Scott v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73-1703-73-1705.,73-1703-73-1705.
• Citation: 496 F.2d 276
• Parties: William SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANCHOR MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., Defendant-Appellant. William SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANCHOR MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees. William SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 377, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

496 F.2d 276 (1974)

William SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANCHOR MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

William SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANCHOR MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

William SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 377, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 73-1703-73-1705.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued December 11, 1973.

Decided April 30, 1974.

Paul H. Tobias, Cincinnati, Ohio, on brief for plaintiff-appellant ; Goldman, Cole & Putnick, Cincinnati, Ohio, Niki Z. Schwartz, Cleveland, Ohio, Thomas P. Wellman, Youngstown, Ohio, of counsel.

Bernard S. Goldfarb, Cleveland, Ohio, on brief for Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. ; Goldfarb & Reznick, Cleveland, Ohio, of counsel.

Eugene Green, Green, Schiavoni, Murphy & Haines, Youngstown, Ohio, for Teamsters Local Union No. 377.

Before CELEBREZZE, PECK and McCREE, Circuit Judges.

CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge.

Consolidated herein are three appeals from a judgment against a company and a union. Plaintiff William Scott (Scott) sued his former employer and union representative under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,¹ claiming that Defendant Anchor Motor Freight (Anchor) had wrongfully discharged him and that Defendant Teamsters Local 377 (Local 377) had unfairly represented him in protesting the discharge.

Through special verdicts, the jury found that Scott had been wrongfully discharged and assessed damages against Anchor of $12,500. It also awarded Scott $12,500 from Local 377, which it found had failed to represent him properly.

Local 377 appeals the final judgment, as well as the District Court's denials of motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for vacation of the judgment. Anchor appeals on identical grounds, as well as appealing a denial of a motion for a new trial. Plaintiff Scott also appeals, claiming that the District Court's denial of a post-trial motion for an award of attorney fees was erroneous.

Scott began driving trucks for Anchor in 1953. In 1964 Anchor shut down its Norwood, Ohio terminal, where Scott had been working. A new terminal was opened in Lordstown, Ohio in 1966, and Anchor offered Scott a job after a physical examination by a company doctor, who certified Scott under ICC rules though noting that he was a diabetic. Over two months later, Scott was discharged, on July 23, 1966. Anchor claims the discharge resulted from Scott's physical problems while on the job in 1966 and a second letter from its doctor, stating that Scott was unfit to drive a truck. It argues that Scott was unfit under ICC rules, so that it was merely obeying the ICC when it discharged Scott. Scott claims he was fired because of his initiation of legitimate complaints against the Company. Scott introduced evidence that the company doctor had been pressured into changing his opinion as to Scott's fitness, that Anchor officials acted out of personal hostility in discharging him, and that he suffered no blackouts or other uncontrollable problems from his diabetes, which was being treated by mild medication.

Soon after his discharge Scott sent two letters to Teamsters Local 377, complaining of pay shortages for completed work and of an unfair discharge. He did not file a standard grievance form, according to Local 377, nor did he appeal his discharge in writing to the Company within ten days of his discharge. Local 377 did not press Anchor about the discharge, and Scott introduced evidence that the Union handled his protest perfunctorily and in bad faith. In December 1966 or January 1967, Scott attempted to have Local 377's steward and committeeman process a grievance concerning this discharge. There was evidence that because of the newness of the Lordstown operation, Local 377 did not have the requisite machinery to process a grievance within ten days of Scott's discharge, a time limit imposed by the labor contract for appealing discharges thought to be unfair.

Receiving no relief from the Company and no significant help from the Union, Scott filed a complaint in District Court in April 1968, alleging an improper discharge and unfair representation by Local 377. The jury verdict followed.

The first issue we face is whether Defendants were entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that Scott failed to invoke the grievance procedures set forth in the Local 377—Anchor contract. If Scott's efforts to invoke the contract grievance procedures were insufficient as a matter of law, he is barred from suing his employer and union. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965) ; Durham v. Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d 864, 865 (6th Cir. 1968).

