Scott v. Gardner
| Decision Date | 31 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02 Civ.8963(RWS).,02 Civ.8963(RWS). |
| Citation | 287 F.Supp.2d 477 |
| Parties | Harold SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. Lt. G. GARDNER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Harold J. Scott, Great Meadow Correctional Facility, Comstock, NY, Plaintiff, pro se.
Honorable Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York State, New York, NY (Steven N. Schulman, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for defendants.
Defendants Lieutenant G. Gardner ("Gardner"), Lieutenant Longobardo ("Longobardo"), Sergeant James Dunn ("Dunn"), Correction Officer D. Young ("Young"), Robert H. Kuhlman ("Kuhlman"), Dr. Lee ("Lee"), Director Donald Selsky ("Selsky") have moved under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint of pro se plaintiff Harold Scott ("Scott"), on the grounds that Scott has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, that Scott's claim is barred by the statute of limitations, that the defendants have qualified immunity and that Scott has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
Scott is a prison inmate in Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") custody and was incarcerated at Sullivan Correctional Facility ("Sullivan") when the events complained of began. Scott is currently incarcerated in Great Meadow Correctional Facility in Comstock, New York.
Gardner is an employee of DOCS assigned to Sullivan at all relevant times.
Dunn is an employee of DOCS assigned to Sullivan at all relevant times. Dunn was responsible for supervising the urinalysis program at Sullivan.
Longobardo is an employee of DOCS assigned to Sullivan at all relevant times.
Young is an employee of DOCS assigned to Sullivan at all relevant times.
Kuhlman was the Superintendent of Sullivan at all relevant times.
Selsky is DOCS Director of Special Housing/Inmate Disciplinary Program.
Lee was at all relevant times an employee of the Office of Mental Health (OMH) assigned to the Sullivan Psychiatric Satellite Unit.
John Doe # 1 is the Psychiatric Unit Chief at Sullivan and is an OMH employee.
John Doe # 2 is the Classification Analyst in the Albany DOCS Division of Classification and Movement.
Jane Doe is an OMH social worker.
In 1990 Scott commenced a federal action in the Southern District of New York alleging that the discipline he received in connection with the possession of a shank and refusing to make a court appearance violated his rights. The case arose out of incidents which occurred in Green Haven Correctional Facility in the 1980's. The only common defendant with this case is Selsky. In Scott v. Coughlin, 78 F.Supp.2d 299 (S.D.N.Y.2000), the Court denied in part and granted in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The case was settled in January 2000.
On November 12, 2002, Scott filed the complaint in the present action, alleging, inter alia, that defendants retaliated against him for pursuing the prior litigation by subjecting him to multiple urine tests, an illegal disciplinary proceeding, unwanted mental health treatment and a sanction in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) of Fishkill Correctional Facility.
Defendants moved to dismiss the action on May 12, 2003. After submission of briefs, the matter was deemed fully submitted on September 3, 2003.
The following facts are drawn from Scott's complaint, Rule 56.1 statement and accompanying exhibits, and do not constitute findings of fact by the Court.
Scott was subjected to numerous urine tests. These tests occurred at Sullivan on September 11, 1998, September 19, 1998, January 18, 1999 and February 20, 1999 by Longobardo, March 9, 1999 by Gardner and March 13, 1999 and March 26, 1999 by Young. Following his transfer to Fishkill Correctional Facility ("Fishkill"), Scott was given a urine test by non-defendant Correction Officer Bennett. After transfer to Great Meadow Correctional Facility ("Great Meadow"), Scott was tested on June 24, 1999, September 5, 1999, November 24, 1999, December 22, 1999 and January 11, 2000. Scott does not allege that any defendant participated in the tests at Great Meadow.
