Scott v. IBM Corporation, Civ. Action No. 98-4092 (JBS) (D. N.J. 11/29/2000), Civ. Action No. 98-4092 (JBS).
| Decision Date | 29 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | Civ. Action No. 98-4092 (JBS). |
| Parties | HENDERSON SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. IBM CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
This matter comes before the Court on motion of defendant IBM Corporation (IBM) for reargument of this Court's decision in this case dated September 27, 2000 pursuant to Rule 7.1(g), L. Civ. R. For reasons explained in its Opinion of that date, Scott v. IBM Corp., 196 F.R.D. 233 (D.N.J. 2000), the Court granted in part and denied in part the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P. The Court dismissed plaintiff Henderson Scott's claims arising under the ADA. Plaintiff's claims under the ADEA and Title VII survived.
IBM urges the Court to reconsider its previous ruling that IBM's destruction of evidence relevant to this lawsuit could permit a factfinder to make a "spoliation inference" that the lost or destroyed evidence was harmful to IBM. The Court concluded that this available inference created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether IBM's proffered reasons for discharge were pretextual within the meaning of McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), thus precluding summary judgment. For reasons now discussed, IBM's motion for reconsideration will be denied, but the Court's intent with respect to the prospect of a spoliation instruction to the jury will be clarified, and this case will be set for trial.
Local Civil Rule 7.1(g) requires that a motion for reargument shall be served within 10 days of the entry of the order or judgment on which reargument is sought. Such motions should be accompanied by a "brief setting forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the Judge or Magistrate has overlooked." Id. "A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the court's decision, and `recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party's burden.'" Panna v. Firstrust Sav. Bank, 760 F. Supp. 432, 435 (D.N.J. 1991) (quoting Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan, 721 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D.N.J. 1989)). As this Court has stated, "motions for reargument succeed only where a `dispositive factual matter or controlling decision of law' was presented to the Court but not considered." Damiano v. Sony Music Entertainment, 975 F. Supp. 623, 634 (D.N.J. 1996) (JBS) (quoting Pelham v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (D.N.J. 1987). Where no facts or cases were overlooked, such a motion will be denied. Egloff v. New Jersey Air Nat. Guard, 684 F. Supp. 1275, 1279 (D.N.J. 1988); Resorts International v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992). If the record was inadequately developed on a particular issue, the court has discretion to reconsider the matter, Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace Corp., 849 F. Supp. 987, 990 (D.N.J. 1994), but not to the extent of considering new evidence that was available but not submitted while the motion was pending. Florham Park Chevron, Inc. v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 159, 162 (D.N.J. 1988). In other words, a "motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle to reargue the motion or to present evidence which should have been raised before." Bermingham v. Sony Corp. of America, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 834, 856-67 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 37 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir. 1994). As the late Chief Judge Gerry noted, "[w]e are in fact bound not to consider such new materials, lest the strictures of our reconsideration rule erode entirely." Resorts International, 830 F. Supp. at 831 n. 3. (Emphasis in original). Consequently, only when the matters overlooked might reasonably have resulted in a different conclusion if the court had considered them will the court entertain such a motion. Panna, 760 F. Supp. at 435.
IBM argues that this Court erred in denying summary judgment on plaintiff's Title VII and ADEA claims. In IBM's view, the Court erred because: (1) the Court's ruling denied IBM due process; (2) a spoliation inference is not warranted in this case; and (3) a spoliation inference alone is not an adequate ground upon which to deny summary judgment. The Court will address these arguments in turn.
The Court first addresses IBM's due process argument. IBM first posits that the Court imposed a sanction arising from the loss or destruction of certain documents. IBM's position is that the Court should not impose a spoliation sanction without first giving the party to be sanctioned (IBM) a chance to brief the relevant issues. (Def. Br. at 2-5.) This argument is unavailing.
