Scott v. Hughes, 102,690.

• Decision Date: 04 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 102,690.,102,690.
• Citation: 275 P.3d 890
• Parties: Bonnie Jean Brungardt SCOTT, surviving spouse of Jeffery Wade Scott, and the Estate of Jeffery Wade Scott, by and through its Administrator, Bonnie Jean Brungardt Scott, Jeffrey Wagner, and Adam Stein, Appellees, v. Christopher HUGHES, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

275 P.3d 890

Bonnie Jean Brungardt SCOTT, surviving spouse of Jeffery Wade Scott, and the Estate of Jeffery Wade Scott, by and through its Administrator, Bonnie Jean Brungardt Scott, Jeffrey Wagner, and Adam Stein, Appellees,

v.Christopher HUGHES, Appellant.

No. 102,690.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

May 4, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issues in the case. An appellate court applies the same rules.

2. When evaluating a district judge's ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, an appellate court applies the same standard as the district court. The court is required to resolve all facts and inferences reasonably to be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. The matter becomes a question of law for the court's determination when no evidence is presented on a particular issue or when the evidence presented is undisputed and is such that the minds of reasonable persons may not draw differing inferences and arrive at opposing conclusions with reason and justice.

3. Statutory interpretation and construction are reviewed on appeal de novo.

4. Interpretation of caselaw precedents raises questions of law reviewable de novo.

5. A covered worker's remedy under the Workers Compensation Act is exclusive. Under K.S.A. 44–501(b), if the worker experiences a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, then the Act applies, and no separate civil suit in tort against the employer is permitted. Under the going and coming rule of K.S.A. 44–508(f), a worker is ordinarily not within the scope and course of employment while traveling to and from work. An exception to the going and coming rule applies if the travel is an intrinsic part of the worker's job.

6. If an employee is injured by a coworker while the coworker is acting in the course and scope of his or her employment, then fellow servant immunity under K.S.A. 44–501(b) applies.

7. On the record in this case, the district judge erred by denying the defendant's motions for summary judgment and for judgment as a matter of law, because the evidence could lead only to one factual finding: Because travel was intrinsic to the job of the defendant, he was within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident and protected by fellow servant immunity from civil suit.

Lyndon W. Vix, of Fleeson, Gooing, Coulson & Kitch, L.L.C., of Wichita, argued the cause, and William L. Townsley, III, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for appellant.

Scott J. Mann, of Mann Law Offices, LLC, of Hutchinson, argued the cause, and Michael J. Wyatt, of the same firm, and Matthew L. Bretz, of Bretz Law Offices, LLC, of Hutchinson, and Mitchell W. Rice, of the same firm, were with him on the brief for appellees.

The opinion of the court was delivered by BEIER, J.:

This is an appeal by defendant Christopher Hughes after a jury verdict against him in this negligence action. Hughes was the driver in a one-car accident that killed passenger Jeffery Wade Scott and injured passengers Jeffrey Wagner and Adam Stein. At the time of the accident, the four were traveling together to work on a drilling crew for employer Duke Drilling, Inc. (Duke Drilling). Hughes challenges the district judge's decision that Hughes was not immune from suit as a fellow servant under workers compensation law, as well as rulings on the admission of evidence and jury instructions. Because we resolve this case in favor of Hughes on the first issue, we do not reach the second and third issues.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal is the second involving Hughes and plaintiff Bonnie Jean Brungardt Scott, Scott's surviving common law wife. The first was interlocutory; Hughes appealed a denial of summary judgment in his favor and a grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Brungardt Scott. We reversed and remanded. Scott v. Hughes, 281 Kan. 642, 132 P.3d 889 (2006). The following review of the entire factual and procedural background of this appeal puts our earlier decision and the issues now before us in appropriate context.

The accident giving rise to this action occurred in July 2003 in Stafford County. Criminal charges were filed against Hughes as a result, leading ultimately to his no contest plea to possession of methamphetamine and vehicular homicide.

