Scott v. Coughlin
| Decision Date | 14 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 90 Civ. 0494(RJW).,90 Civ. 0494(RJW). |
| Citation | 78 F.Supp.2d 299 |
| Parties | Harold SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. Thomas A. COUGHLIN, III, et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Laurent A. Sacharoff, New York City, for plaintiff.
Vincent Leong, Assistant Attorney General, New York City, for defendant.
Defendants have moved, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), for summary judgment. For the reasons hereinafter stated, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
On January 22, 1990, Scott filed the present action pro se under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, charging eleven defendants with violating his constitutional rights while he was an inmate at the Green Haven Correctional Facility.1 The facts in this case are set forth in detail in Scott v. Albury, 156 F.3d 283 (2d Cir.1998) and Scott v. Coughlin, 944 F.Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y.1996). Nevertheless, a brief review of the facts relevant to the present motion and the procedural history in this case follow.
On November 7, 1986, while conducting a search of plaintiff's cell, Corrections Officer John R. Novak allegedly found a "shank," or home-made knife hidden in one of the legs of plaintiff's bed. A misbehavior report against plaintiff was filed the same day by Novak, charging Scott with possession of a weapon. Novak also reported the incident to the New York State Police. As a result, State Police Investigator Nelson Howe charged Scott with criminal possession of a weapon and promotion of prison contraband.
A disciplinary hearing was held on November 13, 1986 to determine whether Scott was guilty of the allegations made in Novak's misbehavior report. The hearing was conducted by Patrick McGann, a Deputy Superintendent at Green Haven. At the conclusion of the hearing, McGann found plaintiff guilty of the weapons charge and sentenced him to 45 days keeplock confinement, 30 days of which were deferred. Scott subsequently filed an administrative appeal, but his appeal was denied.2
On January 22, 1987, Scott was produced before the Beekman Town Justice Court (hereinafter the "Beekman Court") to be arraigned on the criminal charges filed against him by Howe. Believing that he could not be compelled to appear without a written court order, plaintiff refused to enter the courtroom. That evening Corrections Officer Gordon LaBonte served plaintiff with a second misbehavior report, charging him with disobeying a direct order and interfering with corrections officers.3
On January 28, 1987, Joseph Tanner, Corrections Captain, presided over Scott's second disciplinary hearing. Tanner found plaintiff guilty of the charges alleged in LaBonte's report and sentenced him to 60 days keeplock confinement. Although sentenced to keeplock, plaintiff states that he was confined to the more restrictive A2-Special Housing Unit ("SHU").4 Plaintiff appealed Tanner's ruling following the hearing. This appeal was denied.5
* * * * * *
Scott originally set forth ten claims in his complaint. Claims one, two, eight, nine, and ten alleged that defendants violated Scott's rights to due process and equal protection by producing him before the Beekman Court without a court order. Claims three, four and five asserted that plaintiff's two disciplinary hearings did not comply with the requirement of due process because Scott was deprived of a fair and impartial hearing officer, denied the right to call witnesses and present evidence, and was not provided with the necessary witness refusal forms. Claim six alleged that plaintiff's second disciplinary hearing was instituted in retaliation for Scott's exercise of his constitutional rights. Finally, claim seven asserted that certain defendants conspired to have Scott falsely charged and prosecuted for possession of a weapon and promotion of prison contraband.
On July 25, 1990, this Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's five claims arising out of the Beekman Court incident. Scott v. Coughlin, No. 90 Civ. 494 (RJW), 1990 WL 108383 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 1990). The Court found that Scott's constitutional rights were not violated as a result of his compelled production because Scott did not possess a liberty interest in being produced only with a court order.6
Then, on March 19, 1991, this Court granted defendants' first motion for summary judgment as to those portions of plaintiff's remaining claims which asserted that defendants violated Scott's constitutional rights by denying his request present evidence at his two disciplinary hearings. Scott v. Coughlin, No. 90 Civ. 494, Hon. Robert J. Ward, Memorandum Decision, dated March 19, 1991. In its ruling, the Court noted that an inmate's request for evidence may be denied where the evidence would be irrelevant to the proceedings. The Court went on to find that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the relevance of the requested evidence and concluded that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment in 1995 on the surviving claims, all of which alleged various due process violations. Without reaching the merits of these claims, the Court granted defendants' motion and dismissed the complaint. Scott v. Coughlin, 944 F.Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y.1996). The Court found that under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), Scott could not assert a claim for denial of due process because his sixty-day confinement to SHU did not implicate a liberty interest triggering due process protection.
On March 9, 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated this Court's decision, finding that the Court, in its Sandin analysis, erroneously relied on the New York Prison regulations in place at the time of the court's decision, rather than at the time of Scott's SHU confinement. Scott v. Albury, 156 F.3d 283 (2d Cir.1998). The Second Circuit, therefore, remanded the case and directed this Court to analyze Scott's due process claims in light of the earlier regulations.
Currently before the Court is defendants' renewed second motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's remaining five claims. These claims include: (1) denial of plaintiff's right to a fair and impartial hearing officer at the Tanner hearing brought against Tanner, LaBonte, Albury, Scully, and Coughlin (Claim Three); (2) denial of the right to call witnesses at the Tanner hearing alleged against the same defendants (Claim Four); (3) denial of plaintiff's right to witness refusal forms at the Tanner hearing against Tanner, Scully, and Coughlin (Claim Five); (4) denial of the right to be free from retaliation for asserting due process rights brought against Coughlin, Scully, Seitz, Tanner, Winch, Albury, and LaBonte (Claim Six); and (5) denial of the right to be free from false charges and prosecution against Novak, Howe, and Scully (Claim Seven).7
In support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants reargue the Sandin issue based on the earlier regulations. They also assert that even if the Court finds that plaintiff does possess a liberty interest triggering due process protection, they are nevertheless entitled to summary judgment because defendants lack the requisite personal involvement to be held liable, are entitled to qualified immunity, and did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights. For the following reasons, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
A motion for summary judgment may only be granted if the court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried and that the facts warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir.1995). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and in determining whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, the Court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor." Consarc Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 996 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir.1993).
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a prison inmate must first show that he possessed a protected liberty interest and that he was deprived of that interest without due process of law. The Supreme Court has held that disciplinary confinement such as Scott's sixty-day SHU sentence, does not create a protected liberty interest triggering due process protection unless the confinement imposes an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995).
As the Second Circuit has recently explained, after Sandin, a prisoner has no actionable due process claim if other prisoners typically experience approximately the same deprivation as a result of the "ordinary administration of the prison." Welch v. Bartlett, 196 F.3d 389, 392 (2d Cir.1999).8 Due process claims are reserved instead for those prisoners who endure hardships that are "substantially more grave" than those hardships that prisoners would ordinarily experience as members of the general prison population. Id.
Due to confusion among the district courts, the Second Circuit has recently attempted to clarify what factors should be considered in conducting the Sandin analysis. To this end, the Second Circuit has directed district courts to engage in extensive fact-finding as to the specific conditions of the inmate's disciplinary confinement. Ayers v. Ryan, 152 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir.1998); Brooks v. DiFasi, 112 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir.1997). In determining whether these conditions create a "significant and atypical hardship," the Second Circuit has stated that district courts should compare the specific conditions of the inmate's...
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