Scott v. CSL Plasma, Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 13-2616 (JNE/BRT) |
| Citation | 151 F.Supp.3d 961 |
| Parties | Lisa Scott, Plaintiff, v. CSL Plasma, Inc., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
151 F.Supp.3d 961
Lisa Scott, Plaintiff,
v.
CSL Plasma, Inc., Defendant.
Civil No. 13-2616 (JNE/BRT)
United States District Court, D. Minnesota.
Signed December 3, 2015
Andrew P. Muller, Muller & Muller, P.L.L.C., and John Klassen, John Klassen, P.A., appeared for Plaintiff Lisa Scott.
Bruce J. Douglas and Stephanie J. Willing, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., appeared for Defendant CSL Plasma, Inc.
ORDER
JOAN N. ERICKSEN, United States District Judge
Lisa Scott is a transgender woman who attempted to give plasma at a collection center run by defendant CSL Plasma, Inc. (“CSL”) but was rejected because she is transgender. She has asserted a single cause of action against CSL for unlawful discrimination under Section 363A.17 of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”). CSL moved for summary
judgment. Although the parties' arguments at times invoke broader concerns regarding the fairness and propriety of federal guidance on plasma donor eligibility, such policy concerns are not properly before the Court, and the Court does not address them. This decision concerns only whether, in this particular instance and on the record before the Court, there are any genuine disputes of material fact for a jury to consider.
Summary judgment is proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To support an assertion that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed, a party must cite “to particular parts of materials in the record,” show “that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute,” or show “that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must view genuinely disputed facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Ricci v. DeStefano , 557 U.S. 557, 586, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009), and draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the nonmovant's favor, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed. On November 17, 2008, Scott, a male-to-female transgender woman, visited a CSL center in Minneapolis intending to “donate” plasma. CSL compensates plasma “donors” for the time they spend giving plasma, including the pre-donation screening process, and Scott sought that compensation. As Scott went through the standard pre-donation screening steps intended to determine donor eligibility, she met with a CSL nurse (“Nurse”) to discuss her medical history, current medications, and other topics. When the Nurse learned that Scott was taking hormone replacements and had undergone a sex change operation, she designated Scott as permanently ineligible to donate. The Nurse noted in Scott's file that Scott was permanently rejected “due to sex change operation and hormone replacement medication.”
Scott filed a charge of discrimination with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (“Department”) on April 20, 2009, and amended the charge in October. The Department then issued a letter stating its determination of probable cause on June 29, 2010. Over three years later, on July 31 and August 2, 2013, respectively, Scott withdrew her charge and the Department acknowledged the withdrawal. Scott filed the complaint in this action on September 23, 2013.
The MHRA makes it “an unfair discriminatory practice for a person engaged in a trade or business or in the provision of a service” to “intentionally refuse to do business with, to refuse to contract with, or to discriminate in the basic terms, conditions, or performance of the contract because of a person's ... sexual orientation ..., unless the alleged refusal or discrimination is because of a legitimate business purpose.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.17. Sexual orientation encompasses transgender identity. Id. § 363A.03, subd. 44.
DISCUSSION
CSL asserted multiple arguments in support of its motion for summary judgment. For different reasons, none succeed.
Statute of Limitations
CSL first argued that Scott's complaint was untimely, although it acknowledged that no MHRA statute of limitations expressly bars this action. Scott filed both her original charge (April 20, 2009) and an amended charge (October 23, 2009) with the Department within the one-year statute of limitations for filing a charge. Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 3. The Department then, within twelve months of the filing of the amended charge, issued a letter on June 29, 2010 stating its determination that probable cause existed. Id. § 363A.28, subd. 6(b). On July 31, 2013, Scott notified the Department that she was withdrawing her charge in order to file a civil case. She filed the complaint in this action 54 days later.
An aggrieved person may bring a civil action either “within 45 days” after receiving notice that the Department dismissed the charge or reaffirmed a finding of no probable cause; or “after 45 days from the filing of a charge,” unless a hearing has been held or the charging party has signed a conciliation agreement. Id. § 363A.33, subd. 1 (emphasis added). If bringing an action after 45 days from the filing of a charge for which the Department determined probable cause exists, “[t]he charging party shall notify the commissioner of an intention to bring a civil action, which shall be commenced within 90 days of giving the notice.” Id. § 363A.33, subd. 1(3). Because the Department determined in Scott's case that probable cause existed, and nothing in the record suggests that a hearing occurred or that Scott signed a conciliation agreement, subdivision 1(3) of Section 363A.33 governed Scott's charge. She was thus entitled to bring an action after 45 days from the Department's probable cause determination, as long as she filed her complaint within 90 days of notifying the Department of her intention, which she did. See State by Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc. , 552 N.W.2d 695, 702 n. 6 (Minn.1996) (recognizing that while the statute gives the Department only twelve months to make the probable cause determination, the charging party “may bring [a] civil action after 45 days from [the] filing of the charge”). Scott met her deadlines under the MHRA.
The two cases on which CSL relied, Beaulieu and Powers – Potter v. Nash Finch Co. , No. 14-cv-0339, 2014 WL 2003063 (D.Minn. May 14, 2014), are distinguishable. Beaulieu noted that the statute imposes a twelve-month limitation on the Department to make a probable cause determination, and held that it is per se prejudicial for the Department to miss that deadline by waiting 31 months to make its determination. 552 N.W.2d at 703. Powers – Potter also involved agency delay. 2014 WL 2003063, at *1. But CSL did not argue that the Department missed its twelve-month deadline in this case. CSL's argument that Scott's delay made this action untimely must be rejected.
Applicability of Section 363A.17 to Plasma “Donations”
CSL argued that donating plasma is not a business transaction and is not covered by Section 363A.17. The Court already rejected this legal argument on CSL's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and reaffirms its conclusions at this stage. The law provides in relevant part that a “person engaged in a trade or business or in the provision of a service” cannot “intentionally refuse to do business with” or “refuse to contract with” a person “because of” that person's sexual orientation. Minn. Stat. § 363A.17.
CSL is engaged in the plasma collection business. Its plasma collection centers operate for profit, and CSL sells the plasma “donations” that they collect to another entity for manufacture into pharmaceutical
products. CSL also pays plasma donors in exchange for receiving their “donations;” the fact that it technically pays donors for their time spent in the donation process, rather than for their plasma, does not change the fact that it pays them and receives, in exchange, plasma. See, e.g. , Muller Supp. Decl. Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 70-1 (acknowledgement by CSL that it pays donors). In this way, CSL is like a resale shop that purchases items from individuals to stock its inventory of merchandise, which the shop sells for profit.
As in its earlier motion, CSL unsuccessfully cited Section 525A.25 of the Minnesota Statutes to argue that the “donation” of plasma cannot be considered a sale of goods or product. Although Section 525A.25 specifies that the use of blood components from living donors is “the rendition of a health care service ... and is not a sale of goods ... or a sale of a product,” that provision only applies where the blood or blood components are used “for the purpose of injection, transfusion, or transplantation in the human body.” Id. § 525A.25. The definition of source plasma,...
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