Scott v. Benson

• Decision Date: 21 October 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20210280-CA,20210280-CA
• Citation: 501 P.3d 1148
• Parties: Taylor Lynn SCOTT, Appellee, v. Sarah Catherine BENSON, Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

501 P.3d 1148

Taylor Lynn SCOTT, Appellee,

v.Sarah Catherine BENSON, Appellant.

No. 20210280-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed October 21, 2021

G. Clayton Randle, Benjamin Lusty, Salt Lake City, Julie J. Nelson, and Alexandra Mareschal, Attorneys for Appellant

Jeremy G. Jones, Sandy, and Jeffrey C. Jensen, Attorneys for Appellee

Judge Ryan M. Harris authored this Opinion, in which Judges Michele M. Christiansen Forster and Jill M. Pohlman concurred.

Opinion

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 In this case, we must consider whether Taylor Lynn Scott has parental rights, pursuant to the terms of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (the Act), with respect to a child (Child) with whom he shares no biological connection. Under the rather unique circumstances of this case, the district court determined that he does, despite being party to an admittedly fraudulent voluntary declaration of paternity. Sarah Catherine Benson,¹ Child's biological mother, appeals that determination. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.

BACKGROUND²

¶2 Scott and Benson began dating in late 2011. At that time, Benson was already pregnant with Child, and Scott was aware of that when he and Benson began their relationship. It is therefore undisputed that Scott is not Child's biological father.

¶3 Over the next few months, the couple's relationship deepened, and they moved in together and became engaged to be married. When Benson gave birth to Child in the spring of 2012, Scott attended the delivery, helped care for Benson and Child at the hospital, and then upon discharge transported Benson and Child to the couple's joint residence. Child's biological father passed away shortly after Child's birth, and Scott assumed a paternal role thereafter in many meaningful ways, at least for the first few years of Child's life.

¶4 Later in 2012, Benson became pregnant with Scott's biological child (Sibling), who was born in 2013. About a month prior to Sibling's birth, Scott and Benson ended their relationship. After the birth, Benson initiated a paternity action regarding Sibling (but not Child), in which she sought to establish that Scott was Sibling's father and to require him to pay child support. The parties eventually reached an agreement to resolve that action; as part of the settlement, Scott and Benson both executed a voluntary declaration of paternity regarding Sibling. Under the agreement, which was reflected in a court order, Scott enjoyed significant parent-time with Sibling, starting with six out of every fourteen overnights but eventually transitioning into an equal parent-time arrangement. At least according to Scott (whose account was to some extent disputed by Benson), the parties often proceeded as though both children were subject to the same custody arrangement, even though the existing court order applied only to Sibling. That is, for a period of several years, Scott often cared for Child on similar terms as he cared for Sibling, and this informal arrangement continued even after Scott married someone else in 2015.

¶5 In December 2017, Benson was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. She eventually entered a guilty plea, and as a result her driving privileges were suspended for a time. In the wake of these events, Benson asked Scott to temporarily take primary custody of Child and Sibling and, for the next several months, Scott and his spouse acted as the primary caregivers to both children. During this time, Benson struggled with depression and suicidal thoughts, and began to consider what would happen to the children should she no longer be able to care for them. The parties discussed the possibility of signing a voluntary declaration of paternity regarding Child as they had for Sibling, and eventually they agreed to do so. In March 2018, they both executed such a declaration (the VDP), therein making certain representations "under penalty of perjury." In that document, Benson checked a box averring that she "believe[d]" Scott was "the biological father" of Child, and Scott checked a box averring that he "believe[d]" he was "the biological father" of Child. These averments were factually incorrect when made, and both parties knew it.

¶6 For about a year after executing the VDP, the parties continued their informal co-parenting arrangement with regard to both children. But in March 2019, Benson—who had since married and whose spouse apparently wanted to adopt Child—began denying Scott access to Child. Just a few weeks later, Scott filed the instant paternity action, seeking among other things a judicial declaration that he was Child's legal father and an order granting him joint legal and physical custody over Child. In response, Benson not only opposed Scott's petition, but also filed a counter-petition challenging Scott's paternity, specifically alleging that the VDP was fraudulent.