While it is true that due process requires that the parties have sufficient notice of the form of sanction to be imposed, see In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 379-81 (3d Cir. 1997), it is manifest that in my previous opinion in this case I was making an evidentiary ruling, not imposing a sanction. Concerning the lost evidence at issue (the flipcharts created during the reduction in force process which may have included employee rankings), I stated:
Given that the evidence of spoliation in this case might be interpreted by the jury as circumstantial evidence of IBM's desire to cover up discriminatory reasons for discharging Mr. Scott, the Court will permit the use of spoliation evidence as support for plaintiff's pretext theory. The negative inference permitted by evidence that IBM destroyed relevant documents provides grounds for disbelieving IBM's proffered reasons for discharging Mr. Scott under prong one of Fuentes, and thus his Title VII and ADEA claims survive summary judgment. However, because there is no evidence that IBM's conduct in any way hindered plaintiff's ability to bring this suit, no remedy is warranted beyond a jury instruction. The Court emphasizes that plaintiff still bears the burden of proof should this case proceed to trial. At this stage, it only finds that a jury could find pretext on account of this negative inference. IBM's proffered reasons for discharging plaintiff are entirely plausible, and may carry the day.
Scott, 196 F.R.D. at 249-50 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
As this passage makes clear, this Court's decision regarding spoliation was an evidentiary ruling, not a sanction. As the Opinion makes clear, 196 F.R.D. at 248, the Court found that IBM's conduct is discarding the documents did not rise to the standards necessary to trigger sanctions, since the circumstances are "susceptible of an innocent explanation" and "plaintiff's motion for such sanctions will be denied." Courts in this Circuit have consistently held that a broad spectrum of evidence, both direct and circumstantial, is available to plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases. See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2000). Nothing in IBM's brief persuades the Court that its decision regarding this circumstantial evidence of pretext was in error. It is plaintiff's theory that IBM disposed of "the most important evidence in the case", i.e., the flip charts created during the reduction-in-force process. (Pl. Reply Br. in Support of Sum. J. at 9.) The circumstances of IBM's loss or destruction of these relevant documents provides reasonable grounds for a negative inference to be drawn that these documents were harmful to IBM's case, if a jury finds such an inference to be warranted. The jury may also decide, after hearing the relevant evidence, that an innocent reason exists for this non-retention of documents, in which case no negative inference may be drawn. If the proofs at trial are as proffered by the plaintiff in opposing the summary judgment motion, the jury will be instructed accordingly.
Moreover, this Court's decision to entertain a permissive spoliation instruction does not deny the defendant due process of law. The Court's consideration of the availability of the spoliation inference came after full briefing, and after both sides filed multiple supplementary submissions over the course of several months. Indeed, this case is one of the more aggressively litigated on this Court's docket, and the briefs, affidavits and certifications associated with it total in the thousands of pages. The suggestion that IBM would have benefitted from the opportunity to submit further briefing strains credulity. Furthermore, plaintiff's briefs provided ample notice that a spoliation inference might be entertained. In requesting that sanctions be imposed, plaintiff remarked that
[T]he real issue is not whether spoliation sanctions are in order, but how severe the sanction should be under the circumstances. The remedy ought to reflect the following relevant considerations: (1) the large likely value of the destroyed documents . . . ; (2) IBM's persistent and egregious litigation misconduct . . . ; and (3) the degree to which IBM's evidence destruction corresponds to the tort of spoliation.
(Pl. Reply Br. in Support of Sum. J. at 11.) Opposing plaintiff's request for sanctions, defendant mustered its proofs of innocent intent and all such facts were considered and discussed. See Scott, 196 F.R.D. at 239 & 249. The Court is satisfied that plaintiff's explicit request for sanctions forseeably encompasses a permissive spoliation inference instruction, even if the permissive spoliation instruction is viewed as a "sanction" as noted by several courts. See Reilly v. NatWest Markets Group, Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 270 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 940 (2000) (); Howell v. Maytag, 168 F.R.D. 502, 507...
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