Sci Alabama Funeral Services v. Hester

• Decision Date: 30 November 2007
• Docket Number: 2060260.
• Citation: 984 So.2d 1207
• Parties: SCI ALABAMA FUNERAL SERVICES, INC., and Leak Memory Chapel v. Charles Frank HESTER.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

984 So.2d 1207

SCI ALABAMA FUNERAL SERVICES, INC., and Leak Memory Chapel v. Charles Frank HESTER.

2060260.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

November 30, 2007.

Patricia K. Rea of Fann & Rea, P.C., Birmingham, for appellants.

William K. Abell of Shinbaum, Abell, McLeod & Campbell, P.C., Montgomery, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

On February 6, 2006, Charles Frank Hester sued SCI Alabama Funeral Services, Inc., and Leak Memory Chapel (hereinafter collectively referred to as "SCI"), seeking workers' compensation benefits for an injury to his left knee that he alleged had occurred on March 1, 2005, while he was working in the line and scope of his employment. SCI answered and denied liability.

The trial court conducted an ore tenus hearing. On September 20, 2006, the trial court entered an order finding, among other things, that the "sole issue" before the court was whether Hester had timely and properly notified SCI of his injury. The trial court concluded that Hester had in fact done so and, therefore, that Hester's injury was compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975. The trial court further found that Hester was "entitled to any medical and compensation benefits due at this time." On September 27, 2006, SCI filed a motion, purportedly pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., in which it asked the trial court to reconsider its September 20, 2006, judgment and to certify the judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., for purposes of appeal.¹ On October 16, 2006, the trial court entered an order purporting to deny that motion.

On November 8, 2006, the trial court, apparently acting ex mero motu, certified the September 20, 2006, order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). In that order, the trial court stated:

"It is this Court's opinion that this order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from this order would materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation and avoid protracted and expensive litigation."

On December 19, 2006, SCI appealed.

Although neither party has questioned this court's jurisdiction over this appeal, we must address the question because "`jurisdictional matters are of such magnitude that we take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero motu.'" Williams Power, Inc. v. Johnson, 880 So.2d 459, 461 (Ala.Civ.App.2003)(quoting Nunn v. Baker, 518 So.2d 711, 712 (Ala. 1987)). An appeal ordinarily lies only from a final judgment. § 12-22-2, Ala.Code 1975; and Bean v. Craig, 557 So.2d 1249 (Ala.1990). A final judgment is one that "conclusively determines the issues before the court and ascertains and declares the rights of the parties involved." Bean v. Craig, 557 So.2d at 1253. Stated another way, a "final judgment is a `terminal decision which demonstrates there has been a complete adjudication of all matters in controversy between the litigants.'" Dees v. State, 563 So.2d 1059, 1061 (Ala.Civ.App.1990)(quoting Tidwell v. Tidwell, 496 So.2d 91, 92 (Ala.Civ.App.1986)).

In Williams Power, Inc. v. Johnson, supra, this court addressed the issue of finality in the context of a workers' compensation case in which the trial court had failed to determine the amount of workers' compensation benefits due to an injured employee. In Johnson, the trial court entered an order in which it found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and awarded benefits accordingly. The trial court further ordered "`that the [employer] shall reimburse the [employee] for any and all medical expenses already paid by him,'" but it failed to specify the amount of those medical expenses. 880 So.2d at 460. Quoting Dees v. State, 563 So.2d at 1061, this court recognized that a final "`judgment must be conclusive and certain with all matters decided, including the assessment of damages with specificity for a sum certain determinable without resorting to extraneous facts.'" Johnson, 880 So.2d at 461 (emphasis added in Johnson). This court held that the appeal had been taken from a nonfinal judgment because the trial court had failed to specify the amount of damages pertaining to past medical expenses; therefore, this court dismissed the appeal. Id.

