Scofield v. Hadden
| Decision Date | 26 June 1928 |
| Docket Number | 38206 |
| Citation | 220 N.W. 1,206 Iowa 597 |
| Parties | E. G. SCOFIELD, Appellee, v. MARY L. HADDEN et al., Appellees MONTRAVILLE P. MIGHELL et al., Appellants |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
REHEARING DENIED SEPTEMBER 28, 1928.
Appeal from Buena Vista District Court.--D. F. COYLE, Judge.
The nature of the action and the legal propositions involved are fully stated in the opinion.
Affirmed.
Jacobs & McCaulley, for appellants.
Whitney & Whitney, for E. G. Scofield, Hull Scofield, Elizabeth Scofield, and Edna Scofield, appellees.
Bailie & Edson, for Lane-Moore Lumber Company and George J Schaller, Executor, appellees.
FAVILLE, J., not participating.
This is a partition suit, involving 200 acres of real estate situated in Buena Vista County, Iowa, described as the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of Section 17 and the southeast quarter of Section 8, all in Township 92 north, Range 37 west of the 5th P. M. This real estate was owned, at the time of his death, by David Scofield, who, on January 14, 1883, died testate, a resident of Lee County, Illinois.
The last will and testament of David Scofield was executed October 5, 1882. By the first paragraph of his will he devised to his wife, Betsy B. Scofield, certain real estate in Lee County, Illinois, "to be used and enjoyed by her during the term of her natural life." By the second, third, fifth, and sixth paragraphs of his will he devised certain real estate, a portion of which is situated in Illinois, and a part of which is in Iowa, to each of his four sons, David W. Scofield, Hull Scofield, Elija G. Scofield, and Seeley Scofield, the limitation on each devise being, "to be used and enjoyed by him during the term of his natural life." By the fourth paragraph of his will he devised unto his daughter, Nancy J. Mighell, the real estate involved herein, the same "to be used and enjoyed by her during the term of her natural life." The remaining provisions of his will are as follows:
Nancy J. Mighell died testate June 7, 1925, leaving no issue surviving her at the time of her death, and leaving the defendant and cross-petitioner, Montraville P. Mighell, as her surviving husband. In her last will and testament she provides as follows:
"Subject to the payment of all my just debts and funeral expenses, I will, devise and bequeath, to my beloved husband, Montraville P. Mighell, all the estate of which I may die seized and possessed, both real and personal, to do and dispose of as he may deem fit during the whole of his natural lifetime; unless he should marry again, in which case said property, if any remains at that time, shall descend to my heirs at law."
Nancy J. Mighell and her husband, Montraville P. Mighell, were the parents of two daughters, to wit, Maude Mighell, born in 1881, and Hazel Mighell, born in 1885, both of whom died in 1895, prior to the time of the death of their mother, Nancy J. Mighell, said two daughters leaving no lineal descendants, and leaving their mother and father as their sole heirs at law.
At the time of the death of Nancy J. Mighell, she was survived by her brothers, Hull Scofield and E. G. Scofield, and also by Mary L. Hadden and David C. Scofield, who were children of David W. Scofield, brother of Nancy J. Mighell, the said Mary L. Hadden and David C. Scofield being the only surviving heirs of their father, David W. Scofield, who died January 8, 1893.
Hull Scofield, named as defendant in the original petition, afterwards joined with the plaintiff, his brother, E. G. Scofield, in asking for a partition of the real estate herein involved. The defendant Montraville P. Mighell, by way of cross-petition, claims a fee title to said real estate, and asks that his title thereto be quieted in him. The remaining parties to this suit, other than those hereinbefore mentioned, claim some interest in the real estate by way of judgment liens or otherwise, through or against the aforesaid parties.
The facts upon which the defendant and cross-petitioner, Montraville P. Mighell, claims title are as above set out, and are fully averred in his answer and cross-petition. The plaintiff, E. G. Scofield, and the defendant Hull Scofield, and their respective spouses, attack the answer and cross-petition by proper motion to dismiss, which motion is a substitute for what was formerly known as an equitable demurrer. The court sustained said motion to dismiss the answer and cross-petition of the defendant Montraville P. Mighell, and he refused to further plead, and decree was rendered against him, dismissing his cross-petition and granting partition, as prayed by plaintiff and those joining with him. From this action by the trial court the defendant and cross-petitioner, Montraville P. Mighell, has appealed.
It thus becomes manifest that we have no issues of fact to determine, and that the sole matter of controversy is one of law, and must be determined by a construction of the will of David Scofield, deceased. The contention of the appellant is that, under the will of David Scofield, upon his death, appellant's wife, Nancy J. Mighell, took a life estate in the real estate herein involved and hereinbefore described, and that their daughter, Maude Mighell, became seized of a vested remainder therein, subject only to open and let in Hazel Mighell, subsequently born, in 1885; and that, upon the birth of Hazel Mighell, his said two daughters were the owners of said real estate, by way of a vested remainder; and that, upon their respective deaths, without issue, in 1895, he and his wife, by inheritance, each became the owner of an undivided one-half interest in said real estate; and that, under the terms and provisions of the will of his deceased wife, he has become the owner of her undivided one-half interest therein; and that he is now the absolute owner in fee simple thereof.
The contention of the appellees is that Nancy J. Mighell was the owner of a life estate in the real estate in controversy, but that no child or children of hers had any vested right or interest in said real estate upon the death of David Scofield, and that the interest of the children of the life tenant therein was contingent upon their being alive at the date of the death of their mother, when, and only when, they claim that the title was to pass to and vest in said children; and that, since there were no children of Nancy J. Mighell's alive at the time of her death, the title to this real estate passed to the "other children" of the testator, as provided by the will.
Thus we have the contention, upon the one hand, that the remainder provided for by the will is vested, and upon the other, that it is contingent. Our duty is to discover the intention of the testator, as his intention must prevail; and in determining said intention, we must look only to the will and the admitted facts. Rules of law may aid in discovering the intention, but they do not and cannot thwart or defeat it. Williamson v. Youngs, 200 Iowa 672, 203 N.W. 28.
In the examining of the seventh paragraph of the will of David Scofield, hereinbefore quoted, the question naturally arising is, When were the children of Nancy J. Mighell to be come the owners of the real estate? And the answer must be, "At the time of her death;" for the will provides that the real estate in which Nancy J. Mighell is given a life estate shall, at the time of her death, descend to and become the property of her children. It thus becomes manifest that it was not to become the property of any child or children of Nancy J. Mighell's at any time prior to the time specified in the will when it should become her, or their, property. In Williamson v. Youngs, 200 Iowa 672, 203 N.W. 28, the will provides:
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