Scott v. City of New York
| Decision Date | 23 June 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02 Civ. 9530(SAS).,02 Civ. 9530(SAS). |
| Parties | Keenan M. SCOTT, Thomas Logan, John Loomis, Robert Davidson, and Michael C. Demartino, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEW YORK and The New York City Police Department, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Thomas P. Puccio, Law Offices of Thomas P. Puccio, New York City, John T. Brennan, Law Offices of John Brennan, PC, Brooklyn, NY, Will Aitchison, Aitchison & Vick, Inc., Portland, OR, for Plaintiffs.
Charles Jackson, Lorie Elizabeth Almon, Peter A. Walker, Edward W. Bergmann, Brendan Sweeney, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, New York City, Blanche Greenfield, Michele Molfetta, Assistants Corporation Counsel, New York City Law Department, New York City, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs bring this action against the City of New York ("City") and its Police Department ("NYPD") (collectively, "defendants") on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").1 Defendants now move to dismiss the first count of the Amended Complaint ("Count One") for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 Defendants also seek to join the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association ("PBA") and the Detectives' Endowment Association ("DEA") (collectively, "Unions") as necessary, non-aligned parties under Rule 19(a). For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motions to (1) dismiss Count One and (2) join the Unions are denied.
Plaintiffs are current and former New York City police officers and detectives employed by the NYPD.3 They are represented for collective bargaining purposes by the PBA and the DEA, respectively.4 The collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") entered into by the Unions and the NYPD govern the terms and conditions of their employment, such as compensation and overtime, number of hours worked per year, annual leave, length of each shift ("tour of duty"), and benefits.5
Under these CBAs, police officers and detectives who have accrued overtime hours may either receive a monetary payment or time off as compensation for those hours. Specifically, both the PBA/NYC and DEA/NYC CBAs provide:
All ordered and/or authorized hours in excess of forty (40) hours in any week or in excess of the hours required of an employee by reason of the employee's regular duty chart if a week's measurement is not appropriate, whether of an emergency nature or of a non-emergency nature, shall be compensated for either by cash payment or compensatory time off, at the rate of time and one-half, at the sole option of the employee. Such cash payments or compensatory time off shall be computed on the basis of completed fifteen (15) minute segments.6
Count One is premised on defendants' policy of improperly disallowing plaintiffs' use of compensatory time off in violation of the FLSA.7 In particular, plaintiffs aver that when City police officers and detectives who "originally received compensatory time off," request to take this time, they are routinely denied under circumstances "where no undue disruption of the City's operations would result."8 Plaintiffs assert that defendants' compensatory time off system requires them to work for extended periods without the possibility of taking compensatory non-working days, resulting in the accrual of unpaid overtime hours.9
The Complaint alleges four additional FLSA violations. First, plaintiffs argue that defendants routinely force police officers and detectives to "agree in advance to accept compensatory time off in lieu of cash compensation in order ... to be eligible for specified overtime work opportunities."10 In addition, where officers or detectives have earned cash compensation for a specific number of overtime hours (typically 35 hours per month or 105 hours per quarter), they are forced to accept compensatory time off in lieu of cash payment for any additional overtime hours.11 Plaintiffs claim that defendants' policies are not authorized by the governing CBAs.12 Second, plaintiffs state that defendants have assigned, and continue to assign, officers and detectives to schedules that require them to work more than 171 hours in a 28-day period, without adequate overtime compensation.13 Third, plaintiffs claim that defendants' failure to include "shift differential and longevity pay in computing the regular rate of pay in which the named Plaintiffs and all similarly situated police officers and detectives have worked overtime" violates section 7 of the FLSA.14 Fourth, defendants are accused of incorrectly calculating the hours worked by their employees, thereby depriving those employees of overtime hours earned.
15"Given the Federal Rules' simplified standard for pleading, `[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'" 16
Thus, a plaintiff need only plead "`a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."17 Simply put, "Rule 8 pleading is extremely permissive."18
At the motion to dismiss stage, the issue " "19
The task of the court in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is "`merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.'"20 When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), courts must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor.21
Rule 19(a) provides that a person subject to service of process whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction must be joined in an action if:
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or
(2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party.
If such a person cannot be joined, then the court must consider whether "in equity and good conscience" the case should be dismissed.22 Rule 19 protects several interests: the parties' interest in obtaining a complete resolution of their dispute, the interests of others who might be prejudiced if the matter were decided in their absence, and the public's interest in avoiding multiple lawsuits on the same subject matter.23
In order to evaluate whether Count One states a claim, this Court must first determine the meaning of section 7(o) of the FLSA. When confronted with a question of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court has counseled that before reviewing an interpretation of an administrative agency, a court must first determine whether the "intent of Congress is clear" and the meaning of the statute is unambiguous.24 If the court finds that congressional intent as to the disputed issue is clear, then contrary administrative constructions must be rejected. However, if a court finds that the statute is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."25
Section 7(o) of the FLSA provides that, under limited circumstances, public agencies may use compensatory time off (at a rate not less than one-and-one-half hours per hour of overtime compensation owed) in lieu of overtime pay.26 The use of compensatory time is only permissible: (1) when granted pursuant to "applicable provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, memorandum of understanding, or any other agreement between the public agency and representatives of such employees" or "an agreement or understanding arrived at between the employer and employee before the performance of the work" and (2) where "the employee has not accrued compensatory time in excess of the limit applicable to the employee [under the FLSA]."27
Under the FLSA, an employee of a qualifying public agency:
(A) who has accrued compensatory time off ..., and
(B) who has requested the use of such compensatory time, shall be permitted by the employee's employer to use such time within a reasonable period after making the request if the use of the compensatory time does not unduly disrupt the operations of the public agency.28
The DOL, which is responsible for the administration, interpretation, and application of the FLSA, has promulgated regulations explaining various provisions of the act. For instance, section 553.25 states that "[s]ection 7(o)(5) ... provides that any employee of a public agency who has accrued compensatory time and requested use of this [] time, shall be permitted to use such time off within a `reasonable period' after making the request, if such use does not `unduly disrupt' the operations of the agency."29 The DOL regulations further provide that an employee has the right to use her compensatory time off and "must not be coerced to accept more compensatory time than an employer can realistically and in good faith expect to be...
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