Schrunk v. Andres
| Decision Date | 12 April 1946 |
| Docket Number | No. 34125.,34125. |
| Citation | 221 Minn. 465,22 N.W.2d 548 |
| Parties | SCHRUNK v. ANDRES. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Lyon County; Albert H. Enersen, Judge.
Action by Earl Schrunk against Lester Andres to restrain defendant from selling ten second-hand automobiles to satisfy a possessor lien for storage thereof and to recover damages for conversion of certain automobiles and parts thereof by defendant, wherein the defendant filed a counterclaim for damages allegedly occasioned by plaintiff's trespass on certain farm property, possession of which was in defendant. From order denying motion for new trial, the plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
L. P. Johnson, of Marshall, for appellant.
Z. L. Begin, of Marshall, for respondent.
Action to restrain defendant from selling ten secondhand automobiles—models ranging from 1929 to 1935—to satisfy a possessory lien for storage thereof, and to recover $1,350 damages for the conversion of certain of said cars and parts thereof by defendant.
Defendant denied the allegations, and counterclaimed for damages in the sum of $100 occasioned by plaintiff's trespass on certain farm property, possession of which was in defendant, on which plaintiff had kept numerous secondhand cars, including those above described, as well as secondhand car parts and accessories, without the consent of defendant.
The trial court found that defendant had sold certain parts of plaintiff's secondhand cars of the reasonable value of $15; and found further that plaintiff was indebted to defendant in the sum of $120 less the aforesaid $15 as damages for the wrongful use of defendant's property up to the date of trial. This is an appeal from an order denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
The evidence disclosed that plaintiff had entered into an oral month-to-month lease for two acres of the farm with one Lawrence C. Mootz, vendee under a contract for deed for the purchase of the farm from the Prudential Life Insurance Company, fee owner thereof. Said lease provided for a rental payment to Mootz of eight dollars per month, which was subsequently raised by agreement to $10 per month. The two acres adjoin the highway about a mile from the city of Marshall. Plaintiff used and occupied them as and for a secondhand car lot throughout the term of the lease, keeping numerous secondhand cars and car parts thereon. The contract for deed under which Mootz held possession specifically prohibited assignment or transfer of any interest in the premises without the written consent of the fee owner, and it is undisputed that the Prudential at no time gave such consent to the lease between plaintiff and Mootz.
Mootz's interest in the premises was terminated by cancellation of his contract during the month of December 1942. Shortly prior thereto, plaintiff was advised by Mootz and by the Prudential that the contract for deed was being terminated and that plaintiff should remove all of his automobiles and parts from the leased tract. This, plaintiff at all times failed and refused to do.
Subsequently, the Prudential made a written lease with defendant for the entire farm. Thereunder, defendant was entitled to possession as of January 1, 1943. Plaintiff then still had a large number of secondhand and junked cars and parts thereof on the two-acre tract. Defendant immediately instructed him to remove them, as they constituted an "eyesore" and interfered with defendant's full use of the farm. This and other requests to the same effect were ignored by plaintiff. The Prudential, both prior and subsequent to January 1, 1943, requested plaintiff to remove his property, but such requests were likewise ignored.
In June 1943, defendant, believing that plaintiff had abandoned the aforesaid personal property on the two-acre tract, hauled some of it to a grove in the rear of his house. Plaintiff concedes that this was done with his express consent. Thereafter, there still remained on the two-acre tract a substantial number of secondhand cars, frames, junk, and other parts belonging to plaintiff, which plaintiff still refused to remove from the premises. After removal of the cars to the grove, defendant sold some parts thereof, including three motors. Upon plaintiff's complaint, two of said motors were returned to plaintiff, and, as previously indicated, the court determined that the remaining property, including the other motor sold by defendant, amounted in value to $15, for which the court allowed plaintiff due credit. Shortly after the sales aforesaid, defendant commenced proceedings to sell the cars above described to satisfy a possessory lien for the storage thereof. This action by plaintiff followed.
In the fall of 1944, after the commencement of this action, plaintiff removed the cars involved herein to his garage in the city of Marshall. Thereafter there still remained on defendant's premises the framework of various secondhand cars, as well as parts thereof, scattered about the tract. Plaintiff paid no rental for the two-acre tract at any time subsequent to the termination of the Mootz contract for deed, and it was not until February 1945 that he finally removed the last of his property therefrom.
At the trial, plaintiff sought to establish that he had entered into a lease with defendant. Defendant testified positively that he at no time entered into an agreement, either oral or written, with plaintiff for the lease of any part of the premises, but, on the contrary, testified that he had requested plaintiff to remove his property therefrom. In his answer, in addition to his counterclaim for damages for the wrongful use of his premises, defendant asserted his right to a possessory lien for storage of the cars involved, but this latter claim was not pressed, and the court made no findings thereon. It does not appear to be before us now.
Plaintiff submitted testimony to the effect that the cars here involved were in good condition at the time defendant took possession of the premises, and that at the time of their removal therefrom they had become worthless except as junk because of defendant's removal and conversion of various parts thereof, all to his damage in excess of the sum of $1,350. Defendant disputed this, and submitted testimony to the effect that said cars were no better than junk at the time he took possession of the farm; that he was not custodian or bailee thereof; that he had personally not converted any parts thereof except those parts above referred to on which the court made the $15 allowance specified.
On appeal, plaintiff asserts (1) that the court erred in failing to award him damages for the decrease in the value of his cars by reason of defendant's negligence in permitting others to convert parts thereof, or by reason of personally converting parts thereof to his own use; (2) that the court erred in awarding damages to defendant for plaintiff's use of the two-acre tract, contending he had evicted plaintiff therefrom when the cars were removed to the grove in the rear of the premises in June 1943; and (3) that in any event the court erred in awarding damages to defendant up to the date of trial, contending that defendant was not entitled to damages beyond the date of the filing of his answer and counterclaim herein.
1. It is clear that with the termination of the Mootz contract for deed plaintiff's interest in the premises, whatever it may have been, terminated. A lessor cannot create any greater interest in his lessee than he himself possesses, and the lessee takes subject to all claims of title enforceable against the lessor. 32 Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, § 25. It follows that Mootz could not make a lease of the two-acre tract for a term extending beyond his own right therein under his contract for deed, and that, when this was terminated, the right of plaintiff in and to said tract likewise terminated. Under such circumstances, plaintiff's lease automatically expired with the termination of Mootz's interest, and no notice,...
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