises from a slip and fall incident that occurred on January 9, 1985 at the Grantsville Holiday Inn. A jury trial was held in the Circuit Court for Garrett County. The jury awarded Frances McNeal, appellee, $50,000 for injuries she sustained in the fall. Appellants, Thomas Schroyer and his wife, Patricia Schroyer, appeal, contending:
-- the trial court erred in denying the Schroyers' motion for summary judgment; and
-- the trial court erred when it denied the Schroyers' motion for judgment and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.
We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court. We explain.
On January 9, 1985, McNeal arrived at the Grantsville Holiday Inn at about 5:30 p.m. She was in the area for business meetings the next day. There was an accumulation of approximately four inches of sleet and ice on the ground when she arrived. McNeal parked her car in front of the hotel and went to the main lobby area to register. She noted that the area around the hotel's main entrance had been cleared of ice and snow. She also noted, however, that the parking lot had not been cleared.
McNeal requested a room closest to an exit so that she could transfer her paperwork more easily from the car to her room. She was assigned a room close to the west side entrance despite the fact that the hotel's protocol for inclement weather was not to assign rooms at the far end of the hall away from the lobby. Employees were also instructed to advise guests not to use the west entrance in inclement weather. McNeal, however, was not given such an instruction nor were any warnings not to use the entrance posted near the west side entrance.
After registering, McNeal drove her car from the main entrance to the west side and parked her car 10 to 15 feet from the entrance. She saw packed ice and snow around her car and noted it was slippery. She also noted that the sidewalk near the entrance was not shoveled.
McNeal began to unload her car. She took her cat out of the car and carefully crossed the ice and snow without mishap. After she opened her room and placed her cat inside, she returned to her car to retrieve the rest of her belongings. Before she reached her car, however, she slipped and fell, sustaining a broken ankle.
McNeal sued the Schroyers, Pasco Development Corporation (Pasco) and Holiday Inn Incorporated. Pasco constructed the hotel and its sole stockholders are the Schroyers. The Schroyers are franchisees of Holiday Inn and own and operate the hotel. Mr. Schroyer testified that he was responsible for the removal of snow and ice from the premises.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Schroyers contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is not a substitute for trial, but a determination of whether any issue of fact requiring a trial exists. Metropolitan Mortgage Fund v. Basiliko, 288 Md. 25, 28, 415 A.2d 582 (1980). A court, however, possesses discretion to refuse to pass upon or affirmatively deny a motion for summary judgment in favor of a full trial on the merits, even though the technical requirements for summary judgment are met. Basiliko, 288 Md. at 28, 415 A.2d 582. We perceive no abuse of this discretion and therefore the Schroyers' contention is without merit.
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
The Schroyers contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. In reviewing whether the court should have decided the question of the Schroyers' negligence or McNeal's contributory negligence as a matter of law, notwithstanding the jury's verdict, we must view the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to McNeal. Menish v. Polinger Co., 277 Md. 553, 567, 356 A.2d 233 (1976).
Honolulu Limited v. Cain, 244 Md. 590, 596, 224 A.2d 433 (1966). Normally, there is no right of recovery if the injured person knew or should have known of the dangerous condition. Tie Bar Inc. v. Shartzer, 249 Md. 711, 715, 241 A.2d 582 (1968).
Pfaff v. Yacht Basin Co., 58 Md.App. 348, 354, 473 A.2d 479 (1984), quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1), comment (f) (1965).
In the instant case, a natural condition, snow and ice, existed on the Schroyers' property. The hotel policy of assigning rooms close to the lobby and warning guests not to use side entrances in inclement weather recognizes that invitees may fail to protect themselves against dangerous conditions. Moreover, in the case at bar, the Schroyers failed to make the conditions surrounding the hotel safe or to warn McNeal of the dangerous condition at the west side entrance.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to McNeal, we cannot say that the Schroyers were free of negligence as a matter of law.
"Contributory negligence is the failure to observe ordinary care for one's own safety." Menish, 277 Md. at 559, 356 A.2d 233 (citations omitted). The standard of care imposed to protect oneself is that of a reasonable person under like circumstances, judged in the light of all the relevant knowledge which the person actually had. Craig v. Greenbelt Consumer Services, 244 Md. 95, 97, 222 A.2d 836 (1966). What a reasonable person would do in any particular circumstance is usually controlled by the instinctive urge to protect oneself from harm. Greer Lines Co. v. Roberts, 216 Md. 69, 79, 139 A.2d 235 (1958). A reasonable person, however, is not a very cautious person and even if a person's actions turn out to be an error of judgment, there is no contributory negligence if a reasonable person would have made the same error. Sanders v. Williams, 209 Md. 149, 153, 120 A.2d 397 (1956).
In order to find a person contributorily negligent as a matter of law, "the evidence must show some prominent and decisive act which directly contributed to the accident and which was of such a character as to leave no room for difference of opinion thereon by reasonable minds." Rooney v. Statewide Plumbing, 265 Md. 559, 564, 290 A.2d 496 (1972).
A review of the case law on contributory negligence as a matter of law reveals a trend in the analysis of the appellate courts. Two questions are asked: 1) Did the plaintiff know of, or can the plaintiff be charged with knowledge of the dangerous condition? 2) If so, did the plaintiff act reasonably under the circumstances? More specifically, in "slip and fall" cases, the questions become: 1) Did the plaintiff see, or should the plaintiff have seen, what he or she fell on? 2) Did the plaintiff have a safer alternative to the actions he or she took?
In Burkert v. Smith, 201 Md. 452, 94 A.2d 460 (1953), the Court of Appeals held that the question of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, who fell down a flight of stairs in a tavern, was a matter for the jury. Burkert, 201 Md. at 458, 94 A.2d 460. The stairs were located four to eight inches to the left of the entrance. Burkert, 201 Md. at 455, 94 A.2d 460. The plaintiff fell down the stairs when she stepped back from the door to allow another person to enter. The plaintiff had never been in the tavern before and had not seen the stairway when she entered. Burkert, 201 Md. at 455, 94 A.2d 460. The Court noted that the plaintiff had no reason to know that a stairway would be placed so close to the door. Burkert, 201 Md. at 458, 94 A.2d 460. The Court stated this was "not a case of contributory negligence as a matter of law." Burkert, 201 Md. at 458, 94 A.2d 460.
In Honolulu Limited, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff, who slipped and fell on a patch of ice that formed because of water runoff from piles of plowed snow, could not be held contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Honolulu Limited, 244 Md. at 599, 224 A.2d 433. The Court found she had no reason to know of the danger. Thus, her exposure to the danger was both unintentional and completely reasonable under the...
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