Scott v. Fred Beans Chevrolet of Limerick, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 April 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-1071
• Parties: Alicia Scott v. Fred Beans Chevrolet of Limerick, Inc., et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

183 F.Supp.3d 691

Alicia Scott

v.Fred Beans Chevrolet of Limerick, Inc., et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-1071

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed April 28, 2016

Robert P. Cocco, Law Offices of Robert P. Cocco PC, Philadelphia, PA, Matthew B. Weisberg, Weisberg Law PC, Morton, PA, for Alicia Scott.

Matthew J. Noble, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Philadelphia, PA, for Fred Beans Chevrolet of Limerick, Inc., et al.

MEMORANDUM

Dalzell, District Judge

I. Introduction

We consider here cross-motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiff Alicia Scott and defendants Fred Beans Chevrolet of Limerick, Inc. ("Beans") and Timothy E. DeJesus. Scott brings claims against the defendants for violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1691, the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"), 73 Pa.C.S.A. § 201–1 et seq., as well as a state law claim for conversion. Defendant Beans asserts a counterclaim against Scott for breach of contract. We have federal question jurisdiction over plaintiff's federal claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over the parties' state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

For the reasons set forth below, we will deny plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to her ECOA and U.C.C. claims, but grant the motion as to Beans's breach of contract counterclaim. We will grant defendants' motion for summary judgment on Scott's ECOA, UTPCPL, and conversion claims.

II. Factual and Procedural History

On January 24, 2014, Alicia Scott and Beans executed a Retail Installment Contract ("RISC") for Scott's purchase of a 2007 Chevrolet Malibu. Pl.'s Statement of Facts ("S.F.") at ¶ 1, Pl.'s Mot. at Ex. 1. Beans was the sole entity that negotiated the terms of the RISC with Scott. Id. The RISC stated that Beans was immediately assigning the security interest of the RISC to Credit Acceptance Corporation ("CAC"), and that Scott agreed to, among other things, provide Beans with documents that Beans could "reasonably request to perfect [its] security interest." Pl.'s Mot. at Ex. 1. While Beans assigned the RISC to CAC, it was Beans that approved Scott's credit application for the purchase of the vehicle. S.F. at ¶ 4.

On March 25, 2014, CAC notified Beans that it was reassigning the RISC back to Beans and that Scott should make her payments directly to Beans. Id. at ¶ 10. CAC reassigned the loan back to Beans because it had determined that Scott's residence and checking account were insufficiently documented.Id. at ¶ 13. CAC sent a letter to Scott informing her that it had reassigned the loan back to Beans and that she should now make her payments directly to Beans instead of to them. Id. at ¶ 11. Scott, however, never received this letter since she had moved and failed to provide Beans or CAC with her new mailing address. Scott Dep. at 36–37.

In July of 2014, Tim DeJesus, then the Director of Financial Relations for Beans, emailed Scott requesting that she provide the documents necessary to create a new RISC which would be assigned to CAC. Pl.'s Mot. at Ex. 6. The terms of the new RISC were to have been identical to the terms of the RISC Scott signed in February of 2014. Defs.' Mot. at Ex. F. DeJesus also informed Scott that her other options were to return the vehicle to Beans or face legal action. Pl.'s Mot. at Ex. 6. Scott agreed to send the documents to DeJesus, and the two continued a friendly email conversation over the next three weeks. Id. DeJesus emailed Scott on no less than four different occasions in an attempt to obtain the documents necessary to assign the new RISC to CAC. Id. Scott on one occasion did send DeJesus copies of her pay stubs, but the picture of the stubs was not clear. Id. On July 30, 2014, Scott informed DeJesus and Beans that she had moved and provided her new address. Id. at Ex. 7.

