Scollard v. City of Dallas

• Decision Date: 19 June 1897
• Citation: 42 S.W. 640
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Parties: SCOLLARD v. CITY OF DALLAS.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>

42 S.W. 640

SCOLLARD v. CITY OF DALLAS.¹

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

June 19, 1897.

Appeal from district court, Dallas county; Edward Gray, Judge.

Action by the city of Dallas against Thomas W. Scollard to foreclose a tax lien. Plaintiff obtained judgment. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Jno. L. Henry, Wm. P. Ellison, and Jno. L. Young, for appellant. A. P. Wozencraft and T. A. Work, for appellee.

LIGHTFOOT, C. J.

This is a suit brought by the city of Dallas against appellant to recover certain city taxes, assessed and levied against the appellant for the years 1892, 1893, and 1894, upon the property set out and described in plaintiff's petition, and to foreclose the tax lien given by law upon such property. There was a judgment below for plaintiff, from which this appeal is taken.

The conclusions of fact found by the court below have not been excepted to by appellant, and we adopt the same. The allegations of plaintiff's petition were sustained by the facts. We will set out under the different assignments such additional conclusions as may be necessary.

1. Under the first and second assignments of error it is claimed that the court erred (1) in overruling defendant's special exception to the petition of plaintiff, because the property as originally assessed was not sufficiently described, and (2) in permitting plaintiff to introduce in evidence the supplemental assessment roll of 1895, giving a correct description, because the city council at such time had no power to adopt such roll. Neither of these assignments is well taken. The property as originally assessed was given in under oath by appellant and his agents. It is not claimed that the property was misdescribed, or that there was no description, but that some of the lots were not fully described. In the supplemental assessment, which was authorized by law, each lot was fully and accurately described. If the description of the property was lacking in fullness and accuracy in the original assessments, it was the fault of appellant and his agents who gave it in to the assessor, under oath. See Dallas Title & Trust Co. v. City of Oak Cliff, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 217, 27 S. W. 1036, and authorities there cited. The city charter reads as follows: "Sec. 138. If the assessor shall discover any real or personal property which was subject to taxation for any previous year, and which from any cause has escaped taxation for that year, he shall assess the same in a supplement to his next assessment roll at the same rate under which such property should have been assessed for such year, stating the year, and the taxes thereon shall be collected in the same manner as other assessments." Under this section the property of appellant was again duly assessed on a supplemental roll, with full and accurate description of every lot. The main objects to be attained in the description are (1) that the owner may know what land is assessed; (2) that the public may know what land is to be sold; and (3) that the purchaser may know what land he buys. Mr. Cooley, in discussing the question of description in assessment, says: "The owner, if it has been prepared by himself, will read it in connection with his own knowledge of those surrounding circumstances, in the light of which he has framed it; but an equally imperfect description, prepared by another, and unaccompanied by such circumstances, would fail to convey to his mind any idea that his own land was intended." Cooley, Tax'n, 405, citing Jeffries v. Clark, 23 Kan. 448. Again, the same learned writer, after discussing the various rules, says: "A more satisfactory rule would seem to be that `the designation of the land will be sufficient if it afford the means of identification, and do not positively mislead the owner,' or be calculated to mislead him." Id. 407. But in this case the city officials, out of an abundance of caution, caused the property to be reassessed upon a supplemental roll, with a description so full and accurate that no question can be raised upon it.

2. Appellant's third assignment of error is as follows: "The judgment of the court is contrary to law and the evidence, because it appears by plaintiff's charter that during the years 1892, 1893, and 1894 there was no constitutional provision therein for equalizing the value of property taxed, or by which property owners in the city of Dallas were afforded an opportunity to be heard, before a fair and impartial tribunal, in any controversy as to the value of any property upon which said plaintiff attempted to levy taxes; and therefore said city, during said years, was without power to levy taxes on defendant's property." It fully appears from the evidence that appellant and his agents gave in the property for taxation, under oath, for the years 1893 and 1894, and that the city accepted it at the value thus assessed, and that no changes have been made therein; that for the year 1892 the property was given in by appellant for taxation, and the city added to one lot the value of certain improvements placed upon it, and reduced the value of another lot, of which changes by the board of appeals appellant had due and legal notice, and of which he has not complained, and does not now complain; but for the subsequent years (1893 and 1894) he assessed the property, fixing the value himself in accordance therewith. Although appellant has not complained in this case or attempted to appeal from anything done in making the assessment, and has not objected to any valuation or assessment made, yet he contends under this assignment that the city was without power to levy and collect a tax, because no constitutional provision had been made for a board of appeals in the event he should have needed it. We cannot sustain this contention.

Under section 140 of the city charter, as amended by the act of March 9, 1891, legal provision is made for a board of appeals to decide upon the value of property assessed when the assessor and property owner cannot agree upon such value. It appears that the board of appeals was duly and legally organized and at work during the years 1892, 1893, 1894, and 1895; but, there being no disagreement between appellant and appellee, no question was submitted by them, or either of them, for the decision of such board, except as above indicated for the year 1892, of which no complaint is made. But appellant contends that the provision made by statute and the creation of the board under it were unconstitutional and void, because the legislature had no power to provide for any board of equalization other than the county...