Scofield v. Pennsylvania Co.

• Decision Date: 13 January 1902
• Docket Number: 961.
• Citation: 112 F. 855
• Parties: SCOFIELD v. PENNSYLVANIA CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

112 F. 855

SCOFIELD v. PENNSYLVANIA CO.

No. 961.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

January 13, 1902

Elisha B. Durfee and J. K. Hamilton, for plaintiff in error.

E. W Tolerton, for defendant in error.

This is in an action sounding in tort, brought by the plaintiff in error against the Pennsylvania Company, the defendant in error, claiming damages for unlawfully ejecting him from its passenger train on its road between Alliance and Crestline Ohio, on March 6, 1899. The case was tried before the court and a jury, when testimony was adduced tending to show the following facts: The plaintiff, who was a lawyer practicing at Marion, Ohio, made a trip on business to New York, going by another route than that of defendant's. Having completed his business there, and wishing to stop over at Alliance on his return, to attend to some further business there, he applied to the ticket agent of the defendant at New York, and inquired whether he could purchase a ticket of him from New York to Marion, Ohio, with the privilege of stopping over at Alliance, to which the agent replied in the affirmative. Thereupon the plaintiff purchased a through ticket, which was in the common form for the whole trip; the agent assuring him that he would have the right to stop over at Alliance. The ticket bore coupons providing for transportation--First, from New York to Pittsburgh; second from Pittsburgh to Crestline; and, third, from Crestline by a distinct ticket over another road, called the 'Big 4,' to Marion. Soon aster leaving New York, when the conductor took up the first coupon, the plaintiff explained to him that he had purchased the ticket with a privilege of a stop-off at Alliance, and the conductor wrote upon the ticket, which he withheld for the night, the words 'Off Alliance.' After leaving Pittsburgh the next morning, and before reaching Alliance, the plaintiff called for his ticket. Another

conductor was on this train. On being told by the plaintiff that he wished to stop off at Alliance and that he made an agreement when he bought the ticket giving him this privilege, this conductor declared that he had no such right, and refused to allow him the privilege. Against the protest of the plaintiff, he tore off and retained the coupon running from Pittsburgh to Crestline, handing back the ticket from Crestline to Marion. The plaintiff informed the conductor that he had business requiring him to stop off at Alliance, and should do so. The plaintiff left the train at Alliance, and, having dispatched his business, he then took the next train of the defendant going to Crestline. When the conductor of that train called on the plaintiff for his ticket, he explained all the circumstances above narrated, and claimed the right to ride through to Crestline. The conductor did not assent to this, and demanded his fare. The plaintiff refusing to pay it, the conductor telegraphed to the proper office of his company for instructions, as follows:

'Massillon, 3/6/1899.

'F. Clemens: Two pass'rs boarded train at Alliance holding tickets of P.R.R., issued form D25, Nos. 8,670 & 8,671, our coupons lifted. They claim that they bought the ticket with the understanding that they could stop off at Alliance, and on arrival of No. 9 at Alliance got off. Their tickets read Crestline to Marion, limited to March 7. Please advise.

'Altaffer.'

To this he received the following reply:

'3/6/1899.

'Altaffer: Parties were informed that they could not stop over. Collect fare.

'F. Clemens, 'H.'

Thereupon, the plaintiff still refusing to pay his fare, the conductor, in the presence of a considerable number of passengers, putting his hand upon his shoulder, indicated that he would compel him to leave the train. No violence was used, but the plaintiff left because he knew there was no alternative. Later the plaintiff returned to Marion by another route. There was a time limit on plaintiff's ticket, within which it must be used and the trip completed. But there was ample time within it for the stop-off at Alliance, and the plaintiff would have reached his destination in time if he had not been put off the train as above stated. By the rules of the company, upon a question arising of the character of that between the plaintiff and the conductor who ejected him, the conductor was required before resorting to such a measure to report the matter to 'headquarters' and receive instructions, and he could not put the passenger off without instructions. Clemens, the station agent at Crestline, was appointed by the company to exercise the duty of receiving these reports, and giving such directions on the part of the road where the plaintiff was ejected.

Upon testimony tending to prove these facts, the court, at the request of the defendant, instructed the jury to find for that party. This was done. The case comes here on writ of error from the judgment entered upon the verdict.

Before LURTON, DAY, and SEVERENS, Circuit Judges.

SEVERENS Circuit Judge, having stated the case as above, .

From the narrative contained in the bill of exceptions of the proceedings at the trial, it appears that the learned judge who presided directed a verdict for the defendant upon the ground that, conceding the plaintiff had a valid contract with the defendant for his transportation from New York to Marion, with the right to stop off at Alliance, still, the conductor on the train running from Pittsburg to Crestline having taken from him his coupon covering the distance between those places, he was left without any evidence of his right to travel on another train from Alliance to Crestline, and could not complain that the conductor of the next train put him off upon his refusal to pay fare, because, to quote from the charge given to the jury, 'the law is that, as between conductor and passenger, the evidence of the contract, which is the ticket, is conclusive, and that the conductor must follow out his conduct on that evidence and on that ticket. ' In this we think the court erred. It was held by the supreme court in Railroad Co. v. Winter's Adm'r, 143 U.S. 60, 12 Sup.Ct. 356, 36 L.Ed. 71, that a passenger's ticket is not necessarily the only evidence of his right, and that it is competent to show a parol agreement made with the company's agent at the time the passenger buys his ticket and that he should have a privilege such as that of stopping off at some place along the line, and then seasonably resuming his journey. That case is a sufficient authority. But see many cases affirming the same doctrine collected in 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 603-639,-- especially Railroad Co. v. Pauson, 17 C.C.A. 287, 70 F. 585, 30 L.R.A. 730, and Hufford v. Railroad Co., 64 Mich. 631, 31 N.W. 544, 8 Am.St.Rep. 859, cited with approval in the Winter Case. The evidence in the present case tended to show that the plaintiff's contract for transportation contained such a privilege. If that was so, it became the duty of the company to carry him to Alliance, and there afford him an opportunity to stop off, and then by some later train carry him on to Crestline. But it is said the...