Brungardt Scott filed a workers compensation claim and reached a settlement of that claim, as did Wagner and Stein. Hughes also filed a workers compensation claim. Duke Drilling challenged Hughes' right to recover because it alleged that he was intoxicated at the time of the accident.

In addition to the workers compensation proceedings, Brungardt Scott, Wagner, and Stein each filed a civil lawsuit against Hughes.

Hughes sought summary judgment in Brungardt Scott's action, arguing that it was barred by his fellow servant immunity under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act. Brungardt Scott responded and filed a cross motion. She argued that Hughes was ineligible for workers compensation because of his intoxication at the time of the accident and thus unprotected from civil suit by fellow servant immunity.

The district judge denied Hughes' motion and granted Brungardt Scott partial summary judgment, ruling that Hughes was “not entitled to workmen's compensation benefits because his injury was contributed to by [his] use or consumption of alcohol.” On Hughes' request, the judge amended his journal entry to enable interlocutory review, certifying this question: “[W]hether an individual allegedly unable to obtain workers compensation benefits by reason of intoxication thereby loses his or her statutory fellow servant immunity and is subject to civil liability in a suit brought by a co-worker.” Permission to docket the interlocutory appeal was granted, and the case was transferred to this court.

In our opinion issued April 28, 2006, we set forth the central questions posed by the denial of Hughes' motion for summary judgment: “If alcohol or drug use by Hughes would eliminate Duke Drilling's liability to him for workers compensation benefits, would it also eliminate the coemployee or fellow servant immunity he would normally enjoy under K.S.A. 44–501(b)? Would it place him instead in the position of a third-party tortfeasor subject to this civil suit for damages under K.S.A. 44–504?” Scott, 281 Kan. at 647, 132 P.3d 889.

We concluded:

“Neither entitlement to receive nor actual receipt of workers compensation benefits by a coemployee tortfeasor is required for fellow servant immunity to attach and bar a civil suit. What matters is whether that coemployee was acting within the scope and course of employment when he or she caused injury to another.” Scott, 281 Kan. at 652, 132 P.3d 889.

In other words, the district judge erred by yoking together two unrelated legal concepts. The first—whether the accident arose out of and in the course of Hughes' employment, or, in the parties' equivalent formulation, whether Hughes was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident—posed a threshold question. It must be answered affirmatively for the Act to apply and for Hughes to be protected by fellow servant immunity. The second concept—whether Hughes was eligible to recover workers compensation benefits for his own injuries, given Duke Drilling's intoxication defense to liability—was separate and independent. Its answer would not drive the answer to the first question. This meant that the denial of Hughes' summary judgment motion required reversal and remand for consideration under the correct legal framework. We wrote:

“If the district judge concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact, i.e., that there is no evidence to controvert defendant Hughes' claim that he was acting within the scope and course of his employment at the time of the accident, then he is entitled to fellow servant immunity and this wrongful death and survival suit is barred.” Scott, 281 Kan. at 652–53, 132 P.3d 889.

This court also reversed “the district court's additional ruling granting partial summary judgment to Brungardt Scott on the factual issue of Hughes' consumption of alcohol or drugs and its effect on his ability to recover workers compensation benefits.” Scott, 281 Kan. at 653, 132 P.3d 889. The record before us at that point contained only allegations rather than evidence about Hughes' intoxication. In the case's procedural posture on the anticipated remand, it was possible the civil case against Hughes would continue and his intoxication or lack thereof would be further litigated. We also did not address the issue of whether Scott was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident, having assumed he was for purposes of a brief review of statutory provisions on workers compensation. Scott, 281 Kan. at 653, 132 P.3d 889.

On remand, the district court ordered additional discovery, and counsel for Brungardt Scott and Stein and counsel for Wagner took Hughes' deposition. A few months later, Hughes and Duke Drilling settled Hughes' workers compensation claim.

Hughes again moved for summary judgment, this time against all three plaintiffs. He argued that the material uncontroverted facts demonstrated that plaintiffs' lawsuits were barred by fellow...