Scott v. Houston Independent School Dist.

• Decision Date: 27 May 1982
• Docket Number: No. A2970,A2970
• Parties: 7 Ed. Law Rep. 741 Jean Adrian SCOTT, Appellant, v. HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee. (14th Dist.)
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 255

641 S.W.2d 255

7 Ed. Law Rep. 741

Jean Adrian SCOTT, Appellant, v. HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.

No. A2970.

Court of Appeals of Texas Houston (14th Dist.).

May 27, 1982.

Rehearing Denied July 8, 1982.

Robert E. Hall, Bob Hall & Associates, Houston, for appellant.

Henry P. Giessel, Talbert, Giessel & Stone, Houston, for appellee.

Before J. CURTISS BROWN, C.J., and JUNELL and PRICE, JJ.

J. CURTISS BROWN, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered in a suit for Workers' Compensation benefits. The question presented is whether appellant was entitled to have definitions of "harm" and "damage" included in the court's charge to the jury in a case involving an alleged mental or nervous system injury. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jean Scott (Scott or appellant) was an employee of the Houston Independent School District (H.I.S.D. or appellee). It is the policy of H.I.S.D. that teachers are constantly evaluated through visitations, conferences and informal observations. All new teachers are placed on probation for three years during which their performance is assessed frequently. If after the probationary period a teacher is awarded a continuing contract, performance is assessed once every three years thereafter. However, on the basis of such an assessment a teacher may be returned to probationary status.

Scott had taught first and second graders for over ten years before the 1977-78 school year. She had experienced some problems with the assessment process from the start of her career. In her first year she reached a point where she felt stress concerning her conferences and dreaded them. Scott was, however, extended a continuing contract. In 1970 she was transferred to a different school and her assessments indicated steadily declining performance. She was placed on probationary status for the 1976-77 school year.

During the fall of 1977 she had several stressful encounters with H.I.S.D. supervisors. She spent the Christmas holidays home in bed because she felt "wiped out." On the first day of school following the holidays, Scott forgot her lesson plans. She tried to reach a relative by phone to arrange for the plans to be brought to her. Arriving at her classroom a few minutes late, she found her principal waiting for her. Scott was reprimanded in front of the class for being tardy. She became so upset she was unable to continue working and left for home. Her family found her in bed unable to even rise and dress herself.

She was taken to an emergency room and, several days later, was hospitalized under the care of a psychiatrist. Her condition was diagnosed as neurasthenia, a general term encompassing a class of nervous disorders including "anxiety neurosis." It is characterized by a group of symptoms formally ascribed to debility or exhaustion of the nerve centers. After a week in the hospital she was released and allowed to return to work. She was given written notice that her formal job evaluation would be made the next day. H.I.S.D. discharged her on the basis of that evaluation.

Scott filed suit for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act). The 1971 amendments to the Act which added "repetitious physical trauma" to the definition of "occupational disease" were interpreted prior to the trial of this case as denying recovery based upon repeated mental trauma sustained on the job. Transportation Insurance Co. v. Maksyn, 580 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.1979). Thus the case was pled on the specific incident in which Scott was reprimanded in front of her class. Her theory of recovery was based upon the case of Bailey v. American General Insurance Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955). There the Supreme Court of Texas interpreted what is now Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 8306 Sec. 20 (Vernon Supp.1982), which states:

Wherever the terms "Injury" or "Personal Injury" are used in the Workmen's Compensation Laws of this State, such terms shall mean damage or harm to the physical structure of the body .... (emphasis added)

The Bailey opinion first holds that the phrase "physical structure of the body," refers to the entire structure of a living individual, not merely to one of its subsystems e.g. the skeletal structure. Concerning the terms "damage" and "harm", the Bailey opinion defines "harm," used in reference to a living, active structure, such as the human body, as meaning inability to function as it should. The opinion then states:

The ordinary as well as legal connotation of "harm" is that it is of broader import than "damage." Damage embraces direct physical injury to a cell, tissue, organ or organ system; "harm" to the physical structure of the body embraces also impairment of use or control of physical structures, directly caused by the accident. This interference with use or control in an organism whose good health depends upon unified action and balanced synthesis can be productive of the same disabling signs and symptoms as direct physical injury to the cells, tissues, organs or organ systems.

This interpretation was used to extend benefits to a workman who was on a scaffold when it gave way. He watched a coworker die in an eight story fall, but he was caught in the cable in such a...