Schuermann v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 November 1901
• Citation: 165 Mo. 641,65 S.W. 723
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: SCHUERMANN v. UNION CENT. LIFE INS. CO.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>

65 S.W. 723

165 Mo. 641

SCHUERMANN v. UNION CENT. LIFE INS. CO.¹

Supreme Court of Missouri. Division No. 1.

November 19, 1901.

LIFE INSURANCE — MISREPRESENTATION — ACTIONS — TRIAL BY JURY — EQUITABLE RELIEF — STATUTES — PLEADING — SUFFICIENCY — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — DUE PROCESS OF LAW — EQUAL PROTECTION.

1. Rev. St. Mo. 1899, § 7890, providing that no misrepresentation made in obtaining a life insurance policy shall be deemed material, or render the policy void, unless it actually contributed to the contingency or event on which the policy is to become due, and whether it so contributed in any case shall be a question for the jury, does not restrain the power of courts of equity to relieve against actual fraud perpetrated or attempted against life insurance companies.

2. The statute does not violate Const. Mo. art. 2, § 30, providing that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law; for the insurance company has no vested right in a mere form of procedure heretofore adopted by the state, or in force at a given time.

3. The statute does not violate Const. U. S. Amend. art. 14, § 1, providing that no state shall deny to any person the equal protection of the laws, though it designates a class of the community to be brought within its operation.

4. Where, in an action on a life insurance policy, the answer of the company set up as a defense that the insured, in his application, knowingly made certain false representations as to his health and habits of sobriety, and prayed that the court, in the exercise of its powers as a court of equity, would decree the contract to be null and void, such answer does

not contain an equitable defense, or operate to convert the case into one of equity, calling for its trial by the court, but presents a legal defense, properly triable by jury.

Appeal from St. Louis circuit court; L. B. Valliant, Judge.

Action by Margaretta Schuermann against the Union Central Life Insurance Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Geo. P. B. Jackson, for appellant. Seneca N. Taylor, Chas. Erd, and Seneca C. Taylor, for respondent.

ROBINSON, J.

This is an action against the appellant, the Union Central Life Insurance Company, to recover on a policy of insurance issued on the life of respondent's husband, Henry Schuermann. The petition is in the usual form, containing all essential averments. The amended answer, upon which the case was tried, among other things avers that the plaintiff's husband in his application for insurance made certain false representations and statements as to the past and present condition of his health, and his habits of sobriety, etc., fully detailed and set out. It then avers that plaintiff's husband at the time knew said representations and statements as made were false, but that the defendant relied upon and believed them to be true, and that but for its belief, and reliance therein and thereon, it would not have issued the policy in suit. The answer then sets out the amount of premiums received, and avers the deposit of same in court to the use of plaintiff as soon as it learned of the falsity of the insured's statements contained in his application for insurance, and prayed that the court, in the exercise of its powers as a court of equity, decree the policy to be null and void, and for naught held, and for such other relief as the court might think it entitled to under the facts of the case. To defendant's answer plaintiff replied, denying each and every allegation thereof, and, as a further affirmative reply, alleged that her deceased husband stated and represented in his application for insurance that he was a moderate drinker, and that the defendant company knew that fact, and, knowing it, induced deceased to take out the policy in suit, and further averred that said insured died of dropsy, — a malady in no way provoked, caused, or influenced by any of the conditions about which the insured is alleged to have made false and untrue statements and representations. Other averments were made in the reply, unnecessary to recite in the present consideration of the case. Upon the case being called for hearing, both parties announced, "Ready for trial," and the plaintiff demanded a jury. Thereupon the counsel for defendant then objected to a jury being impaneled, or to the trial of the case before a jury, for the reason, as stated, that "under the pleadings the defendant was entitled to have the issues presented in its answer tried before the judge, as a chancellor sitting as a court of equity; that it was entitled to a trial in equity, and without a jury, to determine the issues raised, as to whether or not the policy of insurance relied upon in the petition was obtained by fraud, and because it was improper to submit such issues to a jury, and proceed in the case as upon an action at law," — all of which objections made by defendant were overruled by the court, and a jury was duly impaneled, and the cause was proceeded with before them, resulting in a verdict upon which a final judgment was entered. From that judgment this appeal has been prosecuted by defendant.

Several minor objections have been made to the action of the trial court, that arose during the progress of the taking of testimony, which counsel for appellant, in his brief filed herein, concedes are of no material consequence now, if the action of the court in submitting the case to the determination of the jury, and denying to defendant a hearing in equity, was proper. The maintenance of the judgment of the court below depends upon the construction the trial court put upon section 7890, Rev. St. 1899, which reads as follows: "No misrepresentation made in obtaining a policy of insurance on the life or lives of any person or persons, citizens of this state, shall be deemed material, or render the policy void, unless the matter misrepresented shall have actually contributed to the contingency or event on which the policy is to become due and payable, and whether it so contributed in any case, shall be a question for the jury." The court construed this section to mean, as applied to the conditions of this case, that, in trials at law upon policies of insurance issued on the life of any person or persons, no defense on the grounds of misrepresentations made by the insured in obtaining or securing the policy should be availing to the company to defeat its liability thereunder, unless the matter misrepresented shall have actually...