Schweitzer v. American Nat. Red Cross
| Decision Date | 05 March 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. S-97-1055,S-97-1055 |
| Citation | 256 Neb. 350,591 N.W.2d 524 |
| Parties | Rhonda SCHWEITZER, appellant, v. AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS and Sesostris Shrine Temple, appellees. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences which may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing an order of summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.
3. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Subject matter jurisdiction is a court's power to hear and determine a case in the general class or category to which the proceedings in question belong and to deal with the general subject involved in the action before the court and the particular question which it assumes to determine.
4. Pleadings: Waiver. A judicial admission constitutes a waiver of all controversies so far as an adverse party desires to take advantage of it, and therefore it is a limitation of the issues.
5. Jurisdiction: Courts: Legislature. The Legislature cannot limit or control the jurisdiction of a district court.
6. Jurisdiction: Constitutional Law: Courts: Legislature. Where the Nebraska Constitution does not fix the jurisdiction of any class or grade of courts, the jurisdiction and powers of any such class may be regulated by the Legislature.
7. Courts: Statutes. A statutorily created court has only such authority as has been conferred upon it by statute, and its power cannot extend beyond that expressed in the statute.
Rod Rehm, Lincoln, for appellant.
Carl J. Sjulin and Daniel E. Klaus, of Rembolt Ludtke & Berger, Lincoln, for appellee Red Cross.
William L. Tannehill and Corey L. Stull, of Knudsen, Berkheimer, Richardson, Endacott & Routh, Lincoln, for appellee Shrine Temple.
Rhonda Schweitzer appeals an order of the district court for Lancaster County, in which the district court concluded that it was without jurisdiction to entertain Schweitzer's claim for damages and entered summary judgment in favor of the American National Red Cross (Red Cross) and Sesostris Shrine Temple (Shrine Temple) and dismissed Schweitzer's petition. We reverse, and remand for further proceedings.
Schweitzer injured her right wrist when she fell during a performance of the Shrine circus at Pershing Municipal Auditorium in Lincoln on March 19, 1995. Schweitzer was present at the circus with the Red Cross to provide emergency health services to circus patrons. Schweitzer slipped as she went up a flight of stairs to assist a circus patron who was having a seizure.
Schweitzer filed a petition in the district court for Lancaster County seeking damages against Red Cross and Shrine Temple on September 10, 1996. In paragraph 4 of her petition, Schweitzer alleged that Red Cross was her "direct employer." In paragraph 7 she alleged, inter alia, that she was a "statutory employee" of Shrine Temple "pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-116 [Reissue 1998]." Chapter 48 contains Nebraska's workers' compensation statutes, which provide for the handling of claims by "employees" for work-related injuries. Both Red Cross and Shrine Temple denied that Schweitzer was an employee of their organizations. Both Red The trial court overruled the demurrers which Red Cross and Shrine Temple filed to Schweitzer's petition. In their respective answers, both Red Cross and Shrine Temple denied, inter alia, Schweitzer's allegation that they failed to carry workers' compensation insurance to cover her. Red Cross and Shrine Temple both affirmatively alleged that the district court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate Schweitzer's claims.
Cross and Shrine Temple alleged Schweitzer was a volunteer. Schweitzer sought an award of special damages of $10,000 for medical expenses, compensation in an unspecified amount for lost wages and lost earning capacity, and an award of general damages for physical pain and mental suffering. Schweitzer alleged that she was entitled to damages generally because the Red Cross and Shrine Temple failed to provide her with a safe workplace. In connection with this allegation, she specified five failures, such as failure to provide adequate lighting. Schweitzer alleged that despite her "employee" status, neither Red Cross nor Shrine Temple "possessed a policy of workers' compensation insurance that was in effect to provide coverage for the plaintiff [Schweitzer]."
Red Cross and Shrine Temple subsequently moved for summary judgment. The substance of Red Cross' and Shrine Temple's motions for summary judgment was that the issues of whether Schweitzer was an employee as she claimed and whether Red Cross and Shrine Temple carried workers' compensation insurance for her were the exclusive province of the Workers' Compensation Court.
Red Cross offered, inter alia, Schweitzer's deposition testimony in support of the summary judgment motions. In her deposition, in answer to the question, "Do you consider Red Cross to be your employer?" Schweitzer testified, "Yes, I do."
In her deposition, Schweitzer testified that she fell going up a staircase, slipping on a step upon which she thought soda pop had been spilled. Schweitzer admitted that she had a flashlight for use while attending to circus patrons' health and safety needs in the semidarkened auditorium, but she was not using it when she fell. Schweitzer testified as to the equipment which the Red Cross provided to its first-aid teams; the training required to be on the first-aid team; and the benefits conferred on the first-aid team members, such as food at the events at which they participated. Schweitzer stated that she understood that Red Cross had insurance and complained that the Red Cross had not paid for her medical treatment. She expressed no specific complaint against Shrine Temple.
Schweitzer offered two depositions in opposition to the summary judgment motions of Red Cross and Shrine Temple. Exhibit 2 is deposition testimony of Kathy Hill, who was employed as the Red Cross director of health and safety at the time Schweitzer was injured. One of Hill's duties was supervising first-aid teams which provided health assistance at public events. Hill testified that Schweitzer was a first-aid team member before Hill came to work for Red Cross. Hill did not testify regarding whether Schweitzer was an employee of Red Cross or Shrine Temple when she was injured. Hill did not testify about the existence of workers' compensation insurance.
Exhibit 3 offered into evidence by Schweitzer was the deposition testimony of Nora Barrett, a licensed practical nurse who was a Red Cross coordinator for Pershing events for the 5 years preceding Schweitzer's injury. Barrett described the safety equipment Red Cross provided at Pershing for emergency team use and the Red Cross manual describing team members' emergency response procedures. Barrett testified that she saw Schweitzer fall on the stairs and that she assisted Schweitzer in completing an incident report form. Barrett testified that she had no knowledge of the financial relationship between Red Cross and Shrine Temple regarding the circus performances. She offered no testimony regarding whether Schweitzer was an employee of Red Cross or Shrine Temple. Barrett did not testify about the existence of workers' compensation insurance.
The trial court sustained the summary judgment motions of Red Cross and Shrine Temple and dismissed the petition. In an [i]nasmuch as the plaintiff has based her cause of action on the theory that she was an employee of the Red Cross and that her injury occurred in the course of such employment, her remedy is limited to that available under the Workers' Compensation Act and this court has no jurisdiction.
order filed September 4, 1997, the trial court noted that in her petition, Schweitzer alleged that she was in the employ of the Red Cross when the accident causing her injuries occurred, and that
This appeal followed.
Schweitzer claims that the trial court erred in concluding that the Workers' Compensation Court had exclusive jurisdiction over her claims and thus that the court erred in granting Red Cross' and Shrine Temple's motions for summary judgment and dismissing her petition.
Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences which may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Community First State Bank v. Olsen, 255 Neb. 617, 587 N.W.2d 364 (1998).
In reviewing an order of summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. Herman Bros. v. Great West Cas. Co., 255 Neb. 88, 582 N.W.2d 328 (1998).
Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law for the court. Miller v. Walter, 247 Neb. 813, 530 N.W.2d 603 (1995). When reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court's ruling. Zimmerman v. FirsTier Bank, 255 Neb. 410, 585 N.W.2d 445 (1998).
Subject matter jurisdiction is a court's power to hear and determine a case in the general class or category to which the proceedings in question belong and to deal with the general subject...
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