Schwartz v. Hubbard
| Decision Date | 28 January 1947 |
| Docket Number | 32359. |
| Citation | 177 P.2d 117,198 Okla. 194,1947 OK 27 |
| Parties | SCHWARTZ et al. v. HUBBARD. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; A. P. Van Meter, Judge.
Action by John C. Hubbard against E. G. Schwartz and others to obtain a declaration that a restriction contract covering property in north half of a block was binding and to enjoin the defendants from leasing or selling property in violation of the contract. Judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendants appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. If no radical change has occurred in the condition and use of property covered by a restriction contract excluding negroes from restricted area, the fact there have been changes in the territory immediately surrounding the restricted area ordinarily will not be sufficient to cause a court of equity to refuse to enforce the restriction contract.
2. In an equity case the Supreme Court will examine the record and weigh the evidence, but will not reverse the judgment unless clearly against the weight of the evidence.
Gilliland Ogden, Withington, Shirk & Vaught, of Oklahoma City, for plaintiffs in error.
Howell & Deupree and Richard R. Linn, all of Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court of Oklahoma County upholding the validity of a property owner's agreement restricting the north half of Block 8, Jordan Place Addition to Oklahoma City against the sale to, or occupancy by, those of negro blood.
Plaintiff's action was based upon a contract entered into in 1941 by all property owners in the north half of said block, covering 17 lots, of which plaintiff owned one and three fourths lots. The contract declared for its purpose the maintenance of property values in that block for the mutual benefit of all and provided that any deed, lease or conveyance in violation of the agreement would be void and could be set aside upon petition of one or more interested parties, the contract to constitute a mutual covenant running with the land.
The record reflects that a former restriction contract covering all of Block 8 had been invalidated, and one negro had purchased property in the south half of this block. The owners in the north half of the block abandoned their efforts as to the entire block and concentrated their efforts on the north half only. The new contract was executed by all property owners in the north half of said block and was duly recorded March 17 1941; except as to W. B. and Hannah Hardee, who brought themselves under the provisions thereof by separate instrument recorded March 17, 1943.
In January 1944, most of the property owners in the north half of block 8 entered into and filed for record a 'Release of Restriction,' wherein they recited the filing of the original contract, but stated they had mutually agreed that it was for their best interests, because of changed conditions, to release their property from such restrictions. Plaintiff neither signed nor acquiesced in the execution of this instrument.
Plaintiff's petition stated three causes of action based upon the original restriction contract. The first sale of property covered by the contract by defendants Schwartz and wife to defendants Hall and wife, persons of negro blood; and asked that the trial court decree the contract to be binding, cancel and set aside the deeds, and enjoin defendants from further leasing or selling of their property in the block to persons of the negro race. The second cause of action asserted a further violation by defendants Schwartz in that they had either rented or sold property covered by the restriction contract to negroes, and asked that such persons be enjoined from occupancy and defendants Schwartz be enjoined from further renting or selling to such persons.
The third cause of action alleged the restriction to be of benefit and enforcement thereof necessary, that the purported release of restrictions injured plaintiff by clouding the effect and validity of the restriction contract, and asked the trial court to declare same a binding contract running with the land, cancel and set aside the purported release, and enjoin all defendants from further lease or sale of property to negroes.
By answer defendants admitted execution of the restriction contract but alleged same was no longer of value in that since execution thereof the property involved in the contract had changed by reason of having become surrounded by negro property owners, so that it had become impractical to carry out the original intention and purpose of the contract. Defendants alleged the provisions of the contract had been broken down and were no longer of value, and for this reason asked that the restriction contract be declared invalid and cancelled, and held to be a cloud upon the title of the defendants Hall and wife (negroes who had purchased from Schwartz').
The record reflects that prior to execution of the contract now before us two lots in the south half of Block 8 were owned by a negro; two lots in the 1400 block on East 8th Street, close to the north half of block 8, and four lost in the 1600 block on East 8th Street were occupied by negroes. Since execution of the contract in question the remainder of the south half of block 8 has been bought up by negroes, as has the remainder of block 7, which is immediately to the east of the north half of block 8. Thus it may be seen that the north half of block 8 is surrounded to the east, southeast, south and southwest by negro occupants.
The evidence was directed toward showing that the property had a greater value because of the restriction contract than it would have were the restriction held invalid; and that the restriction made the property desirable for white occupancy, and if the restriction was upheld and a definite border line established the value of the property would be maintained.
Numerous defendants testified that proximity of the negro population to the area had materially lessened the rental or sale value of their property. Some of these witnesses testified the value of the property, insofar as being of value to white purchasers, was totally destroyed.
In rendering judgment for plaintiff the trial court found the original contract to be a valid contract running with the land; the attempted release filed by defendants was set aside and cancelled of record. The attempted conveyance from defendants Schwartz and wife to the Halls was cancelled and set aside and title revested in grantors; and perpetually restrained and enjoined defendants from selling, leasing or disposing of any of the property covered by the contract to negroes; and ordered negro defendants to vacate premises they occupied and enjoined them from any further occupancy in the area, and provided for further appropriate action to compel compliance with the court's judgment.
Three propositions are urged for reversal of this judgment, the first of these being the contention that restrictions and prohibitions of the use of real property are not favored in the law and the rule of construction applicable to such covenants is one of strictness. That this is a fundamental principle of the law of real property is unquestioned. Christie v. Lyons, 173 Okl. 158, 47 P.2d 128; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Drauver, 183 Okl. 579, 83 P.2d 840, 119 A.L.R. 1112. So firmly settled is this rule of construction that the proposition requires no discussion, other than to direct attention to our holding in Vaughn v. Lyon, 122 Okl. 179, 252 P. 1088, which was reaffirmed in Lyons v. Wallen, 191 Okl. 567, 133 P.2d...
To continue reading
Request your trial