During this time, Scott had stopped making payments on the car. In fact, she did not make payments on the vehicle in May, June, July, August, September, or October of 2014. Scott Dep. at 33–34. Even though Beans was still trying to assign the RISC back to CAC, it testified, through one of its corporate designees, that it would have continued the loan and allowed Scott to maintain possession of the vehicle as long as she made her monthly payments. Gilbert Dep. at 23. In August, Beans and DeJesus sent Scott a letter, through its counsel, informing her that she was delinquent on her payments for the car and demanding that she bring her payments up to date. Defs.' Mot. at Ex. I. But this letter was sent to Scott's previous address, even though Scott had in late July provided Beans with her new mailing address. S.F. at ¶ 27.

In November of 2014, Scott's grandmother, Robin Muffley, received a series of messages from Beans stating that Scott was driving her vehicle "without a lien" and that the vehicle was "stolen," and that Scott should "turn herself in." Id. at ¶ 32. Tim DeJesus also called both Scott and her grandmother seeking possession of the vehicle. Scott Dep. at 88–91. Scott told DeJesus that he could come and get the vehicle sometime that month. Id. at 93. The vehicle was repossessed shortly thereafter, S.F. at ¶ 33, and Beans sold the vehicle at auction in December of 2014. Id. at ¶ 34. After selling the vehicle at auction, Beans never sent Scott a notice of sale or deficiency. Id. at ¶ 36.

Scott initiated this action on March 3, 2015, and the case was assigned to the Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter. After discovery, the parties filed their cross-motions for summary judgment in October of 2015. This case was reassigned to us on January 22, 2016 after Judge Buckwalter's retirement.

III. Legal Standard

Parties may move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) on any claim or defense in the case, and the "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.

A party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its argument that there is no genuine issue of material fact by "identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). If the moving party meets this initial burden, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 then obliges the non-moving party to show, via submissions beyond the pleadings, that there are genuine factual issues for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

There is a genuine issue of material fact only when there is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable juror could find for the party opposing the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (explaining further that a mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient). Material facts are those that would affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. We may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, and we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) ; A r mour v. County of Beaver, PA, 271 F.3d 417, 420 (3d Cir.2001). Our function is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial, and we may not prevent a case from reaching a jury simply because we favor one of several reasonable views of the evidence. Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 287 (3d Cir.1999).

We treat cross-motions for summary judgment as if they were distinct, independent motions, and must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis. Beneficial Mut. Sav. Bank v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 36 F.Supp.3d 537, 544 (E.D.Pa.2014) (citing Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir.2008) ). In evaluating each motion, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 735 F.3d 131, 134–35 (3d Cir.2013).

IV. Discussion

We will consider the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment separately and in turn.

A. Plaintiff Alicia Scott's Motion for Summary Judgment

Alicia Scott moves for summary judgment on her ECOA and U.C.C. claims and on Beans's counterclaim for breach of contract. We will grant in part and deny in part plaintiff's motion.

1. ECOA Claim

Scott moves for summary judgment on her ECOA claim. The ECOA requires a creditor to provide notice to an applicant when the creditor takes an "adverse action" against the applicant. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(1). This notice must provide an explanation for the creditor's "adverse action." Id. at § 1691(d)(2). Thus, in order to sustain her claim Scott must show that (1) Beans is a creditor as defined by the ECOA, (2) Beans took an adverse action against Scott, and (3) Beans provided notice with insufficient explanation as to why it took the adverse action.

The ECOA defines a creditor as "any person who regularly extends, renews, or continues credit ... [or] any person who regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or continuation of credit." Id. at § 1691a(e). Courts applying the ECOA to car dealers have mused that "[w]hether a car dealer is a creditor is a fact specific question," and have taken into consideration whether the dealer (1) sets the terms of credit, (2) negotiates with the customer as to payment terms, (3) receives proceeds from the interest, and (4) is the first to assess the customer's credit application. Barnette v. Brook Rd., Inc., 457 F.Supp.2d 647, 654 (E.D.Va.2006) (citing Treadway v. Gateway Chevrolet Oldsmobile Inc., 362 F.3d 971, 980 (7th Cir.2004) ). Here, Beans negotiated with Scott on...