Schuster v. McDonald

• Decision Date: 12 July 1999
• Citation: 692 N.Y.S.2d 721
• Parties: Linda SCHUSTER, etc., et al., appellants, v. Robert S. McDONALD, et al., defendants, Town of Hempstead, et al., respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 721

692 N.Y.S.2d 721

Linda SCHUSTER, etc., et al., appellants, v. Robert S. McDONALD, et al., defendants Town of Hempstead, et al., respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

July 12, 1999.

Bracken & Margolin, L.L.P., Islandia, N.Y. (Patricia M. Meisenheimer and Linda U. Margolin of counsel), for appellants.

Rivkin, Radler & Kremer, Uniondale, N.Y. (Evan H. Krinick and Merril S. Biscone of counsel), for respondent Town of Hempstead.

Owen B. Walsh, County Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Catherine M. Van Der Waag of counsel), for respondent County of Nassau.

Lewis, Johs, Avallone, Aviles & Kaufman, Melville, N.Y. (James P. McCarthy and Dawn C. DeSimone of counsel), for defendant William C. Brochhagen.

DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, MYRIAM J. ALTMAN and WILLIAM D. FRIEDMANN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Segal, J.), dated June 10, 1998, as granted those branches of the separate motions of the defendants Town of Hempstead and County of Nassau which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the respondents.

In 1993 the plaintiff Robert Schuster, a pedestrian, allegedly suffered catastrophic injuries as a result of a two-car collision at the intersection of Bedford Avenue and Wilson Avenue in Bellmore. At the time of the accident the intersection was regulated by, inter alia, a stop sign for traffic entering from Wilson Avenue onto Bedford Avenue. Schuster and his wife (asserting derivative claims) commenced this action against the drivers of the vehicles, the respondent Town of Hempstead, which maintained Wilson Avenue, and the respondent County of Nassau, which maintained Bedford Avenue. The plaintiffs alleged that the Town and the County each failed to maintain a reasonably safe roadway, e.g., that additional traffic signs should have been installed or that the subject intersection should have been regulated by a traffic light. After issue was joined and discovery completed, the Town and the County each moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them under the doctrine of qualified immunity. The Supreme Court granted the motions, and we affirm.

A governmental body owes a nondelegable duty to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition (see, Friedman v. State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 271, 502 N.Y.S.2d 669, 493 N.E.2d 893; Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 167 N.E.2d 63). However, a governmental body is accorded a qualified immunity from liability arising out of a highway safety planning decision (see, Friedman v. State of New York, supra; Alexander v. Eldred, 63 N.Y.2d 460, 483 N.Y.S.2d 168, 472 N.E.2d 996; Weiss v. Fote, supra). Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a governmental body may not be held liable for a highway safety planning decision unless its study of a traffic condition is plainly inadequate, or there is no reasonable basis for its traffic plan (see, Friedman v. State of New York, supra; Alexander v. Eldred, supra; Weiss v. Fote, supra). The doctrine arises out of the need to place proper limits on intrusions into the planning and decision-making function of a governmental body. "To accept a jury's verdict as to the reasonableness and safety of a plan of governmental services and prefer it over the judgment of the governmental body which originally considered and passed on the matter would be to obstruct normal governmental operations and to place in inexpert hands what the Legislature has...