Scott v. Archon Group, L.P.

Decision Date06 May 2008
Docket NumberNo. 102,782.,102,782.
PartiesRobert SCOTT, Jr.; Amanda Scott; and Jessica Ball, Owen Ball, and Daniel Scott, Minor Children, by and through their parents and next friends, Robert Scott, Jr., and Amanda Scott, Plaintiffs/Appellants/Respondents, v. ARCHON GROUP, L.P., A Delaware corporation; Prime Financial corporation; Northwest Tower Limited Partnership, an Illinois corporation; Winthrop Financial Co., Inc., a Massachusetts corporation; Sandi Leech; W9/PHC Real Estate Limited Partnership, a Delaware limited partnership; and Trammell Crow Operations, Inc., a foreign corporation, Defendants/Appellees/Petitioners.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV.

¶ 0 Certiorari was previously granted to review a Court of Appeals decision reversing the trial court's award of summary judgment to defendants in a premises liability action where plaintiffs sought recovery of damages from defendants for injuries suffered when a clearance beam at the entrance into the upper parking deck of the office building where plaintiff Robert Scott, Jr., worked fell on his truck after the truck struck the beam. Plaintiffs sued the building's owner, previous owners, interest holders and property management group and employee. The Honorable Vicki L. Robertson, trial judge, granted summary judgment to all defendants and plaintiffs appealed. We hold summary judgment was properly granted, reverse the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirm the trial court.

DECISION OF COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION REVERSED. JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED.

John W. Norman, John B. Norman, Jerri K. Bird, Norman & Trammel, Oklahoma City, OK, and Gary B. Homsey, Jeffrey M. Cooper, Kevin E. Hill, Homsey, Cooper, Hill & Associates, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiffs/Appellants.

Daniel K. Zorn, Jason C. Wagner, Collins, Zorn, Wagner & Gibbs, P.C., Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants/Arcane Group, L.P., and W9/PHC Real Estate Limited Partnership.

Joe E. Edwards, Joel W. Harmon, Lisa M. Molsbee, Day, Edwards, Propester & Christensen, Oklahoma City, OK, and Kathy R. Neal, William S. Leach, Eldridge Cooper Steichen & Leach, LLC, for Defendant/Appellee Prime Financial Corporation.

Gerald E. Durban, Glen Mullins, R. Ryan Deligans, Durbin, Larimore & Bialick, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants/Appellees Trammell Crow Operations, Inc., and Sandi Leech.

EDMONDSON, V.C.J.

¶ 1 The dispositive issue before us is whether the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to the defendants in this premises liability action. We answer in the negative. We find the evidence provides undisputed proof of the open and obvious condition of the premises, supporting but a single inference that favors nonliability of the defendants based on absence of duty to the plaintiffs. We previously granted certiorari and now reverse the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 2 Mr. Scott was seriously injured on February 19, 2002, in a single-vehicle accident on the roof level parking deck of the Oklahoma City office building where he worked. The building, known as "The Tower," had parking on two levels. In order to prevent overweight trucks from parking on the upper deck, a steel barrier beam had been erected across the entrance ramp to stop vehicles taller than 8 feet 6 inches from entering. Mr. Scott was driving a truck which was 11 feet tall. When the truck struck the beam, the beam was knocked loose and fell onto the cab of the truck crushing it and rendering Mr. Scott a quadriplegic.

¶ 3 Plaintiffs, Mr. Scott, his wife and their children, brought this action against multiple defendants: the owners of The Tower, W9/PHC Real Estate Limited Partnership(W9/PHC); its assets manager, Archon Group, L.P.(Archon); the building's on-site property manager, Trammell Crow Operations, Inc. (Trammell), and its senior managing employee, Sandi Leech (Leech); as well as former owners of The Tower, Northwest Tower Limited Partnership, Inc. (Northwest) and its partner, Winthrop Financial Co., Inc. (Winthrop), and Prime Financial Corporation (Prime).

¶ 4 Plaintiffs alleged Mr. Scott's injuries resulted from breaches of the defendants' respective duties to exercise reasonable care in that they negligently erected and maintained the beam across the ramp and failed to warn and protect from dangers which the defendants knew about or should have foreseen. Plaintiffs alleged Mr. Scott was an invitee, and that the manner of the beam's installation constituted a violation of the defendants' duty to keep the premises reasonably safe for him, in that the ease with which the beam could be toppled and the resulting danger of serious injury posed by the weight of it constituted a hidden snare, trap or pitfall.

