Scott v. Department of Labor and Industries

• Decision Date: 20 September 1924
• Docket Number: 18644.
• Citation: 228 P. 1013,130 Wash. 598
• Parties: SCOTT v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

228 P. 1013

130 Wash. 598

SCOTT v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES.

No. 18644.

Supreme Court of Washington

September 20, 1924

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; Askren, Judge.

Action by James Scott to compel the Department of Labor and Industries to classify an injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act and to make an award. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

John H Dunbar and M. H. Night, both of Olympia (Donald R. Fraser, of Olympia, of counsel), for appellant.

Burkey O'Brien & Burkey, of Tacoma, for respondent.

HOLCOMB, J.

This action was brought by respondent to compel the Department of Labor and Industries to classify an injury to respondent under the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state (Rem Comp. Stat. 1922, § 7673 et seq.), and to make an award therefor.

The Dupont De Nemours Company is a foreign corporation doing business in this state and operating a plant at Dupont; and the steamship Carolyn was chartered by this company and used to bring a cargo of sulphur from a point outside the state to Dupont. J. T. Steeb & Co., as agent of the Dupont Company hired stevedores to unload the boat. Scott was one of the stevedores so employed. His duties were to unhook the sling which carried the sulphur from the boat to a hopper on the dock. The tide was at ebb, and the ship heavily laden, so that the boom which carried the sling did not clear the hopper sufficiently to make its operation entirely accurate. The empty sling caught on the hopper and tipped it over, precipitating Scott to the deck of the boat, from which he sustained the injury for which he seeks compensation.

The trial court, among other things, found: That respondent was injured on April 15, 1923, while in the employ of the E. I. Dupont De Nemours Company, at Dupont, Wash., in assisting in unloading sulphur from the steamer Carolyn, his work at that time being entirely upon land, and no part thereof on the steamer, which steamer was at that time lying in the navigable waters of Puget Sound, unloading its cargo at the dock at Dupont. That the injuries received by respondent were caused by the negligence of the employees of the Dupont Company, whose work was entirely upon land, and the accident and cause of the injuries to respondent did not constitute any tort coming within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States courts. That the pay roll of respondent while engaged in that work was entirely separable from the pay roll of other employees of the Dupont Company who at that time were engaged in work on the steamer, and that respondent's work was wholly upon land. That respondent received injuries entitling him to compensation under the Workman's Compensation Act of the State of Washington, and that the injuries received by respondent come within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Insurance Division of the Department of Labor and Industries. From these findings the court concluded that respondent was entitled to a judgment adjudging that the injuries sustained by him in the accident come within the jurisdiction of the Workman's Compensation Act of the State of Washington, and that he is entitled to have his injuries classified and receive compensation therefor. To all but the first paragraph of the findings above summarized and the conclusions of law, appellant excepted, and it also proposed other findings, some of which were, and some of which were not, borne out by the record in the case.

Appellant states that----

'The question to be solved is whether James Scott, who was a stevedore employed by the ship's charterer to help unload the ship and who was injured while so employed, comes under the Workman's Compensation Act of this state. The determination of this case involves: (1) The jurisdiction of the state courts in matters involving workmen engaged in maritime service, injured on a boat in navigable waters; and (2) whether or not the courts can compel the Department of Labor and Industries to pay compensation to a workman when the Department is precluded from collecting premiums from such workman's employer. While the matters may thus for convenience be separately stated, the determination of the first is practically conclusive of the second.'

It is first contended by appellant that the test of admiralty jurisdiction in cases of tort is the locus of the injury, and not the locus of the cause of the injury, and that the maritime nature of the employment is the second test of admiralty jurisdiction.

A great array of cases cited by appellant defining and limiting jurisdiction in admiralty and the right of recovery to persons engaged in maritime activities have been examined. However, the facts in this case remove it from the realm of most of the cases cited. The engagement of respondent was for services on shore. He performed no service on board ship. His services were not mixed, partly ashore and partly aboard ship. His duties were to attend the sling at the end of the ship's tackle from which sulphur was dumped into a movable hopper on a track on the dock. He stood on a platform which was attached to, and made a part of, the hopper. The hopper was a part of the permanent equipment of the dock, and was from 10 to 12 feet above the dock, and about 12 feet back from the outer edge thereof. To steady and support the hopper and platform, two wooden supports or legs were hinged to the lower side of the platform at the corners. These legs were customarily let down into the dock when cargo was being unloaded into the hopper, and were otherwise fastened up to the under side of the platform, to permit the hopper to be moved.

There were also arrangements made to fasten a chain to the top opposite the water and to a point on the dock farther away. At the time of the accident these legs were not down, but were fastened up under the platform, and the chain was not attached to the hopper. The placing of these supports and the chain was solely the duty of the owner of the dock, and had nothing to do with the operation of the vessel. The accident was due entirely to the fact that the supports and chain were not in place; otherwise the accident could not have happened. When the...