Schutt v. Lewis, Case No. 6:12-cv-1697-Orl-37DAB
| Decision Date | 07 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 6:12-cv-1697-Orl-37DAB |
| Parties | MITCHELL SCHUTT; JACKIE SCHUTT; K.S.; and M.S., Plaintiffs, v. JERRY MORGAN LEWIS; CITY OF OCOEE, FLORIDA; and ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This cause is before the Court on the following:
3. Defendant, Orange County's Dispositive Motion for Final Summary Judgment as to Orange County (Doc. 107), filed February 28, 2014;
4. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant City of Ocoee's Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Doc. 128), filed March 21, 2014;
5. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Jerry Morgan Lewis' Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Doc. 129), filed March 21, 2014;
6. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Orange County's Dispositive Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Doc. 133), filed March 21, 2014;
9. Defendant Orange County's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Orange County's Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 152), filed April 4, 2014.
Upon consideration, the Court finds that the motions are due to be granted.1
On September 8, 2012, Defendant Jerry Morgan Lewis, an Ocoee police officer, drove to Plaintiffs' house to return a family member's misplaced identification card. (Doc. 141-1, p. 95.) He was armed with a gun, as well as a Taser and other less lethal weapons. (Id. at 32, 35.)
When he arrived at the house, Lewis knocked on the front door and then stepped back onto the lawn. (Id. at 99-101, 126-27.) He heard barking, and after a moment Plaintiff Jackie Schutt opened the door. (Id. at 100, 104, 126-27.) When she did, Plaintiffs' two American Boxers—Ali and Laila—exited the house. (Id. at 100; Doc. 105-3, p. 4; Doc. 142-8, ¶ 5.) Jackie Schutt called the dogs back, but only Ali listened; Laila ran towards Lewis. (Doc. 141-4, pp. 15-20; Doc. 142-7, ¶ 7.) Lewis stepped back andunholstered his gun. (Doc. 142-7, ¶¶ 9-10.) Jackie Schutt grabbed Laila's hind legs, stopping the dog's advance. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9; Doc. 141-4, pp. 20-24.) Nevertheless, Lewis shot Laila three times, killing her. (Doc. 142-7, ¶ 10; Doc. 142-8, ¶¶ 6, 8-9; Doc. 140-3.) The entire incident lasted approximately four seconds. (See Doc. 141-2, p. 202.)
After the incident, Lewis called his supervisor and reported that he had shot and killed a dog. (Doc. 141-1, p. 14.) Although Laila had never actually made contact with Lewis during the incident3 (Doc. 142-7, ¶ 11; Doc. 142-8, ¶ 7), when the supervisor arrived, Lewis told him that Laila had bitten him. (Doc. 142-1, pp. 23-24.) The supervisor ordered Lewis go get medical treatment and then called Orange County Animal Services ("OCAS") to retrieve Laila's body for rabies testing. (See id. at 25-33.)
When the OCAS investigator arrived, Lewis' supervisor informed the investigator that Laila had been shot and killed during an attack on an officer. (Doc. 142-6, p. 41.) Based on this information, the OCAS investigator decided to obtain Laila's vaccination records from Jackie Schutt, photograph the scene, and take Laila's body to OCAS headquarters. (Id.) There, OCAS officials packaged the portions of Laila's body that were needed for rabies testing, then incinerated the remains. (Doc. 142-6, pp. 56, 65.) The next day, Jackie Schutt called OCAS and asked for Laila's body. (Doc. 141-5, p. 10.) A representative informed her of the incineration and offered her Laila's ashes, but she declined when she learned that Laila's remains had been incinerated alongside those of other animals, and thus the ashes would be mixed. (Id. at 10-11.)
Thereafter, Plaintiffs brought this action against Lewis, the City of Ocoee, andOrange County. (Doc. 48.) Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants violated their constitutional rights and committed several tortious acts by shooting Laila and then destroying her remains. (See id.) Defendants each moved for summary judgment on the claims against them. (Docs. 104, 105, 107.) Plaintiffs opposed. (Docs. 129, 130, 133.) Defendants replied. (Docs. 150, 151, 152.) This matter is ripe for the Court's adjudication.
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Materiality of the facts depends on the substantive law applicable to the case. See id. To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must "go beyond the pleadings, and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists." Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The Court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, see Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 759 (11th Cir. 2006), but may disregard assertions of fact that are "blatantly contradicted" by record evidence, see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
Based on Laila's shooting, Plaintiffs bring against Officer Lewis an unreasonable seizure claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and several tort claims under Florida law. (Doc. 48,¶¶ 61-69, 87-117, 165-72.) Lewis moves for summary judgment on all of those claims, arguing that his decision to shoot Laila was reasonable under the circumstances and was correspondingly non-tortious. (Doc. 105, pp. 6-11, 19-23.) The Court agrees.
With respect to the § 1983 claim, aggrieved parties may bring an action for damages against any person who, while acting under color of state law, deprives them of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In this case, Plaintiffs allege that by shooting and killing their pet dog Laila, Lewis deprived them of their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. (Doc. 48, ¶¶ 61-69.) Lewis concedes that his actions amounted to a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes,4 but argues that the seizure was reasonable under the circumstances. (Doc. 105, pp. 6-11.)
The reasonableness of a seizure is determined by balancing "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983). The touchstone for reasonableness in dog-shooting cases is typically officer safety. See Carroll v. Cnty. of Monroe, 712 F.3d 649, 652 (2d Cir. 2013). While the shooting of a pet dog is "a severe intrusion given the emotional attachment between a dog and an owner," ensuring officer safety is a "particularly significant governmental interest." Id. When officer safety is at issue, "the 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Grahamv. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); see also Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 205 (4th Cir. 2003) (). Importantly, "[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
Here, on Plaintiffs' best construction of the facts and with all reasonable inferences drawn in their favor, the Court finds that Lewis' actions were objectively reasonable. It is undisputed that when Laila ran past Jackie Schutt and into the yard, Lewis faced a rapidly approaching dog that was large, uncollared, and noncompliant with its owner's commands. (Doc. 105-3, p. 4; Doc. 141-1, p. 100; Doc. 141-4, pp. 15-20; Doc. 142-7, ¶ 7.) With only seconds to respond, Lewis chose to shoot Laila, and the Court cannot say that decision was unreasonable under the circumstances. See Esterson v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 09-60280-CIV, 2010 WL 4614725, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2010) ().
The facts that Lewis had less lethal means of force available and that Jackie Schutt was able to get ahold of Laila's hind legs before she reached Lewis do not change the Court's conclusion. While in retrospect, trusting Jackie to keep Laila at bay or attempting to use less lethal force may have been preferable to shooting Laila, an officer's response need not be the best possible reaction under the circumstances to be considered reasonable. See Altman, 330 F.3d at 207. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed under similar circumstances, "nonlethal force may have beensuccessful, but, tellingly, it may not have been." Id. The Fourth Amendment reasonableness calculus permits officers some leeway in "tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving" situations, and in this case, Lewis acted within the bounds of his discretion.5 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Accordingly, because the seizure here was reasonable under the circumstances, there was no Fourth Amendment violation, and Lewis is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' §...
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