Schumacher v. Schumacher, No. A03-1064.

• Citation: 676 N.W.2d 685
• Decision Date: 30 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. A03-1064.
• Parties: David SCHUMACHER, Appellant, v. Harold SCHUMACHER, Respondent.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota

676 N.W.2d 685

David SCHUMACHER, Appellant, v. Harold SCHUMACHER, Respondent.

No. A03-1064.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

March 30, 2004.

Douglas A. Boese, Kari C. Stonelake-Hopkins, Dunlap & Seeger, P.A., Rochester, MN, for appellant.

Michael B. Goodman, Goodman & Guzinski, P.A., Rochester, MN, for respondent.

Considered and decided by STONEBURNER, Presiding Judge, ANDERSON, Judge, and HUDSON, Judge.

OPINION

STONEBURNER, Judge.

Appellant David Schumacher challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment to respondent Harold Schumacher, claiming that the district court erred in ruling that the Iowa Domesticated Animal Activities Immunity Statute applies to this negligence action to relieve respondent from liability for injuries appellant sustained when respondent's horse kicked him in the face. Appellant argues that Minnesota law applies and, alternatively, that even if the Iowa law applies, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether respondent's conduct was reckless, in which case the Iowa immunity statute would no longer apply. Because we conclude that the Iowa immunity statute applies and there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether respondent acted recklessly, we affirm.

FACTS

Appellant David Schumacher sued his father, respondent Harold Schumacher, for damages due to injuries he sustained when he was kicked in the face by respondent's horse at a horse show in Iowa, while appellant was helping respondent with the horses.

Respondent owns, breeds, raises, and shows Percheron draft horses on his farm near Plainview, in Wabasha County, Minnesota. Percherons are generally known as strong, high-strung animals possessing great speed and agility. An adult Percheron weighs approximately 2,000 pounds and stands 18 hands high.

Appellant was 20 years old at the time of the accident. He grew up helping respondent with the horses. He currently lives in a house owned by respondent and performs work for respondent, including help with showing the Percherons, in lieu of cash rent.

The parties took six geldings and a one-year old stallion to a horse show in Iowa. When they arrived, respondent learned that he had been assigned double-tie stalls, designed to hold two horses. This concerned respondent because his horses are not used to being stalled with another horse. Respondent had never before stabled a stallion with a gelding because stallions generally try to dominate geldings. Nonetheless, while respondent prepared a separate stall for the stallion, he placed the stallion and one of the geldings in the same stall, separated by a 4×8 piece of plywood. When respondent moved the stallion about ten minutes later, the gelding was upset and agitated because the stallion had bitten and otherwise aggravated him.

Shortly after respondent had moved the stallion, appellant, who knew that the stallion had just been removed from the stall and that the gelding was upset, approached the gelding and was kicked in the face. The manner in which appellant approached the gelding is disputed by witnesses.¹ It is undisputed, however, that appellant suffered severe injuries to the head and has undergone eleven surgeries to reconstruct his face. The costs of appellant's care, to date, exceed $200,000.

Following discovery, respondent moved for summary judgment arguing that Iowa law controls this case and provides him with immunity for negligence, the only cause of action alleged in appellant's complaint. Appellant opposed the motion, arguing that Minnesota law applies and that even if Iowa law applies, respondent's act of placing the gelding and stallion together constitutes recklessness, for which the Iowa statute does not provide immunity. The district court granted summary judgment to respondent, concluding that the Iowa law applies under a choice-of-law analysis, there is no evidence that respondent engaged in reckless conduct, and therefore Iowa's statutory immunity for domesticated animal activities precludes appellant's negligence suit against respondent. This appeal followed, and respondent filed a notice of review on the district court's failure to alternatively dismiss the case under a primary assumption of the risk theory.

ANALYSIS

On an appeal from summary judgment, reviewing courts ask two questions: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the district court erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990)

. This court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1993).

No genuine issue of material fact exists "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." DLH Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn.1997) (alteration in original). "[T]he party resisting summary judgment must do more than rest on mere averments." Id. at 71. Therefore, a genuine issue for trial must be established by substantial evidence. Id. at 69-70.