¶ 5 All defendants moved for summary judgment and asserted that the undisputed facts showed they had no duty to protect or warn Mr. Scott because the beam was an open and obvious condition. Defendants also contended Mr. Scott became a trespasser by reason of his attempt to enter into an area where trucks were specifically prohibited. They further argued that even if even if he should establish his status as an invitee rather than a trespasser, they had no legal duty to warn him because the beam posed an open and obvious danger which should have been observed by any person exercising ordinary care for his own safety. Defendants contend Mr. Scott tried to drive his 11-foot-high truck through an 8 foot 6 inch opening in daylight despite the facts that the barrier beam was in plain view, its clearly marked height-clearance warning visible to all, and there were also height-clearance warnings on his vehicle. Former owners asserted they had no duty to Mr. Scott as they did not have possession or control of the property, nor did they have any knowledge regarding concerns about the beam that should have been revealed by them to their vendees.

¶ 6 Without specifying her reasons, the trial court granted each defendant summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed, claiming that: (1) whether the clearance bar was open and obvious or a hidden hazard was a question of fact for the jury, (2) whether plaintiff was an invitee or a trespasser was a question of fact for the jury, and (3) under the facts of this case Prime is liable to Mr. Scott even though it sold the land to W9/PHC four years prior to his injury. The Court of Civil Appeals, in an unpublished decision, affirmed summary judgment granted in favor of the more remote owners, Northwest and Winthrop, owners of the property from November 1983 to February 1997, and Archon, W/9PHC's assets manager. But that court reversed summary judgment granted in favor of W9/PHC, Trammell, Leech and Prime, the former owner which sold the property to W9/PHC.

¶ 7 Prime had been the mortgage lender to Northwest and Winthrop. In February 1997, Prime exercised its option to purchase the collateral property in order to market and sell it, which it did in March 1998, to W9/PHC. Pursuant to successive written contracts, Trammell had provided property management services as an independent contractor to The Tower since 1996, first with Northwest and continuing on with Prime, and then with W9/PHC. Those defendants individually sought certiorari. We hold (1) defendants had no legal duty to protect or warn Mr. Scott as the beam was open and obvious as a matter of law, (2) because the condition was open and obvious it is unnecessary to determine Mr. Scott's precise status, and (3) as a former owner of the building, Prime is not liable for Mr. Scott's injury.

¶ 8 Summary judgment is proper where there is no substantial dispute as to any material fact, and it appears that one party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Beatty v. Dixon, 1965 OK 169, 408 P.2d 339; Weldon v. Seminole Municipal Hospital, 1985 OK 94, 709 P.2d 1058, 1059. Our review is de novo; in addition to the pleadings, we may consider evidentiary materials submitted by the parties to the trial court such as depositions, affidavits, admissions, and answers to interrogatories, viewing all evidentiary inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing nonmovant. Hargrave v. Canadian Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc., 1990 OK 43, 792 P.2d 50, 55.

¶ 9 The record shows numerous uncontroverted facts presented to the trial court. The steel beam (variously referred to by the parties as a "height bar," "warning bar," "clearance beam" and "barrier beam") was set across the south access ramp to the upper parking deck on two steel posts that were anchored in concrete. The beam was at a height of approximately nine feet and it was 12 feet long and weighed 1,843 pounds. The beam had lettering on the side facing oncoming traffic which was ten inches high and clearly visible, reading:

"NO TRUCKS VISITOR PARKING CLEARANCE 8'6"."

¶ 10 Mr. Scott's employer's office was in The Tower and on a daily basis for more than two years before the accident, he had driven up the south ramp, passed under the beam, entered the upper parking deck and parked. Mr. Scott had the option of parking in the garage beneath the upper deck, but he preferred parking on the upper level and always did so. Mr. Scott routinely drove his own vehicle, a Ford Expedition, to work; however, on the day in question he was driving the eleven-foot-high U-Haul truck because he was moving some family furniture. A warning sign prominently displayed on the dashboard read "11 foot Clearance Requirement" and a similar warning sign was on the outside of the truck where the driver could see it in the rear view mirror. Mr. Scott had rented a truck like this one on two previous occasions.

¶ 11 Mr. Scott's accident occurred in daylight at about 8:30 in the morning as he was arriving for work. Mr. Scott stated that as he approached the south ramp he checked to make sure no traffic was coming toward...

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