Scibek v. Gilbert
| Decision Date | 14 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:20-cv-2638-DCN |
| Parties | SUZANNE SCIBEK, individually and on behalf of her minor children, C.S., J.S., and E.S.; and JACOB SCIBEK, Plaintiffs, v. LAURA GEE GILBERT and CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
AMENDED ORDER
The following matter is before the court on defendant Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.'s (“Cracker Barrel”) motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 34. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the motion.
This negligence action arises out of a June 13, 2020 collision involving defendant Laura Gee Gilbert's (“Gilbert”) vehicle and a golf cart in which plaintiffs C.S., J.S., and E.S. (the “Scibek children”) were riding. Prior to the collision, Gilbert had been working in the retail section of Cracker Barrel's Summerville, South Carolina location. According to Cracker Barrel's records and surveillance footage Gilbert clocked out at 7:43 p.m. and was seen driving away in her vehicle from the Cracker Barrel parking lot at 8:00 p.m. Approximately thirty minutes after that, Gilbert's vehicle collided with the golf cart carrying the Scibek children. Gilbert was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and later pled guilty to that charge. The parties dispute whether Gilbert began consuming alcohol while she was working at Cracker Barrel or only after she had clocked out. Gilbert herself testified that she did not consume any alcohol before coming to work on June 13, did not consume any alcohol while at work, and did not begin consuming alcohol until after she clocked out and left work. ECF No. 34 at 3 (citing ECF No. 34-3, Gilbert Dep. at 97:3-14).
Plaintiffs Suzanne and Jacob Scibek (the Scibeks”) filed suit against Gilbert and Cracker Barrel on July 16, 2020, asserting negligence claims based on respondeat superior and negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision. ECF No. 1, Compl. After the complaint was filed, Mackenzie Day (“Day”)-Gilbert's co-worker who had worked alongside Gilbert on June 13-agreed to speak with her former Cracker Barrel supervisor, Milinda Anderson (“Anderson”)[1] and Cracker Barrel's counsel[2] over the phone on August 17, 2020 (the “August Call”). In January 2021, Day also met with the Scibeks' private investigator on several occasions. During these meetings, Day prepared an affidavit in which she disclosed that on the day of the accident, she had observed a “pungent” smell on Gilbert and that Gilbert was acting unsteadily. ECF No. 22 at 1-2. She also claims in her affidavit that she attempted to communicate her concern to Anderson and offered to drive Gilbert home, but Anderson rebuffed her attempts.
On October 15, 2021, Cracker Barrel filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 34. The Scibeks responded in opposition on November 5, 2021, ECF No. 40, and Cracker Barrel replied on November 12, 2021, ECF No. 42. The court held a telephonic hearing on the motion on January 25, 2022. ECF No. 55. As such, the motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for the court's review.
Summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248. “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249. The court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all inferences in its favor. Id. at 255.
Cracker Barrel moves for summary judgment on all claims asserted by the Scibeks against Cracker Barrel-Counts Two and Three of the complaint.[3] The court addresses each claim in turn.
As the primary basis underlying its motion for summary judgment, Cracker Barrel argues that it owed the Scibek children no legally cognizable duty of care. To prevail in a negligence action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2) defendant breached the duty by a negligent act or omission; (3) defendant's breach was the actual or proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury; and (4) plaintiff suffered an injury or damages.” Doe v. Marion, 645 S.E.2d 245, 250 (S.C. 2007). “An essential element in a cause of action for negligence is the existence of a legal duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.” Bishop v. S.C. Dep't of Mental Health, 502 S.E.2d 78, 81 (S.C. 1998). The existence and scope of the duty are questions of law for the courts. Miller v. City of Camden, 451 S.E.2d 401, 403 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994), affd as modified, 494 S.E.2d 813 (S.C. 1997); Roe v. Bibby, 763 S.E.2d 645, 648 (S.C. Ct. App. 2014). “If there is no duty, then the defendant in a negligence action is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Hurst v. E. Coast Hockey League, Inc., 637 S.E.2d 560, 562 (S.C. 2006); see also Hopson v. Clary, 468 S.E.2d 305, 307 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) ().
The Scibeks' complaint alleges that “Cracker Barrel is responsible for the acts and/or omissions of their agents, servants and/or employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” Compl. ¶ 24. The complaint further alleges that under this doctrine, “Cracker Barrel had a duty to ensure that its employees did not drive home while visibly intoxicated.” Id. ¶ 26. The Scibeks' response to Cracker Barrel's motion similarly argues that Cracker Barrel owed a duty of reasonable care based on an “employer-employee relationship.” ECF No. 40 at 5. Alternatively, the Scibeks argue that even if such a duty did not exist, “Cracker Barrel created a duty to act reasonably when they undertook the affirmative steps surrounding the removal of Ms. Gilbert from their premises.” Id. at 4. For ease of reference, the court groups and discusses the Sciberks' various arguments regarding the existence of a duty together where it considers appropriate.
The court focuses first on the allegation that Cracker Barrel owed a duty to the Scibek children based on its status as Gilbert's employer. In support of this argument, the Scibeks argue that although there is no general duty to control the conduct of another or to warn a third person, South Carolina recognizes an exception “where the defendant has a special relationship to the victim.” ECF No. 40 at 5 (citing Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 711 S.E.2d 908, 911-12 (S.C. 2011)). However, the Scibeks flatly ignore the remainder of the South Carolina Supreme Court's explanation of when such a special relationship will be found. “The defendant may have a common law duty to warn potential victims under the ‘special relationship' exception when the defendant ‘has the ability to monitor, supervise, and control an individual's conduct' and when ‘the individual has made a specific threat of harm directed at a specific individual.'” Id. at 912 (citing Marion, 645 S.E.2d at 250) (emphasis added).
For purposes of summary judgment, there is no meaningful dispute that Cracker Barrel had the ability to monitor, supervise, and control Gilbert's conduct. However, the Scibeks have presented no evidence that Gilbert made a specific threat of harm directed at the Scibeks or the Scibek children. Therefore, under the “special relationship” test cited by the Scibeks, Cracker Barrel owed no duty of care.
The Scibeks then pivot to argue that Cracker Barrel is directly liable because a standard of care may be established by a corporation's “own policies and guidelines.” ECF No. 40 at 7. In this respect, the Scibeks place the cart before the horse. Cracker Barrel's corporate policy cannot alone establish the existence of a duty; it is merely a source for determining the applicable standard of care. See Madison v. Babock Ctr., Inc., 638 S.E.2d 650 659 (S.C. 2006) (). In Madison, a case cited by the Scibeks, the court had already determined that the defendant owed the victim a duty because (1) they shared a “special relationship” and (2) the defendant “voluntarily undertook the duty.” Id. at 657. As the court has and will discuss, however, the Scibeks have not established the existence of a duty based on a special relationship or voluntary undertaking. Any discussion of the applicable standard of care established by Cracker Barrel's policies and guidelines goes to the element of breach, but whether Cracker Barrel violated those policies has no bearing on whether they owed a duty. See id. at 656 (...
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