Schultz v. Territory of Arizona

• Decision Date: 23 February 1898
• Docket Number: Criminal 127
• Citation: 52 P. 352,5 Ariz. 239
• Parties: WILLIAM SCHULTZ, Defendant and Appellant, v. TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, Plaintiff and Respondent
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

52 P. 352

5 Ariz. 239

WILLIAM SCHULTZ, Defendant and Appellant, v. TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, Plaintiff and Respondent

Criminal No. 127

Supreme Court of Arizona

February 23, 1898

APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in and for the County of Yavapai. J. J. Hawkins Judge. Reversed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

W. H Barnes, for Appellant.

C. M Frazier, Attorney-General, H. D. Ross, District Attorney, and P. W. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for Respondent.

OPINION

DAVIS, J.

-- The defendant, William Schultz, was tried at the June term, 1897 of the district court of Yavapai County, upon an indictment charging him with murder. He was convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to a term of ten years' imprisonment in the territorial prison. The appeal is from the judgment of conviction, and from an order denying the defendant's motion for a new trial.

The appellant bases his contention for reversal upon two instructions given by the trial court at the request of the prosecution. One of these instructions was in the following language: "The court instructs the jury that the defendant claims, as one of his defenses, what is known in law as an alibi; that is, that, at the time the homicide with which he is charged was committed, he was at a different place, so that he could not have participated in its commission. The burden is upon the defendant to prove this defense for himself, by a preponderance of evidence; that is by the greater and superior evidence. The defense of alibi, to be entitled to consideration, must be such as to show that, at the very time of the commission of the crime charged, the accused was at another place, so far away or under such circumstances that he could not with any ordinary exertion have reached the place where the crime was committed so as to have participated in the commission thereof." While conceding that it is not without authority for its support, we do not think this instruction fairly and correctly states the law applicable to the defense of alibi. The burden of proof never rests upon the accused to show his innocence, or to disprove the facts necessary to establish the crime with which he is charged. The defendant's presence at, and participation in, the corpus delicti, are affirmative material facts that the prosecution must show beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction. For the defendant to say he was not there is not an affirmative proposition; it is a denial of the existence of a material fact in the case. He meets the evidence of the prosecution by denying it. If a consideration of all the evidence in the case leaves a reasonable doubt of his presence, he must be acquitted. We hold that the instruction given may have misled the jury to the prejudice of the rights of the defendant. It, in effect, said to the jury that evidence tending to show such alibi is not to be considered in favor of the defendant, unless it outweighs all the evidence in opposition to it. We think it was the duty of the trial judge to have said to the jury that they must consider all the evidence in the case, including that relating to the alibi, and determine from the whole evidence whether it was shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed the crime with...