Scott v. Clarke

• Decision Date: 25 November 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:12–cv–00036.
• Citation: 64 F.Supp.3d 813
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
• Parties: Cynthia B. SCOTT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Harold W. CLARKE, et al., Defendants.

64 F.Supp.3d 813

Cynthia B. SCOTT, et al., Plaintiffs

v.Harold W. CLARKE, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:12–cv–00036.

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Charlottesville Division.

Signed Nov. 25, 2014.

Amy Elizabeth Walters, Erin Margaret Trodden, Kimberly Anne Rolla, Mary Catherine Bauer, Mary Frances Charlton, Abigail Turner, Angela A. Ciolfi, Brenda Erin Castaneda, Charlottesville, VA, Ivy Ann Finkenstadt, Falls Church, VA, Deborah Maxine Golden, Washington Lawyers Committee, Theodore Augustus Howard, Wiley Rein LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

John Michael Parsons, James Milburn Isaacs, Jr., Kate Elizabeth Dwyre, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NORMAN K. MOON, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, all prisoners residing at Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women (“FCCW”), a facility of the Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Corrections (the “VDOC”), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.¹ Plaintiffs assert that FCCW fails to provide adequate medical care and that Defendants are deliberately indifferent to this failure. Plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctions ordering FCCW to provide adequate medical care to Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated women residing at FCCW. The matter is set for a two-week bench trial to commence on December 1, 2014.

The case is presently before me on consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, I will grant Plaintiffs' motion seeking partial summary judgment on two key elements of their complaint—that is, that Defendants bear a non-delegable “constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to” Plaintiffs, West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988), and that the specific health problems and conditions of which the named Plaintiffs complain constitute “serious medical needs,” “deliberate indifference to” which is “proscribed by the Eighth Amendment,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1975). Granting Plaintiffs' motion necessarily means that Defendants' motion must, to some extent, be denied, given that Defendants contend, among other things, that they have contractually delegated their duty to provide adequate medical care; moreover, my review of the record leads me to conclude, as explained herein, that I must deny Defendants' motion in its entirety.

I. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that a court should grant summary judgment (or partial summary judgment) “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “As to materiality ... [o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In order to preclude summary judgment, the dispute about a material fact must be “ ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.; see also JKC Holding Co. v. Washington Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir.2001). However, if the evidence of a genuine issue of material fact “is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In considering a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, a court must view the record as a whole and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.1994).

When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, the standard is the same. The court must consider “each motion separately on its own merits to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law.” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir.2003) (quotations omitted). If the court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact, both motions must be denied, “[b]ut if there is no genuine issue and one or the other party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law, the court will render judgment.” Trigo v. Travelers Commercial Ins. Co., 755 F.Supp.2d 749, 752 (W.D.Va.2010). The mere existence of “some ” factual disputes will not defeat summary judgment; the dispute must be “genuine” and concern “material” facts, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; see also Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir.2008) ; in other words, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Only legitimate disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law fall within that category. Id.; see also Fields v. Verizon Servs. Corp., 493 Fed.Appx. 371, 374 (4th Cir.2012).

II. Factual Background

A.

Operated by the VDOC, FCCW houses approximately 1,200 women, a majority of whom are 35 years of age or older and are serving median sentences of twenty years. FCCW includes a medical building in which medical, dental, and mental health services are provided. FCCW is the prison within the VDOC system purportedly able to provide the most complete medical care to women prisoners, and it is where women with serious medical problems are sent in the first instance, or to which they are transferred from other VDOC facilities for the purpose of receiving a supposedly “heightened” level of care.

Since FCCW opened in 1998, the VDOC has contracted with outside medical providers for health care at the facility. Since at least November 2011, a frequently changing series of private, for-profit corporations have contracted to provide almost all medical, dental, and mental health services to the women at FCCW, with limited exceptions for services provided directly by the VDOC. The new contractor generally re-hires the medical personnel employed by the prior contractor. Frederick Schilling, the VDOC's Health Services Director, testified that the price bid is the primary factor in the selection of the winning contractor from among competing bidders. Regarding the procurement process that resulted in Armor's replacement of Corizon in 2011, he stated, “The number one difference [between the winning and losing bidder] was price.”

Beginning in 2011, the VDOC sought bids for the FCCW contract based on “capitated financing,” in which the contractor sets up a pricing schedule that fluctuates monthly, based on the facility's average daily population. “Capitated financing” allows the VDOC to predict, with some degree of certainty derived from population forecasts, how much it will spend on medical care over the life of the contract. Prior to the 2011 change, contracts were based upon a risk/reward-sharing model, under which the VDOC and the private contractor shared equally in the risk that medical expenses might exceed expectations (up to a certain pre-determined level, where 100% of the risk falls back upon the VDOC).

Under the capitated financing scheme, also known as a “full-risk contract,” the contractor bears the full risk that health care costs may exceed the per prisoner price dictated by the pricing schedule in the contract.² The capitated financing model was used in the 2011 contract, the 2013 contract, and the new contract that is supposed to have gone into effect on October 1, 2014. The contractor using the capitated system receives a fixed amount of money per prisoner, and its profit increases as the cost of care it provides to the prisoners decreases, regardless of how much or how little care is provided to the prisoners.

The VDOC promulgates standard operating procedures for the provision of health care within its prisons, including those prisons, such as the FCCW, where health care services are rendered by private contractors. Private contractors—for example, Corizon Health, Inc. (“Corizon”) and Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc. (“Armor”) (collectively, the “contractors”), both of which were formerly defendants in this case—have their own procedures, but they must also follow the VDOC's procedures. Additionally, a contractor's doctors must use the VDOC formulary for prescribing medication. Although a series of private health care contractors has come and gone in rotating fashion during the sixteen years since FCCW opened, the policies, practices, and many of the personnel providing care have largely remained the same. According to individual health care providers who have worked at FCCW, a change of contractor only rarely causes a substantive change in the provision of care; rather, only certain administrative procedures and the nature or volume of paperwork actually change.

The warden at FCCW is the highest-ranking VDOC official at the facility. The warden has authority over all staff, including medical personnel. Even when there is a private medical contractor, the warden remains ultimately responsible for the operation of the facility, including health care treatment and security. The VDOC determines the medical accommodations prisoners may receive, and medical staff has no authority to override VDOC criteria.

B.

I have reviewed the allegations and the evidence concerning Plaintiffs' medical conditions in several opinions I have issued in the course of this case. The following is but a sampling, and is not an exhaustive or conclusive list, of Plaintiffs' significant health problems. I include it here as a factual prelude to my finding that Plaintiffs have carried their summary judgment burden to show that...