Schubert v. J. R. Clark Co.

• Citation: 49 Minn. 331,51 N.W. 1103
• Parties: SCHUBERT v J. R. CLARK CO.
• Decision Date: 21 April 1892
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

49 Minn. 331

51 N.W. 1103

SCHUBERTvJ. R. CLARK CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 21, 1892.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

If one engaged in the business of manufacturing goods not ordinarily of a dangerous nature, to be put upon the market for sale and for ultimate use, so negligently constructs an article that by reason of such negligence it will obviously endanger the life or limb of any one who may use it, and if the manufacturer, knowing such defects, and knowing that the same are so concealed that they are not likely to be discovered, puts the article in his stock of goods for sale, he is liable for injuries caused by such negligence to one into whose hands the dangerous implement comes for use in the usual course of business, even though there be no contract relation between the latter and the manufacturer.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; HOOKER, Judge.

Action by Edward J. Schubert against the J. R. Clark Company to recover for personal injuries. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Welch, Botkin & Welch, for appellant.

F. B. Larabee, for respondent.

DICKINSON, J.

The sufficiency of the complaint as showing a right to recover against the defendant is here for decision. The facts of the case, as shown by the complaint, may be thus stated: The plaintiff, a house painter, was in the employ of one Phelps. He was engaged in the work of painting the interior of a certain building. His employer, Phelps, as a purchaser, ordered from a retail merchant a new 10-foot step-ladder, directing that it be delivered to the plaintiff at the place where he was at work. The merchant, not having such a ladder in his stock of goods, ordered the defendant corporation to deliver such a step-ladder to the plaintiff for his use. The defendant delivered a ladder to the plaintiff pursuant to that order. This we construe to have been a purchase by the merchant from the defendant. The defendant was a manufacturer of such goods, and the ladder so delivered had “theretofore” been manufactured by it, “to be sold for the purpose of being used.” It was made of poor, cross-grained, and decayed lumber, and “was so insufficient in strength as to be dangerous to the life and limb of this plaintiff and whoever might use the same.” It is alleged that the defendant knew, or ought to have known, such defects and insufficiency. Neither the plaintiff nor his employer nor the merchant from whom the latter ordered the ladder knew such defects, and it was so varnished, oiled, and painted that they could not discover them. The plaintiff, supposing the ladder to have been made of good material, and to be of sufficient strength, proceeded to use it in the performance of his work, and while he was standing on it, seven feet above the floor, it broke without his fault, causing him to fall, and he was thereby injured. The complaint is defective in not stating, but leaving it only to be inferred, that the ladder broke by reason of the alleged defects; but this fault is not relied upon by the appellant, and we pass it over to consider the real merits of the case.

Let us consider more particularly wherein the defendant is shown to have been guilty of a wrong towards the plaintiff, of which the latter may complain, or what legal duty the defendant owed to the plaintiff, or generally to any one who, in the ordinary course of events, might procure the ladder for use. There was no contract relation between the plaintiff and the defendant, and hence no contract obligation for the violation of which the plaintiff can recover. Neither the plaintiff nor even his employer was a party to the contract of sale pursuant to which the ladder was delivered to the plaintiff. He did not stand in any relation of privity with the contracting parties,-the retail merchant, who purchased, and the defendant, who sold, the ladder. The contract was not entered into nor executed for his benefit; and, if there was any breach of the contract, the plaintiff has no right of action merely for that. If the defendant is liable, it must be upon the ground that the circumstances under which the ladder was manufactured and delivered were such that the neglect to disclose the existence of the defect was a wrong,-a neglect of a duty recognized by law independent of contract. Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, we assume that by reason of the defects complained of the ladder was dangerous to the life or limb of a person using it in the way in which such articles are ordinarily used. If there was any legal duty resting on the defendant for the breach of which the plaintiff can complain it will be more apparent if the alleged negligence and consequent injury are brought into close proximity. Hence we will for the present assume that when the ladder was delivered directly to the plaintiff for his use by the defendant the latter knew the concealed defects, and had reason to apprehend that the use of it by the plaintiff, or by any one, would be attended by serious personal injury. It would constitute an actionable wrong for the defendant to thus knowingly and unnecessarily do what it had reason to suppose would result in injury to the plaintiff without the intervention of any fault or neglect on his part or on the part of any other person. If the defendant knowingly delivered such an article for the plaintiff's use, it was its duty to warn him of the danger by disclosing the hidden defects; and neglect of that duty would constitute actionable negligence. Every one may be supposed to understand that such articles are manufactured, sold, disposed of, with a view to their being used. They are valuable and salable only because of their supposed fitness for use. One who procures such an article, either from a manufacturer or from a retail dealer, would ordinarily assume without inquiry, and without any express warranty, that it is what it appears to be,-a thing intended for actual use; and that it has not been so negligently manufactured that by reason of concealed defects its use would be attended with danger of serious injury. And this must be supposed to be understood by the person who disposes of it; and if, knowing the existence of such defects, he neglects to disclose them, so that the other party may be warned of his danger, such neglect amounts to bad faith. Under such circumstances, silence would partake of the nature of an assurance that the thing had not any such known but concealed dangerous defects. Silence would have the effect and the quality or deceit.

The following cases may be cited as instances in which, although there were no contract relations between the parties, a legal duty towards the person injured...