Scott also alleges that on October 30, 1998, OMH ordered him to report to the Psychiatric Satellite Unit at Sullivan. Scott was referred to OMH by John Doe # 1 because he was complaining that the actions of corrections officers were causing anxiety. Scott was interviewed by an OMH social worker, identified as Jane Doe, who advised him that he would have to receive therapy every two to three weeks and would be admitted to the Central New York Psychiatric Center if he refused. Dr. Lee allegedly made similar threats. Scott was classified as "delusional" by OMH and his OMH mental health level was changed to indicate that he had mental health issues. Scott reported for therapy until he was transferred on April 1, 1999.
Scott alleges that the March 13, 1999 urine test was taken by Young, who had made comments critical of Scott's legal actions. Scott alleges that Young mishandled that sample, which tested positive for opiates. Sergeant Dunn performed a confirmatory test which was also positive. After confirming with a nurse that Scott was not prescribed any opiates, Dunn issued a misbehavior report initiating disciplinary charges for illicit drug use.
On March 19, 1999, a hearing was held before Lt. Longobardo. Scott raised objections to the testing process and to the evidence received at the hearing. Longobardo found Scott guilty and imposed 180 days of keeplock confinement, of which 60 days were suspended, in addition to 365 days loss of package, commissary and telephone privileges, of which 180 days were suspended. On April 8, 1999, Scott appealed the sanction to Director Selsky, who reviews disciplinary proceedings at the departmental level. On May 19, 1999, Selsky modified the sanction to 90 days keeplock plus 180 days loss of package, commissary and telephone privileges. Scott alleges that he served a total of 90 days confinement.
Scott filed an Article 78 petition for review in the Supreme Court of New York for Albany County. In the course of the litigation, Scott was served with a computer printout which showed that the March 13, 1999 urine test, which had led to the sanctions, was conducted under suspicion, rather than randomly as previously claimed. On January 18, 2000, Scott wrote to Selsky, bringing the computer printout to his attention. On February 7, 2000, Selsky reversed the sanctions and ordered that the record of the disciplinary proceedings be expunged.
On March 23, 1999, Scott asked Gardner why he had been subjected to frequent urine tests. Scott alleges that in response Gardner initiated a transfer to a facility further from New York City, apparently in cahoots with John Doe # 2, the DOCS classification analyst who allowed the transfer to proceed.
On April 1, 1999, Scott was transferred first to Downstate Correctional Facility and then to Fishkill. On arrival at Fishkill, Scott was placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) in a double cell, rather than keeplock. Scott filed a grievance protesting serving a keeplock sanction in SHU, which was ultimately denied. On June 16, 1999, Scott was transferred to Great Meadow, in upstate New York.
Scott filed two grievances at Sullivan and three grievances at Fishkill which were appealed to the Central Office Review Committee (CORC). Of the two grievances at Sullivan, one related to the postage for insurance and the other related to doublecelling. Of the grievances at Fishkill, one related to the issuance of soap, one related to a request for a single cell, and one alleged that he was placed in SHU rather than keeplock upon arrival at the facility. CORC sustained the superintendent's decision on the latter grievance denying the grievance on May 12, 1999.
In addressing the present motion, the Court is mindful that the plaintiff is proceeding pro se and that his submissions should be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers ..." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)); see also Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 11 F.3d 21, 22 (2d Cir.1993). Indeed, district courts should "read the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments they suggest." McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994)). Nevertheless, pro se status does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.1983) (quotations omitted).
To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) defendants acted under "color of state law" (2) to deprive plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Shabazz v. Vacco, No. 97 Civ. 3761, 1998 WL 901737, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.28, 1998) (citing Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547-48 (2d Cir.1994)); see also Am. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999). An individual defendant is not liable under § 1983 absent personal involvement. See Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir.1994); Morris v. Eversley, 205 F.Supp.2d 234, 241 (S.D.N.Y.2002). Generally, to withstand a motion to dismiss, a § 1983 complaint must set forth specific factual allegations indicating a deprivation of constitutional rights. Shabazz, 1998 WL 901737, at *2; see Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir.1987) ().
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) ("PLRA"), states that:
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