Scott v. Gardner
| Decision Date | 16 January 1942 |
| Docket Number | No. 14014.,14014. |
| Citation | 159 S.W.2d 121 |
| Parties | SCOTT v. GARDNER et al. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Tarrant County; Walter L. Morris, Judge.
Action by Beulah Gardner and husband against Winfield Scott for injuries sustained by Beulah Gardner in an automobile accident. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.
Judgment affirmed upon condition that plaintiffs file a remittitur.
Cantey, Hanger, McMahon, McKnight & Johnson and J. A. Gooch, all of Fort Worth, for appellant.
McGown, McGown, Godfrey & Logan and B. E. Godfrey, all of Fort Worth, for appellees.
On the 20th day of October, 1933, the plaintiff Beulah Gardner was injured in an automobile wreck. On the 18th day of August, 1934, she filed this suit, thus beginning this long lasting litigation. The case was before this court upon a former appeal. Scott v. Gardner, Tex.Civ.App., 106 S.W.2d 1109. After a subsequent trial, this appeal was taken. Some of the questions presented upon this appeal are settled by the decision of the Supreme Court, in answer to certified questions, in Scott v. Gardner, Tex.Com.App., 156 S.W.2d 513. We refer to the two opinions cited for detailed statements of the facts involved, and shall in this opinion discuss only the questions not disposed of by the holding of the Supreme Court.
Appellant's third proposition reads as follows: "Plaintiffs who admit that they would perjure themselves for financial gain should have no standing in the courts of our State."
This proposition appears to be based upon the admission of the plaintiff George F. Gardner that he signed a statement, shortly after the date of the accident, which upon its face appears to absolve Scott of any blame for the accident. Gardner admitted that his testimony differed from the written statement, but claimed that he signed the statement upon Scott's request, and upon Scott's assurances that he would take care of everything. Appellant cites no authorities in his brief in support of his proposition, nor do we know of any that support it. The testimony in question was a matter for the jury to consider in passing upon Gardner's credibility as a witness, but cannot, under any rule of law known to us, have the effect of barring plaintiffs from maintaining their suit.
Special Issue No. 6, and the instruction accompanying it, read as follows:
Appellant's second assignment of error, complaining of the alleged error in this issue and instruction, reads as follows:
"The court erred in omitting, over the objection of defendant, to instruct the jury in connection with the issue relating to damages that they could allow only such damages as were proximately caused by the alleged negligent act on the part of Winfield Scott which caused the injury."
Appellant relies upon the holdings of this court in Anderson v. Reichart, Tex.Civ. App., 116 S.W.2d 772, and in Standard Paving Co. v. Pyle, Tex.Civ.App., 131 S. W.2d 200.
A defendant is liable only for such damages as are the proximate result of his wrongful act. The charge of the court should, in some manner, limit the jury to the consideration of damages proximately caused by defendant's wrongful act. In determining whether there is error, and in determining whether the error requires a reversal, the entire charge must be examined, and must be considered in the light of the precise situation existing at the time the supposed error was committed. An error which in one situation would materially affect the result, might in a different situation have no effect upon the result of the case. It is our observation that statements found in opinions of the appellate courts are sometimes misconstrued because of a failure to consider and interpret them in the light of the facts or the situation which the court had before it when it wrote its opinion. It is to be borne in mind that the courts endeavor primarily to make a correct disposition of the case on appeal, and not always to write a general rule of law to be followed as a text in all manner of cases arising in the future.
Bearing in mind the foregoing observations, let us examine the charge of the court, and the state of the record, now before us. Plaintiffs were seeking to recover damages for the injuries sustained by Mrs. Gardner in the automobile wreck. Neither the pleadings nor the evidence shows any attempt on the part of the defendant to establish that her injuries, or any aggravation or complication of such injuries, resulted from any other cause. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the entire record showing that any pain or suffering sustained up to the time of the trial resulted from any cause other than the injuries received in the accident in question. Recovery for future pain and suffering is expressly limited by the charge to that which will in reasonable probability result from the injuries received in the accident. The issue itself, as distinguished from the explanatory instruction, limits the compensation to the injuries sustained on the occasion of the overturning of the automobile. The charge elsewhere establishes the causal connection between the wrongful act of defendant and the overturning of the automobile. The jury is limited to such damages as it may find from a preponderance of the evidence. It is difficult for us to imagine how the jury could ever have supposed, under the actual charge given, and in view of the evidence, that the court was inquiring about any damages outside of those received when the car overturned. And we find nothing in the case to suggest that they could, under the charge, have considered other pain and suffering, which, so far...
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...caused by the acts complained of. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Davis, 140 Tex. 398, 168 S.W.2d 216 (1942); Scott v. Gardner, 159 S.W.2d 121 (Tex.Civ.App.1942), writ ref., w.m.; 40 Tex.Jur.2d 667, 668, Sec. 144; 17 Tex.Jur.2d 305, Sec. 246. Further, it is well established that, in person......
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