Scott v. Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P.

• Decision Date: 28 July 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:13–cv–00600 CRC
• Citation: 60 F.Supp.3d 156
• Parties: Karen Scott, Plaintiff, v. District Hospital Partners, L.P. et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

60 F.Supp.3d 156

Karen Scott, Plaintiff

v.District Hospital Partners, L.P. et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:13–cv–00600 CRC

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed July 28, 2014

Laurence Allnutt Elgin, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Andrew J. Marcus, Bonner Kiernan Trebach & Crociata, LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge

Plaintiff Karen Scott, an African–American woman in her fifties, worked at George Washington University Hospital from 2007 to 2010. After she was fired in the wake of an altercation with her supervisor, Scott filed a series of three unsuccessful discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. She has now brought suit in this Court against the hospital and its owners, alleging discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment on the basis of disability and race, all under federal law, and wrongful termination under District of Columbia common law. The hospital has moved to dismiss all of Scott's claims aside from race discrimination. The Court will dismiss Scott's disability and retaliation claims because she failed to raise them in a timely fashion before the EEOC and, alternatively, because she has failed to allege that she has a legally recognized disability. The Court will also dismiss her wrongful termination claim for failure to state a claim. But the Court will let stand, for now at least, Scott's claim of hostile work environment based on race, which she has pled in barely sufficient detail to survive the hospital's motion to dismiss.

I. Background

Scott, a Licensed Practical Nurse, worked as a case management associate at the George Washington University Hospital from August 2007 to November 2010, mainly processing insurance claims. Compl. ¶¶ 6–8, 30. Scott's direct supervisor, Beth Reinhart, who is white, recommended her for the position, and the two worked together amicably at first. Id. ¶¶ 10–11, 14. But that apparently changed following an altercation in April 2010, when Reinhart allegedly “upbraided” Scott for propping open the door to her shared office space due to what Scott perceived as dusty air coming from the ventilation system. Id. ¶ 22.¹ Scott further alleges that Reinhart responded to Scott's complaints about the air with “sudden, unexpected outbursts and tirades” and that she stopped authorizing Scott's overtime hours. Id. ¶¶ 22–23. Scott also claims that, around this time, Reinhart fired several non-white employees and replaced them with white employees. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. When Scott complained about Reinhart's conduct to supervisors, she says she was fired under the pretext of a reorganization plan that replaced Scott's position with one requiring a registered nurse degree. Id. ¶¶ 29–30.

Scott challenged her termination in three sets of charges against the hospital with the EEOC. Proceeding pro se, Scott filed her first charge on January 3, 2011. Where asked to identify the bases for the alleged discrimination on the standard EEOC charge form, Scott checked the boxes adjacent to the categories race, religion, and age. She did not check the boxes for disability and retaliation. In the narrative portion of the form, Scott described the “particulars” of her claim, in full, as follows:

In August 2007, I was hired by George Washington University Hospital as a Case Management Associate. On April 1, 2010, I was suspended for one week by Beth Reinhart, Director, Case Management (White). On November 29, 2010, Ms. Reinhart terminated my employment.

I believe I have been discriminated against (disciplined, discharged) because of my race (Black), religion (Christian) and age (54). I feel the Respondent has violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended (ADEA).

Mot. to Dismiss. Ex. 1. Scott also completed an intake questionnaire that accompanied the standard EEOC charge form in which she again left blank boxes indicating that her claims of discrimination were based on disability or retaliation. She did, however, respond to the questing “[w]hy do you believe these actions were discriminatory?” by stating that there was “ ‘dust’ in office that was making [her] sick” and that she had “difficulty breathing.” Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 7. Scott also provided the EEOC with notes from a doctor, titled “Disability Certificate[s],” permitting her to stay home from work due to shortness of breath, id. 9 & Ex. 2, as well as emails she sent to hospital management recounting her confrontation with Reinhart. Id. Ex. 3 & 5. EEOC intake notes indicate that Scott alleged that Reinhart had a practice of firing non-white employees and replacing them with white employees, that Reinhart “treat[ed] younger workers better than [Scott,]” and—apparently in support of her religious discrimination claim—that Reinhart “might be into witchcraft or be a witch” because “black dust emits from [her.]” Id. Ex. 8.

Scott filed an amended EEOC charge on August 26, 2011, after securing counsel, which added allegations of a hostile work environment and removed religion as a basis for discrimination. Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 2. Once again, Scott (and her lawyer) left blank the boxes on the charge form for disability discrimination and retaliation. The narrative portion of the amended charge did not elaborate on the facts underlying her initial charges based on race and age, and did not mention disability as a basis for the new hostile work environment charge.

Over a year later, on January 7, 2013, Scott filed a second amended EEOC charge, alleging discrimination and retaliation based on race and disability, as well as a hostile work environment. Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 6. Scott's counsel argued at the time that the disability claim related back to Scott's 2011 charges, but the EEOC considered her disability claim untimely. The EEOC then dismissed Scott's allegations in all three of her EEOC charges, explaining that it was closing its file on the charges because it was “unable to conclude that the information obtained establishe[d] violations of the statutes.” Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 3.

On April 30, 2013, Scott filed a five-count complaint in this Court. Count One alleges that the hospital failed to accommodate, and ultimately fired her because of, a disability—“shortness of breath” caused by poor air quality in her workspace—in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101. Count Two alleges that that she was terminated because of her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Count Three alleges that the hospital maintained a hostile work environment based on race, disability, and age. Count Four alleges that the hospital terminated Scott in retaliation for having complained about her mistreatment by Reinhart. And Count Five alleges wrongful termination under District of Columbia common law. The hospital has moved to dismiss, or alternatively, for summary judgment, with respect to all of Scott's claims except Count Two for race discrimination under Title VII.

II. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” and “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The Court assumes the plaintiff's factual assertions to be true and draws all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id.

Motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies are properly addressed as motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Marcelus v. Corr. Corp. of Am./Corr. Treatment Facility , 540 F.Supp.2d 231, 235 (D.D.C.2008). The defendant bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies by a preponderance of the evidence. E.g., Hudson v. Children's Nat. Med. Ctr., 645 F.Supp.2d 1, 4 (D.D.C.2009) (citing Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C.Cir.1997) ).

While the Court cannot consider materials outside the pleadings when deciding a motion to dismiss without converting it to a motion for summary judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d), it can “consider documents attached to or incorporated by the complaint in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting the motion into one for summary judgment” including documents referenced or cited to in a complaint. Marcelus, 540 F.Supp.2d at 235 (citing EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1997) ). Because Scott refers to her three EEOC charges and their accompanying documents in her complaint, Compl. ¶¶ 33–36, the Court deems them incorporated into her complaint and will consider them without converting the hospital's motion into one for summary judgment.

III. Analysis

A. Disability and Retaliation Claims (Counts I and IV)

The Court turns first to Scott's disability and retaliation claims. The hospital argues that both claims should be dismissed because Scott did not raise them in a timely fashion before the EEOC and thus failed to exhaust her administrative remedy. Scott responds that, even though her original and first amended EEOC charge did not explicitly allege disability discrimination or retaliation, the EEOC was nonetheless put on notice of those charges by the intake questionnaire and other materials that she submitted with her initial charge. She also argues that her second amended charge in 2013, which did include disability and retaliation claims, ...