The District Court let the jury determine whether Scott had complied with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. It instructed the jury :

"The second question you will be asked to answer either yes or no, which, in either instance, has to be the unanimous opinion of you all, is :

`Has the plaintiff properly filed or caused to be filed in his behalf a notice of appeal from discharge in writing within the time limitation, if any, set forth in the contract?\'

In conjunction with that, you will be required to answer Question 2-A, which reads:

`If the answer to Question No. 2 is in the negative, has the plaintiff been excused from compliance with any required notice by the conduct of the union?\'

The plaintiff must comply with all conditions precedent or requirements on his part of things to be performed by him under the contract before he can recover.

The contract provides in part: `Appeal from discharge, suspension or warning notice must be taken within ten days by a written notice.\'

The defendants contend that the contract provides that a copy of an appeal must be filed by the plaintiff with the company and the plaintiff has failed to comply with certain provisions of the contract.

The plaintiff states that the contract does not require that plaintiff file a copy of an appeal with the company and that the contract requires a filing with the union, and further, if the contract does require a filing with the company, that the plaintiff is excused from filing said appeal or grievance with the company as a result of the conduct of the union.

I state to you that it is for you to determine whether or not the contract requires that a copy of an appeal or grievance should be filed by the plaintiff with the company and, if you determine that the contract does require the filing by the plaintiff with the company, whether or not the plaintiff\'s compliance with that provision is excused or waived by reason of the alleged conduct of the union.

I state to you that if the conduct of the union wilfully prevented compliance with the contract requirement that a copy of the appeal be filed with the company, such requirement can be waived.

Likewise, the defendants contend that the contract requires that any notice of appeal or protest or grievance shall be filed within ten days of the date of discharge and the plaintiff has failed to comply with said provision of the contract and, therefore, cannot recover.

It is for your determination as to the meaning of the contract and the time when the ten-day limitation starts to run and for you to determine the plaintiff\'s compliance or noncompliance within the meaning of the provision of the contract, as you determine the meaning of said provision."

It is clear from Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), that an "employee must at least attempt to exhaust grievance and arbitration procedures established by the collective bargaining agreement," 386 U.S. at 184, before a court may entertain a claim of unfair representation against a union and wrongful discharge against an employer. "Unless the contract provides otherwise, there can be no doubt that the employee must afford the union the opportunity to act on his behalf." Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653, 85 S.Ct. 614, 616, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965). Whether a plaintiff has done this is a question of federal law, subject to proof at trial. The evidence in this case sufficed to support a finding that Scott made a good-faith effort to invoke the contract's grievance procedure.

On August 2, 1966, Scott sent a letter to Local 377, which stated that "I feel that I am a safe driver and should be reinstated with back pay" and requested a meeting and hearing as soon as a steward and representative committee for the Lordstown plant could be elected, none having been set up since the Lordstown operation's opening. Assuming that this letter was timely sent and properly addressed, it was a sufficient attempt to invoke the collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedure, under Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox and Vaca v. Sipes, to give the District Court jurisdiction over the case. Contrast Steen v. Local 163, 373 F.2d 519 (6th Cir. 1967), where "plaintiff had made no effort whatsoever to comply with the grievance procedure," 373 F.2d at 520; and Broniman v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 353 F.2d 559 (6th Cir. 1965), where "there was no real attempt to use the grievance procedure," 353 F.2d at 563.

Given this conclusion, whether Scott actually wrote this letter and whether he complied with the terms of the contract in delivering it are questions of fact, subject to a jury's determination.

When a contract is ambiguous, it is for the jury to determine the meaning of its terms, subject to proper instructions and based upon "evidence of the surrounding circumstances and the practical construction of the parties." Tennessee Consolidated Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 416 F.2d 1192, 1198 (6th Cir. 1969) ;² Goddard v Foster, 17 Wall. 123, 142, 84 U.S. 123, 21 L.Ed. 589 (U.S. 1872) ; Local 783 v. General Electric Co., 471 F.2d 751, 757 (6th Cir. 1973). Article 32 stated that appeals from discharge "must be taken within ten days by a written notice." The...