Schweihs v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 30 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:18-cv-140 |
| Parties | NICOLE SCHWEIHS, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the court on the Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 32] filed by the defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, on October 29, 2019. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
This matter arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on August 17, 2016. The plaintiff, Nicole Schweihs, was a passenger in a vehicle being driven by Dylan Sherman, a State Farm insured. Sherman attempted to make a left turn onto Stone Avenue in Portage, Indiana, when another motorist, Anthony Ditola, proceeded through the intersection and the two vehicles collided. Schweihs suffered injuries as a result of the accident and sued both Sherman and Ditola for negligence.
At the time of the accident, Schweihs did not have any personal auto insurance in her own name. Ditola was insured by a policy of insurance issued by Progressive Insurance Company. Progressive paid Schweihs the liability limits of $25,000 in full settlement of her claim against Ditola.
Sherman owned the vehicle he was operating. He was insured under a policy of insurance issued by State Farm to his father, Robert Sherman. The Policy provided for underinsured motor vehicle coverage with limits up to $100,000 and liability coverage with limits up to $100,000. At the time of the accident, Sherman and Schweihs were dating and lived together at Robert Sherman's home. They are now married. Schweihs recovered $100,000 in coverage under Sherman's liability policy.
Schweihs has brought this action against State Farm for breach of contract. Schweihs contends that State Farm breached its contract by failing to pay underinsured motorist benefits as required by the Policy. State Farm has filed the instant motion arguing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the undisputed facts show it did not breach its contract with Schweihs. Schweihs filed a response in opposition on December 31, 2019, and State Farm filed a reply on January 13, 2020.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper only if it is demonstrated that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Garofalo v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 754 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 2014); Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2012); Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2009). A fact is material if it is outcome determinative under applicable law. The burden is upon the moving party to establish that no material facts are in genuine dispute, and any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1610, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142,155 (1970); Stephens, 569 F.3d at 786. When the movant has met its burden, the opposing party cannot rely solely on the allegations in the pleadings but must "point to evidence that can be put in admissible form at trial, and that, if believed by the fact-finder, could support judgment in his favor." Marr v. Bank of America, N.A., 662 F.3d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Steen v. Myers
, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) (). The non-moving party cannot rely on conclusory allegations. Smith v. Shawnee Library System, 60 F.3d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 1995). Failure to prove an essential element of the alleged activity will render other facts immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Filippo v. Lee Publications, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 969, 972 (N.D. Ind. 2007) ().
In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 212 (1986); McDowell v. Vill. of Lansing, 763 F.3d 762, 764, 765 (7th Cir. 2014). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must determine whether the evidence presented by the party opposed to the summary judgment is such that a reasonable jury might find in favor of that party after a trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Cung Hnin v. Toa, LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).
State Farm has argued that the undisputed evidence shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and therefore it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. State Farmcontends that it did not breach its contract with Schweihs by failing to pay her benefits under the underinsured motor vehicle provision of Sherman's policy. State Farm has indicated that under the Policy, Schweihs' available underinsured motorist benefits have been reduced to $0. However, Schweihs claims that State Farm's policy is internally inconsistent concerning its definition of an "underinsured vehicle," the "insuring agreement," the "limits" of the "underinsured motor vehicle coverage," and the operation of the "nonduplication" provision. She asserts that the inconsistency creates irreconcilable ambiguities within the Policy.
In Indiana, "[t]he interpretation of an insurance policy is primarily a question of law for the court, and it is therefore a question which is particularly suited for summary judgment." Wagner v. Yates, 912 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Ind. 2009) (citation omitted). Indiana courts interpret an insurance contract under the same rules of construction as other contracts. Westfield Cos. v. Knapp, 804 N.E.2d 1270, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted). Courts "interpret an insurance policy with the goal of ascertaining and enforcing the parties' intent as revealed by the insurance contract." Westfield Cos., 804 N.E.2d at 1274.
The relevant portions of the Policy provide as follows:
We will pay compensatory damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or driver of an underinsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be:
We will pay only if the full amount of all available limits of all bodily injury liability bonds, policies, and self-insurance plans that apply to the insured's bodily injury have been used up by payments or judgments or settlements, or have been offered to the insured in writing.
Underinsured motorist coverage is mandatory absent an express waiver. United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. DePrizio, 705 N.E.2d 455 (Ind. 1999). Underinsured motorist coverage limits must at least equal the limits of liability specified in the bodily injury liability provisions of an insured'spolicy, unless such coverage has been rejected in writing. Ind. Code § 27-7-5-2. However, underinsured motorist coverage must be made available in limits of not less than $50,000. Ind. Code § 27-7-5-2. In order to recover underinsured motorist coverage, an insured "must establish that the tortfeasor was answerable in negligence to him." Sullivan v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 605 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Ind. 1992). As a condition precedent to underinsured coverage, the insured must establish that the amount received from the tortfeasor's policy is less than the per-person limits for the insured's underinsured motor vehicle coverage. Lakes v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 964 N.E.2d 796, 805 (Ind. 2012).
It is undisputed that Schweihs is an "insured" under the Policy. It is also undisputed that Ditola is an underinsured motorist, given that his liability policy limits totaled $25,000, while the Policy's underinsured motor vehicle coverage limits were $100,000 per person. Furthermore, it is undisputed that Schweihs was "legally entitled to recover" damages from Ditola based upon her allegations that he was negligent and that she sustained injuries as a result of the accident.
Schweihs recovered $25,000 from her settlement with Ditola, his liability policy limits, and $100,000 from Sherman under the liability portion of the Policy. Schweihs claims that as an insured under the Policy, she is...
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