¶7 Soon after filing her counter-petition, Benson filed a motion asking the court to compel Scott to submit to genetic testing, which she asserted would conclusively demonstrate that Scott was not Child's biological father. Scott responded by conceding that he was not Child's biological father, but nevertheless asked the court to disregard that fact pursuant to a specific provision of the Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-608 (LexisNexis 2018) (herein referred to as "Section 608"), and apply principles of estoppel and equity to prevent Benson from contesting his status as Child's legal father. At a hearing regarding Benson's motion for genetic testing, the parties stipulated that Scott was not Child's biological father, thereby obviating the need for formal genetic testing.

¶8 Later, Benson filed a motion for summary judgment asking the court to set aside the VDP because the parties had made a "material mistake of fact," a term that in this context is statutorily defined to include a situation in which "genetic test results ... exclude a declarant father." See id. § 78B-15-307(5). The court denied the motion by relying on the "normal and usual application and definition" of mistake: "a conscious choice made on incorrect information or an unconscious choice." In the court's view, there could not have been a "mistake" of fact, because the parties knew that Scott was not Child's biological father at the time they signed the VDP.

¶9 Following denial of Benson's summary judgment motion, the court held a three-day evidentiary hearing to consider Benson's challenge to the validity of the VDP, and to consider Scott's request for application of Section 608. In support of his position, Scott called seven witnesses, including himself as well as various family members and care providers. In brief summary, Scott's witnesses testified that Scott was, for all intents and purposes, Child's father, that he and Child had a strong bond of attachment, and that Scott was an attentive and involved father who had shared roughly equal custody of Child over the preceding years. Scott also admitted to falsely executing the VDP.

¶10 In support of her position, Benson called six witnesses, including herself, her spouse, various family members, and a child psychologist. In brief summary, Benson's witnesses acknowledged that Scott had played some role in caring for Child, but downplayed the scope of that role, offering their view that Scott was inconsistent in his supporting role and that he was not a father figure to Child. Benson acknowledged that she had voluntarily and fraudulently signed the VDP, but explained that she did so during one of the "lowest parts" of her life, a time when she "honestly believed that [she] was going to end [her] life," and was concerned that Child would in that event be placed into foster care and be separated from Sibling. She testified that she no longer wanted Scott to play a part in Child's life, and that she believed that outcome to be in Child's best interest.

¶11 After the hearing concluded, the court took the matter under advisement, and later issued a written ruling. The court accepted the parties’ stipulation that Scott was not Child's biological father, and found that the parties knew that fact when they signed the VDP; as a consequence, the court found that the VDP suffered from two infirmities. First, the court partially reconsidered its summary judgment ruling and concluded that, given the statutory definition of "material mistake of fact," see id. , the parties had been operating under such a mistake when they signed the VDP. Second, the court found that both parties signed the VDP voluntarily, without coercion or duress, and therefore could not have defrauded each other, but nevertheless found that the VDP "was based on fraud" because its effect was to commit a "fraud against the Utah State Division of Vital Statistics."

¶12 On those two independent bases, the court sustained Benson's challenge to the VDP. In its next sentence, the court stated: "Given those restrictions, the Court must conclude and does conclude that the [VDP] is void ab initio , and has no legal force or effect." The court offered no reasoning or explanation for its conclusion that the consequence of Benson's successful challenge was that the VDP was void from its inception.

¶13 Despite concluding that the VDP was void, the court then proceeded to analyze Scott's request—made pursuant to Section 608—that the court ignore the genetic evidence in the case, based on principles of estoppel, equity, and Child's best interest, and nevertheless declare Scott to be Child's legal father. On this score, the court found in Scott's favor, making extensive factual findings in support of its determination. First, the court found Scott to be "particularly credible," especially his "description of his relationship with" Child; the court stated that it had "no reservations regarding the genuine nature of [Scott's] relationship with and affection for" Child. And while the court found Benson to be "generally credible," the court did "not accept ... her characterization of [Scott's]...