Scott, Trotter and Tilford v. Coleman
| Decision Date | 14 June 1824 |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
| Parties | SCOTT, TROTTER AND TILFORD <I>v.</I> COLEMAN. |
To an action of assumpsit brought in the name of James Coleman, the surviving partner of Robert Megowan & Co., the appellants pleaded non-assumpsit, with leave to give special matter in evidence. On the trial, the appellants gave in evidence, three records from the courts of the state of Pennsylvania, in which the demand due from them to Robert Megowan & Co. had been attached by foreign attachments in that state. The firm of the appellants had two houses, one in this state, where two of the partners resided, and one in the state of Pennsylvania, where the remaining partner resided, at which latter house, the demands set up by the appellee were contracted. On the failure of the house of Robert Megowan & Co., in this state, these attachments had issued against the house of the appellants there, two of them by creditors resident there, and one of them by George Trotter, one of the firm of the appellants, against the house of himself and partners in Philadelphia. In one of these records, there is a final judgment, to wit, that in which Trotter himself is plaintiff; in another there is a judgment nisi; and in the third, there is no judgment. It was admitted on this trial, that the appellants, at their house in Philadelphia, had paid these judgments to the several plaintiffs therein, and the question arose, whether the appellants were entitled to a credit for the amount so paid in this action. The court below decided, that as there were no executions issued on said attachments, and the appellants had paid them without such executions, the payment could not avail them as a bar in this action; while the appellants insisted that the judgments alone were a sufficient authority for such payment, and that as the laws of the state of Pennsylvania were not produced, in their absence, the judgments must be taken as prima facie good authority, and as valid until impeached; and these are the questions presented for our consideration.
It must be granted to be a general principle of common law, that process must be executed or the judgment rendered must be invalid, and that naming a person and styling him a party in the writ or pleadings, alone, without giving notice of the proceeding, cannot bind or affect his interest. This rule is, however, made subject to many exceptions by statutory or local regulations, in almost every country, and perhaps it is necessary for the ends of justice and the advancement of commerce, that such particular exceptions should exist. They generally authorize proceedings in rem, or by constructive service of process. Such appears to be the foreign attachment in England by the custom of London; such the laws of several of the American States; and such is our proceeding by a domestic attachment in case of absconding debtors, and of our proceeding in chancery against absent defendants. As the different governments of America may and do institute such proceedings, it is competent for them to make judgments rendered therein, conditionally binding only, or binding at a certain state of the proceedings or at a certain time, or conclusively final, or incontestable.
The constitution of the United States, makes all judgments of any state, evidence, and entitled to full faith and credit in every state; but it is settled by this court, in the case of Rogers v. Coleman and ux, Hard. 413, that this clause does not require greater faith and credit, or a more conclusive effect to be given to judgments or decrees, when tendered as evidence in another state, than they are entitled to in the state where they are rendered. To what credit they are entitled at home, may, then, be often a subject of inquiry, when they are offered abroad; and, of course, the inquiry arises, must he who offers them, prove that they are binding where they are rendered, or he who opposes them, show that they have but a partial effect? If the former is adopted, it would render the constitutional rule of but little effect; for the judgment or decree produced, could prove nothing until its force at home was proved, as a matter of fact and law. We, therefore, conceive the general rule to be, that when the judgment or decree of a sister state is produced, rendered by one of its tribunals, we must presume that tribunal had jurisdiction and authority, and that the act done in pursuance of that authority, does conclude and bind the parties named therein; and as to impeaching its full credit, the onus probandi lies on him who resists it. That it was competent for the appellee to show in this case, that these judgments were not conclusive, or that they could not bind, until execution was completed, we have no doubt; but we are also satisfied, that it lay on him to do so, by...
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