Schwartz v. Crosson

• Decision Date: 21 February 1991
• Citation: 566 N.Y.S.2d 679,165 A.D.2d 147
• Parties: In the Matter of Michael SCHWARTZ, Respondent, v. Matthew T. CROSSON, as Chief Administrator of the Courts, et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 679

566 N.Y.S.2d 679

165 A.D.2d 147

In the Matter of Michael SCHWARTZ, Respondent, v. Matthew T. CROSSON, as Chief Administrator of the Courts, et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

Feb. 21, 1991.

Barbara Zahler-Gringer, Michael Colodner and John Eiseman, New York City, for Matthew T. Crosson, appellant.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Frank K. Walsh and Peter G. Crary, of counsel), Albany, for Edward V. Regan, appellant.

Barton W. Bloom, Middletown, for respondent.

Before WEISS, J.P., and MIKOLL, LEVINE, MERCURE and HARVEY, JJ.

HARVEY, Justice.

Petitioner, a State employee, was appointed as a full-time Principal Law Clerk at a salary grade 31, step 1 in February 1982. Petitioner was incremented to grade 31, step 2 in April 1983. In January 1984, petitioner was appointed as a part-time Law Clerk in a salary grade 24, step 2. Petitioner held the position of part-time Law Clerk until his resignation in April 1984. In July 1985, petitioner was again appointed as a part-time Law Clerk at a salary grade 24 but he was paid at step 1, the hiring rate, because the annual salary increments earned in his previous service could not be credited because he had been terminated for more than one year (see, Judiciary Law § 37[3][e]; 22 NYCRR 25.28[d]. Petitioner remained in this position earning annual increments until December 1988 when his salary was at grade 24, step 3.

At that time, petitioner was offered a position as a full-time Principal Law Clerk which would require petitioner to give up his private law practice. In a letter dated December 13, 1988, the executive assistant to the Administrative Judge of the Ninth Judicial District stated that, based upon petitioner's years of service, petitioner's new position would be at salary grade 31, step 6, at an annual salary of $70,398. In reliance upon this representation, petitioner accepted the position. He was then informed that he was to be paid at the hiring rate of a salary grade 31. A representative of respondent Chief Administrator of the Courts thereafter adjusted petitioner's salary to grade 31, step 4 (with a $64,233 salary) due to reinstatement of his former position at grade 31, step 2 and due to statutory amendments providing two additional annual increments.

Petitioner subsequently commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge the determination of his appropriate salary grade. According to petitioner, respondents should be estopped from denying the original determination of petitioner's salary or that respondents improperly failed to credit petitioner with the annual increments earned at the salary grade 24. Respondents countered that the original representation placing him at grade 31, step 6 was a mistake which had to be corrected in accordance with the applicable statutes and regulations. Without reaching the merits of respondents' defenses, Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that respondents were estopped from raising a defense due to petitioner's detrimental reliance on their original representation. This appeal by respondents followed.

Initially, we must disagree with Supreme Court that the doctrine of estoppel is applicable. We so hold despite petitioner's detrimental reliance upon the original representation that his salary would be $70,398. It is well settled that estoppel is generally not available against the State when it acts in a governmental capacity (see, New York State Health Facilities Assn. v. Axelrod, 154 A.D.2d 10, 14, 551 N.Y.S.2d 663; see also, Matter of E.F.S. Ventures Corp. v. Foster, 71 N.Y.2d 359, 368-370, 526 N.Y.S.2d 56, 520 N.E.2d 1345; Matter of Parkview Assocs. v. City of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 274, 279, 525 N.Y.S.2d 176, 519 N.E.2d 1372). Although an exception to the general rule exists in " 'unusual factual situations' to prevent injustice" (Matter of E.F.S. Ventures Corp. v. Foster, supra, 71 N.Y.2d at 369, 526 N.Y.S.2d 56, 520 N.E.2d 1345), it is our view that the present facts do not fall within such an exception. The possibility of one State employee misinforming another prospective State employee about an anticipated salary, while unfortunate, is not so "highly unusual" that the general rule against estoppel should be ignored. Although application of the general rule in this instance may work a hardship to this particular petitioner, it must be remembered that there are important policy considerations underlying the rule against estoppel in cases such as this and it is generally better for an individual to suffer from governmental mistakes rather than to allow the institution of rules and practices which might eventually result in fraud to the public (see, id., at 370, 526 N.Y.S.2d 56, 520 N.E.2d 1345). While no one suggests here that this particular petitioner is undeserving of the higher salary, it is easy to foresee a situation where a less qualified individual would demand an undeserved salary simply because an official mistakenly promised one.

We now turn to the merits and conclude that respo...