Schultz v. GEICO Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 November 2018
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 18SA135
• Citation: 429 P.3d 844
• Parties: In re Charissa SCHULTZ, Plaintiff v. GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

429 P.3d 844

In re Charissa SCHULTZ, Plaintiff

v.GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant.

Supreme Court Case No. 18SA135

Supreme Court of Colorado.

November 5, 2018

Attorneys for Plaintiff: Speights & Worrich, LLC, David Roth, Jennifer A. Milne, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Defendant: Deisch, Marion & Klaus, P.C., Gregory K. Falls, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 In this original proceeding pursuant to C.A.R. 21, we review the district court’s order requiring the plaintiff-petitioner, Charissa Schultz, to undergo an independent medical examination ("IME"), pursuant to C.R.C.P. 35, at the request of the defendant-respondent GEICO Casualty Company. We issued a rule to show cause and now make the rule absolute.

¶ 2 In this action, Schultz alleges that GEICO breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing and violated its statutory obligation to evaluate and pay her insurance claim without unreasonable delay. GEICO denies liability, asserting that because the question of medical causation was "fairly debatable" at the time it made its coverage decision, it did not act unreasonably or in bad faith. To establish these defenses, GEICO sought an IME of Schultz, and over Schultz’s objection, the district court granted that request.

¶ 3 We now conclude that GEICO’s conduct must be evaluated based on the evidence before it when it made its coverage decision and that, therefore, GEICO is not entitled to create new evidence in order to try to support its earlier coverage decision. Accordingly, we further conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered Schultz to undergo an IME over three years after the original accident that precipitated this case and a year and a half after GEICO had made the coverage decision at issue.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

¶ 4 In February 2015, Schultz and another driver collided when the other driver failed to stop at a stop sign. Thereafter, Schultz underwent multiple knee replacement surgeries.

¶ 5 The other driver’s insurance company settled with Schultz for its $25,000 policy limit, and Schultz then made a demand for uninsured/underinsured motorist ("UM/UIM") benefits under her GEICO policy, which also had a $25,000 policy limit. In connection with this demand, Schultz provided GEICO with medical authorizations to allow it to obtain the medical records associated with her claim.

¶ 6 In April 2017, after months of correspondence and apparent review of an MRI performed on Schultz in April 2015, GEICO offered Schultz its full policy limit, and it did so without requesting that she undergo an IME. Indeed, GEICO’s claim logs reveal that at the time GEICO decided to offer Schultz its policy limits, it "concede[d] peer review wouldn’t be necessary," indicating an affirmative decision not to request an IME.

¶ 7 A few months later, Schultz filed the present lawsuit asserting claims for bad faith breach of an insurance contract and, pursuant to sections 10-3-1115 and 10-3-1116, C.R.S. (2018), unreasonable delay in the payment of covered benefits. GEICO denied liability, disputing the extent and cause of Schultz’s claimed injuries and asserting that causation surrounding the knee replacement surgeries was "fairly debatable" because Schultz had preexisting arthritis

, which GEICO claimed may independently have necessitated her surgeries.

¶ 8 As part of its effort to support these defenses, GEICO requested that Schultz undergo a medical examination pursuant to C.R.C.P. 35. Schultz objected, arguing that C.R.C.P. 35 was inapplicable because her physical condition was no longer in controversy. The parties attended a hearing before the district court to resolve this question.

¶ 9 At the hearing, GEICO contended that it had decided to pay Schultz’s UM/UIM claim even though it had recognized that the question of causation was unresolved. In light of Schultz’s current claims, however, GEICO argued that causation was again a live issue because "[y]ou can’t delay a benefit that was never owed." GEICO thus asserted that it was entitled to explore the causation issue through, among other means, an IME of Schultz. Schultz disagreed, asserting that the reasonableness of GEICO’s conduct had to be evaluated based on the information that GEICO had at the time it evaluated her claim. The district court ultimately agreed with GEICO and ordered Schultz to undergo the C.R.C.P. 35 examination.

¶ 10 Schultz then filed a petition for a rule to show cause pursuant to C.A.R. 21, which we granted.

II. Analysis

¶ 11 We begin by discussing our jurisdiction to hear this matter. We then address the legal framework for claims that an insurer has unreasonably and in bad faith delayed payment to a policy holder. Finally, we consider whether GEICO is entitled to obtain an IME of Schultz long after it made its coverage decision.

