Schwartz v. Schwartz
| Decision Date | 06 June 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 21010,21010 |
| Parties | , 60 USLW 2075 Laura SCHWARTZ, Appellant, v. Christopher SCHWARTZ, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Cherry & Bailus, Las Vegas, for appellant.
Joseph W. Houston, II, Las Vegas, for respondent.
Appellant Laura Schwartz appeals the granting of respondent Christopher Schwartz' motion in a divorce proceeding to allow the custodial father to move with the couple's two small children to Pottsville, Pennsylvania, where Christopher's mother and family are located. After a two-day trial, the district court granted Christopher's motion and incorporated its ruling into the final divorce decree.
Laura and Christopher were married on November 20, 1981. In 1988, serious marital problems developed between the couple. As a result, Laura was twice hospitalized for depression; she also attempted suicide with an overdose of antidepressants. Christopher filed for divorce in November of 1988. At that time, he was awarded primary custody of their children, Debra and William ("Billy").
Prior to the time Christopher filed for divorce, Laura remained in the couple's Las Vegas home, caring for the two children. Christopher had been employed for three years as a casino floorman where he earned an annual salary of $35,000. After the divorce, it appears that Laura worked as a cocktail waitress where she earned a minimum wage plus tips.
On three separate occasions during the course of custody proceedings, Laura accused Christopher or, equivocatingly, the husband of a babysitter, of sexually abusing Billy. As a result, Billy was placed in protective custody and numerous interviews by therapists and physicians followed. On the third round of accusations, state officials ordered lie detector tests. The parties stipulated that the test results could be used in court. Christopher's test showed no deception. 1 The polygraph examiner's evaluation of Laura's test indicated deception. The juvenile court subsequently found that Laura had lied in her reports of child abuse. As a result of these false allegations, the domestic relations referee recommended that Laura have supervised visitation rights.
In support of his motion for authorization to remove the children from this jurisdiction, Christopher stated that his mother owns a four-bedroom house in Pennsylvania which would accommodate a bedroom for each child. The grandmother, who is seventy-three years old, has an established relationship with the children. Christopher also testified that his mother is one of eleven children and that there would be an extended family of aunts and uncles within driving or walking distance in the event of a family emergency. In addition, Christopher is an only child and expects to some day inherit his mother's home.
In this appeal, we are asked in a case of first impression to interpret NRS 125A.350, Nevada's "anti-removal" statute. 2 The overall purpose of such a statute is to preserve the rights and familial relationship of the noncustodial parent with respect to his or her child. See Holder v. Polanski, 111 N.J. 344, 544 A.2d 852, 855 (1988) (citations omitted). As one court has stated, "it is 'in the best interests of a child to have a healthy and close relationship with both parents, as well as other family members.' " In re Marriage of Kutinac, 182 Ill.App.3d 377, 131 Ill.Dec. 487, 490, 538 N.E.2d 862, 865 (1989) (citing In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill.2d 316, 116 Ill.Dec. 220, 224, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1045 (1988)). The proper calculus involves a balancing between "the custodial parent's interest in freedom of movement as qualified by his or her custodial obligation, the State's interest in protecting the best interests of the child, and the competing interests of the noncustodial parent." Holder, 544 A.2d at 855.
Removal of minor children from Nevada by the custodial parent is a separate and distinct issue from the custody of the children. However, some of the same factual and policy considerations may overlap. In custody matters, the polestar for judicial decision is the best interests of the child. See NRS 125.480. In removing a child from the jurisdiction where the child currently lives, the best interests of the child should also be the paramount judicial concern. See In re Marriage of Kutinac, 182 Ill.App.3d 377, 131 Ill.Dec. 487, 490, 538 N.E.2d 862, 865 (1989); Ducheneaux v. Ducheneaux, 427 N.W.2d 122, 123 (S.D.1988); D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J.Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27, 29 (Ch.Div.1976). Determination of the best interests of a child in the removal context necessarily involves a fact-specific inquiry and cannot be reduced to a rigid "bright-line" test. See In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill.2d 316, 116 Ill.Dec. 220, 224, 518 N.E.2d 1041, 1045 (1988) (citations omitted); Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 491 A.2d 606, 614-15 (1984).
Although this court has never established guidelines for the removal of children from this state, we are persuaded that the criteria adopted by D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J.Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (Ch.Div.1976), one of the leading cases in this area, is sound. Therefore, in determining the issue of removal, the court must first find whether the custodial parent has demonstrated that an actual advantage will be realized by both the children and the custodial parent in moving to a location so far removed from the current residence that weekly visitation by the noncustodial parent is virtually precluded.
If the custodial parent satisfies the threshold requirement set forth above, then the court must weigh the following additional factors and their impact on all members of the family, including the extent to which the compelling interests of each member of the family are accommodated: (1) the extent to which the move is likely to improve the quality of life for both the children and the custodial parent; (2) whether the custodial parent's motives are honorable, and not designed to frustrate or defeat visitation rights accorded to the noncustodial parent; (3) whether, if permission to remove is granted, the custodial parent will comply with any substitute visitation orders issued by the court; (4) whether the noncustodian's motives are honorable in resisting the motion for permission to remove, or to what extent, if any, the opposition is intended to secure a financial advantage in the form of ongoing support obligations or otherwise; (5) whether, if removal is allowed, there will be a realistic opportunity for the noncustodial parent to maintain a visitation schedule that will adequately foster and preserve the parental relationship with the noncustodial parent.
In weighing and balancing the above factors, the court will, of course, have to consider any number of sub-factors that may assist the court in reaching an appropriate decision. For example, in determining whether, and the extent to which the move will likely improve the quality of life for the children and the custodial parent, the court may require evidence concerning such matters as: (1) whether positive family care and support, including that of the extended family, will be enhanced; (2) whether housing and environmental living conditions will be improved; (3) whether educational advantages for the children will result; (4) whether the custodial parent's employment and income will improve; (5) whether special needs of a child, medical or otherwise, will be better served; and (6) whether, in the child's opinion, circumstances and relationships will be improved. The foregoing list is by no means exhaustive, and is only illustrative of the many sub-factors that the court may, in the exercise of good common sense, feel the need to pursue prior to ruling on the issue of removal. In certain instances, the court may even conclude that a professional opinion or evaluation by a psychiatrist or psychologist will be desirable in assessing the impact of the move on a child.
Finally, as stated in D'Onofrio, "[t]he court should not insist that the advantages of the move be sacrificed and the opportunity for a better and more comfortable life style for the mother [custodial parent] and children be forfeited solely to maintain weekly visitation by the father [noncustodial parent] where reasonable alternative visitation is available and where the advantages of the move are substantial." D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d at 30.
In the course of the proceedings below, the district court in effect carefully sought to apply the D'Onofrio guidelines we have adopted for this jurisdiction. As a result, the court found that the children would benefit from "a large and helpful extended family." D'Onofrio, 365 A.2d at 32. In addition, the father would be spared approximately $440 in child care expenses which could be used to benefit the children more directly. Christopher also stated that he and the children would be able to live with his mother rent-free, thereby increasing the amount of funds available for the children's needs. 3
The judge rightly determined that it was in the best interests of the children not to be shuttled back and forth between paid...
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