I. Choice of law

A conflict of law exists if choosing the law of one state over the law of another state would be "outcome determinative." Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 590 N.W.2d 670, 672 (Minn.App.1999) (quoting Myers v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 302 Minn. 359, 363, 225 N.W.2d 238, 241 (1974)). Iowa Code § 673.2 (2001), provides that "the owner of [a] domesticated animal ... is not liable for the damages, injury, or death suffered by a participant ... resulting from the inherent risks of a domesticated animal activity." The parties agree that, under Iowa law, respondent would not be liable in negligence for appellant's injuries because the immunity statute applies to the facts of this case. The definition of "domesticated animal" includes a horse. Iowa Code § 673.1 (2001). The meaning of "domesticated animal activity" includes participation in an activity sponsored by a "domesticated animal activity sponsor", which in turn includes a "show." Iowa Code § 673.1.

Minnesota has not enacted a similar immunity statute for owners of domesticated animals. Therefore, choosing to apply Iowa law over Minnesota law is outcome determinative because under the Iowa statute respondent is immune from liability for negligence.

Choice-of-law questions are questions of law and are reviewed de novo. See Reed v. Univ. of N.D., 543 N.W.2d 106, 107-08 (Minn.App.1996)

(framing issue as whether district court erred in its choice-of-law analysis), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 1996). Traditionally, when a conflict-of-law issue arises, a court must decide whether the question involves substantive or procedural law by applying the law of Minnesota. Gate City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. O'Connor, 410 N.W.2d 448, 450 (Minn.App.1987),

review denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 1987). "[S]ubstantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines, and regulates rights." Meagher v. Kavli, 251 Minn. 477, 488, 88 N.W.2d 871, 879-80 (1958). The conflict in this case is substantive because the Iowa law defines and regulates the right of an injured person to seek compensation from the owner of a domesticated animal under the circumstances of this case.

Minnesota applies a five-factor choice-of-law analysis to determine which state's law applies. Jepson v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 513 N.W.2d 467, 469-70 (Minn. 1994). The five choice-influencing considerations are: (1) predictability of result; (2) maintenance of interstate order; (3) simplification of judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests; and (5) application of the better rule of law. Id.

a. Predictability of result

"This factor addresses whether the choice of law was predictable before the time of the transaction or event giving rise to the cause of action." Danielson v. Nat'l Supply Co., 670 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Minn.App. 2003) (emphasis in original), review denied (Dec. 16, 2003). Traditionally, in a tort case, this factor is not of great importance because most accidents are unplanned. Jepson, 513 N.W.2d at 470.

But this case is distinguishable from a random, unpredictable accident, such as an automobile accident. Here, respondent, who is in the business of raising and showing horses, traveled to Iowa to participate in a horse show for which he paid an entry fee. Appellant came along to assist with handling and showing the horses. The business-related nature of the activity makes this case somewhat more like a contract case, in which predictability of result is recognized to be significant. In choosing to participate in such an activity, it is reasonable that the participants would like to be able to predict their exposure to risk of liability. Application of Iowa law to out-of-state domestic animal owners engaged in a domesticated animal activity in Iowa could affect participation. We conclude this factor weighs in favor of applying the Iowa immunity statute.

b. Maintenance of interstate order

This factor addresses whether applying Minnesota law would manifest disrespect for Iowa or impede the interstate movement of people and goods. Jepson, 513 N.W.2d at 471. Evidence of forum shopping or evidence that application of one state's law would promote forum shopping, would be an attempt to evade, and would indicate disrespect for, Iowa law. See id. Minnesota does not encourage forum shopping "because it frustrates the maintenance of interstate order." Reed, 543 N.W.2d at 109.

The application of Minnesota law in this case would promote forum shopping. An Iowa citizen injured while participating in a domesticated animal activity would be quick to ascertain the state residence of the animal owner and to sue in any state that does not grant immunity to such owners for domesticated animal activities.

By passing the immunity statute, Iowa has stated its public policy interest in encouraging participation in agricultural activities, like this horse show, because such...