Similarly, in International Paper Co. v. Dempsey, 844 So.2d 1236 (Ala.Civ.App. 2002), the employer appealed an order finding that the employee was entitled to medical benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act that had accrued until the date of that order; in that order, the trial court reserved ruling on the extent of the employee's permanent disability, if any. The trial court entered an order in which it found that the employee's claim was both timely and compensable. However, the trial court's order failed to establish the nature of the compensation benefits, the amount of compensation benefits due, or the amount of benefits that had accrued until the date of the trial court's order. On appeal, this court determined that because the trial court's order did not determine the amount or type of benefits to which the employee might be entitled, the order was not sufficiently final so as to support an appeal. International Paper Co. v. Dempsey, 844 So.2d at 1238. In dismissing the appeal based on the trial court's failure to determine the amount of benefits due the employee, this court reiterated the general rule that a judgment will not support an appeal unless the judgment "sufficiently ascertain[s] and set[s] forth the rights and obligations of the parties." International Paper Co. v. Dempsey, 844 So.2d at 1238.

In USA Motor Express, Inc. v. Renner, 853 So.2d 1019 (Ala.Civ.App.2003), the trial court conducted a bifurcated hearing, the first part of which was solely to determine compensability. The employer appealed an order of the trial court finding the employee's injury to be compensable and requiring the company to "`provide medical treatment for the [employee].'" 853 So.2d at 1020. The trial court's order required the employer to notify the trial court of the results of medical treatment within 90 days. The trial court did not award temporary-total-disability benefits to the employee. On appeal, this court, relying on its holding in International Paper Company v. Dempsey, supra, held that the trial court's order was an interlocutory order that would not support an appeal. In so holding, this court noted that the order entered by the trial court did "nothing but determine the compensability of the worker's injury." USA Motor Express, Inc. v. Renner, 853 So.2d at 1021.

In CVS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Smith, 944 So.2d 957 (Ala.Civ.App.2006), the trial court entered an order, which it later certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), finding the employee completely and permanently disabled as the result of an on-the-job injury. Among other things, the trial court awarded the employee "`appropriate benefits,' retroactive to ... the date on which the trial court found [the employee] to have reached maximum medical improvement." 944 So.2d at 958. However, in its order, the trial court did not state the amount of benefits the employee was due to receive. The employer appealed. On appeal, this court, noting the trial court's failure to determine a specific amount of benefits due the employee, held that it was bound to dismiss the appeal because the order of the trial court failed to "`"`sufficiently ascertain[ ] and declare[] the rights of the parties'" so as to constitute a final judgment ....'" CVS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Smith, 944 So.2d at 959 (quoting Sign Plex v. Tholl, 863 So.2d 1113, 1116 (Ala.Civ.App.2003), quoting in turn other cases).

In the instant case, the trial court's order found Hester's injury to be compensable, but it did not determine the amount or type of benefits due as a result of the injury. Like the orders entered in Johnson, Dempsey, Renner, and Smith, the order in this case failed to sufficiently ascertain and declare the rights of the parties so as to constitute a final judgment. However, in this case, like in Smith, in an effort to make its judgment final, the trial court attempted to certify its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b).

Rule 54(b) provides, in pertinent part:

"When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."

"`Rule 54(b), [Ala.] R. Civ. P., provides a means of making final "an order which does not adjudicate the entire case but as to which there is no just reason for delay in the attachment of finality." Foster v. Greer & Sons, Inc., 446 So.2d 605, 609 (Ala.1984).'" Summerlin v. Summerlin, 962 So.2d 170, 173 (Ala.2007)(quoting Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So.2d 1373, 1374 (Ala.1987)). However, "[n]ot every order has the requisite element of finality that can trigger the operation of Rule 54(b)." Goldome Credit Corp. v. Player, 869 So.2d 1146, 1148 (Ala. Civ.App.2003).

In Sparks v. City of Florence, 936 So.2d 508 (Ala.2006), our supreme court stated:

"Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., confers appellate jurisdiction over an otherwise nonfinal order only where the trial court `has completely disposed of one of a number of claims, or one of multiple parties.' Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption, Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. It is `our time-honored rule that a final judgment is an essential precondition for appealing to this Court.' John Crane-Houdaille, Inc. v. Lucas, 534 So.2d 1070, 1073 (Ala.1988).

"The fact that the trial court purported to certify its order as final is not determinative. The `"trial court cannot confer appellate jurisdiction upon this court through directing entry of...