Scott v. Hughes, No. 94,265.
Citation | 132 P.3d 889 |
Decision Date | 28 April 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 94,265. |
Parties | Bonnie Jean Brungardt SCOTT, Surviving Spouse of Jeffrey Wade Scott, and the Estate of Jeffrey Wade Scott, By and through its Administrator, Bonnie Jean Brungardt Scott, Appellees, v. Christopher HUGHES, Appellant. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Kansas |
argued the cause, and Lyndon W. Vix, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for appellant.
Scott J. Mann, of Mann Law Offices, of Hutchinson, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
This interlocutory appeal in a wrongful death and survival action requires us to address potential limits on the exclusive remedy and tandem fellow servant doctrines of workers compensation law.
Jeffrey Wade Scott, an employee of Duke Drilling, Inc., was killed in a single-vehicle accident while he and others were being driven to a job site. The driver was defendant coworker Christopher Hughes; it was alleged that Hughes was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the accident.
Plaintiff Bonnie Jean Brungardt Scott, Scott's common-law widow, received $185,000 in a workers compensation settlement and then filed this wrongful death and survival action against Hughes. Hughes moved for summary judgment, contending the workers compensation exclusive remedy and fellow servant doctrines barred any civil suit for damages. Brungardt Scott also moved for summary judgment, arguing Hughes' intoxication would make him ineligible for workers compensation benefits and thus ineligible for immunity under the exclusive remedy and fellow servant doctrines codified in K.S.A. 44-501(b). The district court denied Hughes' motion and granted partial summary judgment in favor of Brungardt Scott on her motion, citing K.S.A. 44-501(d)(2) and ruling that Hughes would be unable to recover workers compensation benefits because he had been under the influence of alcohol or drugs when the accident occurred.
As a result of the accident and Scott's death, criminal charges were filed against Hughes. They included involuntary manslaughter while driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, contrary to K.S.A.2005 Supp. 21-3442; possession of methamphetamine, contrary to K.S.A. 65-4160; and possession of marijuana, contrary to K.S.A. 65-4162(a)(3). Hughes eventually entered a no contest plea to possession of methamphetamine and vehicular homicide, contrary to K.S.A. 21-3405.
For purposes of his summary judgment motion alone, Hughes acquiesced in the presumption that he was driving the vehicle and was under the influence at the time of the accident. However, at the time of the district court's ruling, the factual issue of Hughes' alcohol or drug use remained contested in the wrongful death and survival action generally and the workers compensation proceeding focused on whether Hughes would be entitled to recover benefits for injuries he suffered in the accident. Hughes' workers compensation proceeding was still pending at the time of oral argument before this court.
We must decide whether the district court erred by: (1) denying summary judgment in favor of Hughes on the immunity issue and (2) granting partial summary judgment in favor of Brungardt Scott on Hughes' intoxication and its effect on his ability to recover workers compensation benefits for his own injuries.
" State ex rel. Stovall v Reliance Ins. Co., 278 Kan. 777, 788, 107 P.3d 1219 (2005).
In addition, it is important to note that the potentially dispositive legal question in this appeal is one requiring interpretation of the Workers Compensation Act (Act), K.S.A. 44-501 et seq. Statutory interpretation and construction present questions of law over which this court's review is unlimited. See, e.g., Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 279 Kan. 523, 526, 113 P.3d 241 (2005).
Defendant Hughes moved for summary judgment in his favor because he believed himself immune from civil suit under K.S.A. 44-501(b). Our analysis therefore begins with review of the basic statutory scheme of the Act.
K.S.A. 44-501(a) states:
This portion of the statute defines who is covered by the Act and identifies the injuries compensable under it, i.e., injuries "by accident arising out of and in the course of employment." K.S.A. 44-501(a). The Act is to be
" Neal v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 277 Kan. 1, 14, 81 P.3d 425 (2003).
The statute also provides:
"(b) Except as provided in the workers compensation act, no employer, or other employee of such employer, shall be liable for any injury for which compensation is recoverable under the workers compensation act nor shall an employer be liable to any third party for any injury or death of an employee which was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability against a third party and for which workers compensation is payable by such employer." (Emphasis added). K.S.A. 44-501(b).
Under this subsection, it is well established that a worker who recovers benefits for an on-the-job injury from an employer under the Act cannot maintain a civil action for damages against the employer or against a fellow employee. The remedy under the Act is exclusive; and both employers and coemployees or fellow servants are immune from civil suit for damages. See, e.g., Fugit, Administratrix v. United Beechcraft, Inc., 222 Kan. 312, 314, 564 P.2d 521 (1977).
This contrasts with the Act's allowance of recovery of workers compensation benefits and civil damages when the tortfeasor is a third party. See K.S.A. 44-504(a) ( ); see also Loucks v. Gallagher Woodsmall, Inc., 272 Kan. 710, 715, 35 P.3d 782 (2001) ( ).
The Act also sets out certain exceptions to employer liability for workers compensation. For example, an employer is not liable to compensate an employee for injuries arising out of the employee's own intentional tortious acts, from the employee's failure to abide by statutes about which the employer gave notice, or from the employee's failure to follow precautionary or procedural rules furnished by the employer. K.S.A. 44-501(d)(1). The exception particularly relevant in this case is that an employer is not liable to pay workers compensation when an employee's alcohol or drug use has a role in causing that employee's injury, disability, or death. K.S.A. 44-501(d)(2) states: "The employer shall not be liable under the workers compensation act where the injury, disability, or death was contributed to by the employee's use or consumption of alcohol or any drugs, chemicals, or any other compounds or substances." See Foos v. Terminix, 277 Kan. 687, 693, 89 P.3d 546 (2004); Poole v. Earp Meat Co., 242 Kan. 638, 644-48, 750 P.2d 1000 (1988); Woodring v. United Sash & Door Co., 152 Kan. 413, 417-18, 103 P.2d 837 (1940); Evans v. Frakes Trucking, 31 Kan.App.2d 211, 213-16, 64 P.3d 440 (2002).
From this review of the basic provisions of the Act, it is clear that Duke Drilling was liable on Brungardt Scott's workers compensation claim because Scott's death arose out of and in the course of his employment. It is also clear that, if Hughes' alcohol or drug use and its role in causing the accident are proved, Duke Drilling will not be liable for workers compensation benefits to Hughes for any injuries he suffered in the accident. Finally, the Act dictates that, if Scott's death had been caused by a...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
In re K.M.H.
...fact for trial and the case is appropriate for disposition in her favor as a matter of law. See K.S.A. 60-256; Scott v. Hughes, 281 Kan. 642, 644, 132 P.3d 889 (2006); Kluin, 274 Kan. at 893, 56 P.3d Choice of Law The United States Supreme Court has held: "In deciding constitutional choice-......
-
Scott v. Hughes, 102,690.
...judgment in his favor and a grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Brungardt Scott. We reversed and remanded. Scott v. Hughes, 281 Kan. 642, 132 P.3d 889 (2006). The following review of the entire factual and procedural background of this appeal puts our earlier decision and the issu......
-
Cyr v. Mcdermott's Inc
...language requires a finding that a worker is entitled to compensation before these exemptions come into play. See Scott v. Hughes, 281 Kan. 642, 132 P.3d 889, 897 (2006) (“Whether certain conduct arises out of the scope and in the course of employment is the threshold question .... Whether ......
-
Atkins v. Webcon, 113,117
...the statutory phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment" is a question of law, not fact. See Scott v. Hughes , 281 Kan. 642, 644, 132 P.3d 889 (2006) ( Scott I ) ("[T]he potentially dispositive legal question in this appeal is one requiring interpretation of the Workers Compens......