Schweinle v. State

• Decision Date: 07 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 390-95,390-95
• Citation: 915 S.W.2d 17
• Parties: Martin Thomas SCHWEINLE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 17

915 S.W.2d 17

Martin Thomas SCHWEINLE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 390-95.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas,

En Banc.

Feb. 7, 1996.

Robert G. Turner, Houston, for appellant.

Alan Curry, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, Robert A. Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

PER CURIAM.

A jury convicted appellant of aggravated kidnapping and assessed his punishment at confinement for fifteen years in the penitentiary. The conviction was affirmed. Schweinle v. State, 893 S.W.2d 708 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1995). We granted discretionary review to determine whether evidence of extraneous offenses and expert testimony regarding "battered woman syndrome" was improperly admitted in the guilt-innocence phase, and whether a lesser included offense was raised by the evidence. Due to our disposition of the latter issue, which is raised in ground four of appellant's petition, we will not address grounds one, two and three and will dismiss them without prejudice.

Appellant and the complainant became engaged after a brief courtship, and the complainant, who had formerly lived with her parents, moved into appellant's house. However, the couple began arguing, and the complainant moved back to her parents' house, although she would occasionally spend the night with appellant. On October 23, 1991, they had planned that appellant would pick up some food for dinner, and the complainant would meet appellant at his father's liquor store, where appellant worked. The complainant was alone at her parents' house changing clothes when she heard a door slam. Appellant came into the bedroom, enraged because the complainant had not met him at the liquor store as planned. The complainant testified appellant told her she was coming with him, that he had some food in the car and she was going to eat every bite of it. He grabbed her by the arm, dragged her down the hall and slapped her. The complainant told appellant she did not want to go with him, but appellant insisted she was coming with him and walked her to the truck. As appellant was driving, he smeared a steak sandwich in the complainant's face and pointed a gun at her, telling her he would shoot her if she tried to escape. Appellant drove the truck to a subdivision near his house in which roads had been built but no houses constructed. There, he threw another sandwich at her and hit her in the stomach with his fist. He then drove to his house, where he continued to beat her with a belt and a rolled-up newspaper covered with duct tape. The next morning appellant took the complainant to her parents' house.

In ground four, appellant contends the Court of Appeals erred by holding that the lesser included offense of false imprisonment was not raised by the evidence. Whether a charge on a lesser included offense is required is determined by a two-pronged test. First, we must determine whether the offense constitutes a lesser included offense. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.09 provides that an offense is a lesser included offense if, inter alia: "it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged." Second, the lesser included offense must be raised by the evidence at trial. In other words, there must be some evidence which would permit a rational jury to find that if guilty, the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense. Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666 (Tex.Cr.App.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 919, 114 S.Ct. 313, 126 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993), citing Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Anything more than a scintilla of evidence from any source is sufficient to entitle a defendant to submission of the issue. Bignall v. State, 887 S.W.2d 21 (Tex.Cr.App.1994).

Under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 20.03, a person commits the offense of kidnapping if he intentionally or knowingly abducts another. ¹ " 'Abduct' means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by: (A) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found; or (B) using or threatening to use deadly force." " 'Restrain' means to restrict a person's movements without consent, so as to interfere substantially with his liberty, by moving him from one place to another or by confining him. Restraint is 'without consent' if it is accomplished by force, intimidation, or deception...." V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 20.01.

A person commits the offense of false imprisonment if he "intentionally or knowingly restrains another person." V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 20.02. Kidnapping is accomplished by abduction, which includes restraint, but false imprisonment is committed by restraint only. Thus, false imprisonment is a lesser included offense of kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping.

The next step of the analysis is to determine whether there was evidence that if guilty, appellant was guilty only of restraining the complainant, without intending to prevent her liberation by either secreting or holding her in a place where she was not likely to be found or using or threatening to use deadly force. ² The Court of Appeals held appellant was required to rebut or negate both theories of abduction which could have occurred anytime during the ongoing offense. It noted that appellant argued he needed only to refute that he pointed the gun at the complainant in the truck and that he kept her at his house. It held that keeping the complainant isolated at the undeveloped subdivision constituted restraint in a place where she was not likely to be found. It determined that the only evidence which refuted this theory was appellant's testimony that the complainant freely chose to go with him and stayed in the truck of her own free will. However, it reasoned that because this evidence refuted both abduction and restraint, appellant failed to show if guilty, he was guilty of only the lesser included offense. Schweinle, 893 S.W.2d at 715.

The Court of Appeals' analysis is flawed in two respects. First, the Court of Appeals determined that the subdivision where appellant stopped his truck to throw more food on the complainant and beat her was a place where she was not likely to be found, without considering whether a rational jury could have reached the opposite conclusion under the evidence. In Saunders v. State, 840 S.W.2d 390 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), this Court held that a lesser included offense may be raised if evidence either affirmatively refutes or negates an element establishing the greater offense, or the evidence on the issue is subject to two different interpretations, and one of the interpretations negates or rebuts an element of the greater. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals did not refer to any facts in the record which demonstrated that the subdivision was or was not a place where the complainant was not likely to be found.

Appellant testified that the complainant's parents lived on Woodforest, which was a main thoroughfare, and the subdivision where appellant lived was off Woodforest, two to three minutes away from the complainant's parents' house. Appellant described the area where he stopped his truck as a few blocks from his house and in his neighborhood. He testified he turned right off of Woodforest going into his neighborhood, and "as we got around the corner there, I had to make another left to cut down to go to my house." He testified the area where he stopped was very small, "two or three streets there, it's all cleaned out." He further explained, "It's developed, there is just no houses there ... It's not really what I would call secluded." The complainant testified that the area was "not very far off Woodforest, but it's just a little--just a little bit secluded. There is like some trees and it's right by the school." Pictures of this area were admitted into evidence. From this evidence, a rational jury could have believed that the street where appellant stopped his truck was not a place where the complainant was not likely to be found.

Secondly, by holding that appellant did not raise the lesser included offense because his testimony refuted both the greater and lesser offenses, the Court of Appeals erred under Bignall. In that case, this Court held that the defendant was entitled to submission of the lesser included offense of theft based on defense testimony that no one had a gun, despite his evidence showing he was not guilty of any offense. This Court held that a rational jury could have believed that part of the State's evidence that Bignall was involved in the theft, and that part of Bignall's evidence that no one had a gun, and concluded that appellant was guilty only of theft. We pointed out that the defendant's denial of committing any offense does not automatically foreclose submission of a lesser included offense. Bignall, 887 S.W.2d at 24.

Applying those principles to this case, a rational jury could have believed the complainant's testimony that she did not go freely with appellant. Appellant testified that he did not threaten to shoot the complainant, did not touch the gun during the drive from her parents' house to his and did not point the gun at her at any time. He admitted that the gun was lying on the seat of his truck during the offense, but explained that he habitually carried the gun in his truck either on the seat next to him or on the floor next to the gearshift. He testified that when they reached his house, he retrieved the gun from the truck, took it inside as he always did, and placed it on his pinball machine where he often kept it. The complainant testified that she knew appellant kept a gun in his truck, and that it was not unusual for it to be lying on the seat. From this evidence, a rational jury could have found that despite the presence of a gun on the seat, appellant did not use or threaten to use deadly force to prevent the complainant's liberation. ³

Similarly, the...