Barnette v. Brook Road, Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 July 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:05-CV-590 MHL.,3:05-CV-590 MHL. |
| Citation | 457 F.Supp.2d 647 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | Kamesha BARNETTE, Plaintiff, v. BROOK ROAD, INC., Defendant. |
John Cole Gayle, Jr., The Consumer Law Group PC, Richmond, VA, Leonard Anthony Bennett, Consumer Litigation Assoc. PC, Newport News, VA, for Plaintiff.
Raymond James Sinnott, III, Kenneth Francis Hardt, Mark Charles Nanavati, Sinnott, Nuckols & Logan PC, Midlothian, VA, for Defendant
Before the Court are cross Motions for Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff, Kamesha Barnette, filed a Complaint against the Defendant, Brook Road, Inc., which trades as Car America ("Car America"), following a failed deal to purchase a car and repossession of that car after financing fell through. She brings claims under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f, the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x, the Virginia Consumer Protection Act ("VCPA"), Va.Code Ann. §§ 59.1-196-207 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2005), and Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), Va.Code Ann. §§ 8.9A-101-709 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2005), as well as common law actions of fraud, conversion, and breach of contract. Car America moved for summary judgment on the ECOA, UCC, breach of contract, and conversion claims, and Barnette sought summary judgment on the ECOA, FCRA, and UCC claims.1 The parties have briefed the issues, and the Court held a hearing on June 27, 2006. Accordingly, the Motions are ripe for disposition.
A motion for summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "[A]n apparent dispute is not `genuine' within contemplation of the summary judgment rule unless the nonmovant's version is supported by sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find the facts in his favor." Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir.1995) (citations omitted). A fact is material if under governing law it might affect the outcome of the litigation. Anderson, 411 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
"The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240 (4th Cir.1988). A court views the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, Ml U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Whether an inference is reasonable must be considered in conjunction with competing inferences to the contrary. Sylvia, 48 F.3d at 818. Nonetheless the nonmoving party is entitled to have "`the credibility of his evidence as forecast assumed.'" Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (quoting Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir.1979)). When, based on the evidence presented, a fair minded jury could not reasonably find for the plaintiff, summary judgment is appropriate. See Anderson, 411 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 942-43 (4th Cir.1992). Ultimately, the court must adhere to the affirmative obligation to bar factually unsupportable claims from proceeding to trial. Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex, 411 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548).
On or about May 11, 2004, Barnette received a flyer in the mail that stated, "You are Pre-Qualified by CPS, a national auto finance company" for a loan of up to $16,687.00. (PL's Mot. Summ. J. Mem. Supp. Ex. 1.) CPS issued the flyer on behalf of Car America. (Cunningham Dep. 99-100.) The flyer directed its recipient to take the offer to Car America. (PL's Mot. Ex. 1.) Attached to the flyer was a "Fast Track Reservation Form" that sought information as to the customer's address, employment, and income and requested authorization for CPS and the car dealer to obtain a credit report to "finalize auto financing." (Id.) Barnette contacted by telephone and then visited Car America where Roscoe Pender, a sales person, provided her a credit application. (Cunningham Dep. 61; Pender Aff. Ex. 1.) She completed the application and submitted it to Car America. (Pender Aff. Ex. 1.) On the credit application, Barnette indicated that she worked full-time at Lowe's and part-time at Courtyard Assistance. (Id.)
The process employed by Car America for obtaining financing and executing a sale is as follows. Until April 2004, Car America provided financing itself, but when Barnette sought to buy a car, Car America had stopped financing loans. (Cunningham Dep. 44-45, 55, 86.) After a customer provides a credit application, the finance manager makes a "payment call" to a lender to obtain preapproval at a certain monthly payment for the sale of a car. (Id. at 18.) When Car America submits a credit application, the lender sometimes makes a counteroffer, and Car America communicates the counteroffer to the buyer. (Id. at 61.) If the counteroffer requires a rate that would make Car America lose money on the deal, Car America will cancel the sale. (Id. at 65.) Some lenders permit Car America to collect a fee on the financing by increasing the interest rate. (Id. at 67.) However, Car America does not receive money for shopping a loan to one of the lenders, Regional Acceptance Corporation ("Regional"), who charges Car America a $535 fee. (Id. at 68.) After a customer has been pre-approved by a lender, she selects a vehicle. (Id. at 79-80.) Based on the particulars of the vehicle, Car America drafts a contract, including a Retail Installment Sales Contract ("RISC"), setting the terms of the sale and financing. (Id.) The dealer then submits the sales contract and financing information to the lender for approval of the terms. (Id. at 79.) In setting the terms, Car America structures the loan based on parameters established by the lenders. (Id at 63.) Car America also chooses which lender to shop the loan to based on the lender's criteria. (Id. at 66.) The lender sets the interest rate. (Id. at 62.)
On May 13, 2004, Barnette returned to Car America. She met with Pender, test drove a car, and discussed her credit. (Barnette Dep. 16-17.) Barnette negotiated with Pender concerning the monthly payment: he sought $400, and she insisted upon $350. (Id. at 24.) According to Dave Cunningham, the sales manager, someone at Car America pulled Barnette's credit report to determine whether to enter into a deal to sell her a car, including whether she could qualify for financing. (Cunningham Dep. 74-75.) Car America then shopped her application to two lenders, Regional and United Auto Credit Corporation ("United Auto"). (Cunningham Dep. 75.) Barnette was aware that Car America was not the lender and that a third party would provide the loan. (Barnette Dep. 26, 105.) Regional granted conditional approval of a loan for $12,000, with a $350 maximum monthly payment and $1000 minimum payment, subject to proof of income.2 (Pender Aff. ¶¶ 4-5; Cunningham Dep. 77, 87.) Regional initially required a down-payment of $1000, but Car America negotiated with the lender for a payment of $500 instead. (Cunningham Dep. 78, 112.) After receiving conditional approval for a loan, Barnette chose a car and was told that she would need to provide proof of insurance, which she did not have at the time. (Barnette Dep. 24.)
Barnette signed various documents concerning the sale of the car. (Cunningham Dep. 75.) She did not read them. (Barnette Dep. 30.) Pender guided her through the process of reviewing the documents. (Pender Aff. ¶¶ 2-11.) One of the documents was a Buyer's Order that conditioned the sale upon approval of the RISC. (PL's Mot. Ex. 3.) Barnette and Car America signed the RISC, which fixed the price of the car, annual percentage rate of the loan, finance charge, amount financed, monthly payment of $350, down-payment of $500 cash and $500 for the trade-in, and total payments. (PL's Mot. Ex. 4.) The RISC identified Car America as the "creditor-seller" and indicated that it "assigns its interest in this contract to Regional." (Id.) By signing the RISC, Barnette agreed to give Car America a security interest in the car. (Id.) She also agreed that Car America could repossess the vehicle if she defaulted on the loan. (Id.) Additionally, Barnette and Car America entered into a Delivery Agreement that incorporated the RISC.3 (PL's Mot. Ex. 6.) The Delivery Agreement provided, in pertinent part:
Buyer understands that all financing decisions are made by a financial source not affiliated with Dealer and that financing source is the credit-reporting agency in accordance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Seller will attempt to sell the contract on terms satisfactory to the Seller. If the Seller is successful in doing so, the contract (and all other documents executed by Buyer) shall be deemed delivered and fully binding.
If seller does not receive approval from a lending source for the Contract on terms acceptable to Dealer, Dealer may rescind the sales transaction and the Contract. Buyer agrees that upon notice from Seller, Buyer...
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