Scofield v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co.

Citation43 Ohio St. 571,3 N.E. 907
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Ohio
Decision Date15 December 1885
PartiesSCOFIELD and others v. LAKE SHORE & M. S. RY. CO.
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Reserved in the district court of Cuyahoga county.

The plaintiffs, Scofield, Shurmer & Teagle, filed their petition in the court of common pleas, and therein alleged, in substance, that since 1875 they have been manufacturers of and dealers in refined and other products of petroleum, at Cleveland; that during the same time the Standard Oil Company was largely engaged in the same business; that defendant was the owner of a line of railroad passing through Cleveland and extending from Buffalo, New York, to Chicago, Illinois, with branches to Detroit and Grand Rapids, in Michigan; that it was amply supplied with proper equipment to receive and carry the product of plaintiffs; that it made and published tariff rates for the transportation of oil in barrels, which plaintiffs were at all times charged, in common with all other manufacturers, in Cleveland, except the Standard Oil Company, which plaintiffs say was largely in excess of the rates charged to and paid by the Standard Oil Company to the same points and places; that defendant connected with other railroads at its termini, by and over which said oil was forwarded and carried to its destination; that defendant combined with these connecting roads, so that the charges to plaintiffs for delivery to points beyond defendant's line and branches were largely in excess of the charges to the Standard Oil Company for the same service, and that the proportions of such through rates for carriage over defendant's line were much less to the Standard Oil Company than to the plaintiffs; that defendant refuses to give plaintiffs the through rates given to the Standard Oil Company, and threatens to refuse in the future; that said discrimination is made to the Standard by rebates from tariff rates; that plaintiffs have a large business in the states west, northwest, and south-west of Cleveland, and in the cities and towns along defendant's road, and its branches and connecting lines; that the direct line to many places, the only line over which to supply said business, is the road of defendant; that the same can only be made profitable by their ability to have carried to said markets their said products at as low rates as are given to the Standard, which they say is their principal competitor; that plaintiffs are entitled of right to have from defendant, as a common carrier, equal facilities of shipment and delivery, and equal rates of freight for the shipment of their products, with all other persons and companies engaged in the manufacture, sale, or shipment of the same products to like points; that the defendant, designing to injure plaintiffs in their said business, and to advance the interests of the Standard, made the discrimination aforesaid; that by reason thereof, plaintiffs cannot compete with the Standard in said markets; that defendant refuses to give them the same rates, and threatens to continue the same discrimination; that by so doing defendant is inflicting and will inflict upon plaintiffs irreparable injury and damages that cannot be estimated in money, etc. Whereupon they pray that defendant may be restrained from charging to and collecting from plaintiffs, for freight over said lines, rates and amounts in excess of those charged to the Standard for like goods to the same points, or from discriminating against plaintiffs in favor of the Standard, either upon its own lines, or on through freight over its line and connecting lines.

The defendant, by way of answer, admits the business of plaintiffs; admits it is a common carrier, and owns and operates the railroad and branches designated; denies the combination and intention to injure the plaintiffs, as alleged; admits that plaintiffs are entitled to have their products carried at reasonable rates; denies that it has discriminated against plaintiffs in favor of competitors; and avers that it has at all times been ready and willing to carry the products of plaintiffs at the same price charged others under like circumstances. It denies that it charged plaintiffs more than the Standard, under the same circumstances, with like facilities and for like quantities, and avers its willingness to treat plaintiffs' consignments, to the fullest extent, quantity and conveniences being equal, as it does the consignments of the Standard, and offers so to do. It says that in 1875 the Standard Oil Company was debating as to the propriety of removing its refining business to the oil-producing regions; that it was desirable that so large a business should be retained in Cleveland; that, during the season of navigation on the lakes, vessels carried oil cheaper than defendant could afford to; that prior to 1875 the Standard had shipped largely in that way, and stored the same at commercial centers, for winter distribution through the county; that in 1875 the Standard, through its officers, presented these contingencies to defendant, and proposed that it would give to defendant the carriage of all its products for the markets west and north-west of Cleveland, summer and winter; that it would care for bulk-oil carried in tanks, load and unload its trains, and furnish depots and switches at the termini in and on which to deliver the oil, and take on itself the risk of loss by fire, and that the quantity should at no time be less than the preceding year; that defendant, in consideration of the premises, promised and agreed that it would carry the oil of the Standard to the markets aforesaid at prices averaging about 10 cents per barrel less than tariff rates charged to the rest of the public; that the rates were not fixed rates, but depended upon changes in the tariff rates; that the arrangement was not exclusive, but was open to all persons shipping a like quantity under like circumstances; that such contract has remained in force ever since, and that all the shipments by and rates to the Standard, complained of by plaintiffs, were made and paid under said agreement; that its general tariff rates paid by plaintiffs were reasonable, and as low as defendant could afford to carry plaintiff's oil, having reference to the limited quantity manufactured and shipped by them for said markets; that for the larger portion of the period complained of more than one-half of the oil shipped by the Standard was carried in tanks on cars owned by it, and as to which defendant had no tariff rates, and the rates paid for such transportation was for hauling the cars and tanks over the road, and did not come in competiton with the plaintiffs; that the larger portion of the oil shipped by the Standard was consigned to points beyond the termini of defendant's road; that it had no control over the same as to rates, except by contract with such distributing lines, and which it could not change without the consent of such companies, and that it is not responsible for their actions in the premises. The defendant says it had a right to make such contract; that the same was profitable to it; and that it thereby obtained and retained a large business which would have otherwise been lost to it.

Plaintiffs replied, denying that it had such an arrangement with the Standard Oil Company as defendant averred; denied that they received, during the period mentioned, the benefit of the tariff rates allowed to that company; denied that defendant has been ready or willing to give plaintiffs the same rates as are given to the Standard Oil Company; denied that the tariff of rates given them is reasonable or as low as defendant can afford to carry said products. They deny that, for any portion of the time mentioned, the rates to pliantiffs and to the Standarde Oil Company have been the same, and aver that the conditions of shipment offered by them have been the same as those offered by said company, except the single difference of the amount of refined oils offered for shipment. Plaintiffs aver that they have tanks and cars of precisely the same construction and devoted to the same use as those of the Standard Oil Company; that they have frequently demanded and been refused the same rates of transportation as defendant gave to the Standard; and averred that in their application to defendant it had been for car-load lots and for quantities of from one to ten car-loads; that they have been ready at all times to make shipments at their own risk, but that defendant still refused them the same rates given to the Standard. They say that a large portion of the oil shipped from Cleveland is consigned to points beyond the terminus of defendant's railroad, but that defendant publishes through rates to points reached by connecting lines, and has offered to ship at those rates to those points, but refuses to make the rates the same as those given to the Standard. They aver that the relations of the defendant to said connecting lines are such that defendant could make the same rates as it does make for the Standard Oil Company, and they deny that any arrangement is in force between defendant and said company resting upon any obligation, contract, or agreement, as averred in the answer, and pray judgment as in the petition.

Plaintiffs procured a judgment and decree in the court of common pleas, granting the relief prayed for; and the case having come by appeal into the district court, and said cause coming on to be heard on motion for its reservation, the judges being of opinion that important and difficult questions existed in the case, the same was reserved for decision here. That court found the facts as follows:

(1) The court find the plaintiffs are, and since 1875 have been, partners, carrying on, in a large way, at Cleveland, Ohio, where their refinery is situated, the business of refining crude petroleum, and selling the refined product mainly throughout the territory west and north-west of Cleveland, and extending throughout the...

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