A. Jurisdiction

¶ 12 Although discovery issues generally fall within the discretion of the district court and the appropriate mechanism for reviewing such decisions is by appeal rather than by original proceeding,

[w]hen ... a procedural ruling may significantly affect a party’s ability to litigate the merits of a case and may cause damage to a party that cannot be cured on appeal, it is appropriate to challenge a trial court’s order relating to matters of pretrial discovery by way of an original proceeding.

Belle Bonfils Mem’l Blood Ctr. v. Dist. Court , 763 P.2d 1003, 1013 (Colo. 1988). In addition, we may exercise our discretion under C.A.R. 21 to consider "issues of significant public importance that we have not yet considered." Wesp v. Everson , 33 P.3d 191, 194 (Colo. 2001).

¶ 13 Here, the district court ordered Schultz to undergo a medical examination against her will, and this decision implicates her privacy interests in her body and her health. See Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc. , 972 P.2d 1060, 1068 (Colo. App. 1998) (noting "a generally recognized privacy interest in a person’s body," as well as a "generally recognized privacy interest in information concerning one’s health"). Because a violation of these interests could not adequately be remedied on appeal, we invoke our original jurisdiction pursuant to C.A.R. 21 to review the trial court’s order. See Ortega v. Colo. Permanente Med. Group, P.C. , 265 P.3d 444, 447 (Colo. 2011) (invoking our C.A.R. 21 jurisdiction when the enforcement of the order at issue would have resulted in the disclosure of a party’s medical records and such disclosure, if erroneous, could not properly have been remedied on appeal).

B. Claims for the Unreasonable Delay or Denial of Benefits

¶ 14 Due to the significant disparity in bargaining power between an insurer and its insured, we have recognized the special nature of insurance contracts and of the relationship between an insurer and its insured, and we have concluded that in addition to liability for breach of contract, an insurer’s bad faith breach of an insurance contract also gives rise to tort liability. See Nunn v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. , 244 P.3d 116, 119 (Colo. 2010). Thus, an insured may bring a claim asserting that its insurer, acting in bad faith, has unreasonably refused or delayed payment on a claim. Goodson v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. , 89 P.3d 409, 414 (Colo. 2004).

¶ 15 To prevail on such a claim, the insured "must establish that the insurer acted unreasonably and with knowledge of or reckless disregard for the fact that no reasonable basis existed for denying the claim." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio , 706 P.2d 1258, 1274 (Colo. 1985). The reasonableness of the insurer’s conduct is determined objectively and is "based on proof of industry standards." Goodson , 89 P.3d at 415. Moreover, we have observed that "[a]n insurer’s decision to deny benefits to its insured must be evaluated based on the information before the insurer at the time of that decision." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reyher , 266 P.3d 383, 390 (Colo. 2011) (quoting Peiffer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 940 P.2d 967, 970 (Colo. App. 1996), aff’d , 955 P.2d 1008 (Colo. 1998) ). Thus, in defending against a bad faith claim by attempting to show that it acted reasonably, an insurer may present all of the information that it considered at the time it made the decision to delay or deny the claim. Id.

¶ 16 In addition to the above-described common law bad faith claim, the Colorado General Assembly has provided a statutory remedy against insurance companies that unreasonably delay or deny benefits owed.

¶ 17 Section 10-3-1115 provides, in pertinent part:

(1)(a) A person engaged in the business of insurance shall not unreasonably delay or deny payment of a claim for benefits owed to or on behalf of any first-party claimant.

....

(2) ... for the purposes of an action brought pursuant to this section and section 10-3-1116, an insurer’s delay or denial was unreasonable if the insurer delayed or denied authorizing payment of a covered benefit without a reasonable basis for that action.

¶ 18 Section 10-3-1116(1), in turn, provides that a first-party claimant whose claim for benefits has been unreasonably delayed or denied may bring an action "to recover reasonable attorney fees and court costs and two times the covered benefit" from an insurance company responsible for the unreasonable delay or denial.

¶ 19 Although this court does not appear to have addressed the issue, decisions of both the Colorado Court of Appeals and federal courts interpreting Colorado law have consistently recognized that proof of a statutory claim differs from proof of a common law claim. Specifically, these courts have noted that whereas a common law claim requires proof that the insurer acted unreasonably and that it knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that its conduct was unreasonable, "the only element at issue in the statutory claim is whether an insurer denied benefits without a reasonable basis." Vaccaro v. Am. Family Ins. Grp. , 2012 COA 9M, ¶¶ 21, 44, 275 P.3d 750, 756, 760 ; accord Baker v. Allied Prop. & Cas....