Scott v. Independent Ice Co.

• Decision Date: 09 December 1919
• Docket Number: 41.
• Parties: SCOTT et al. v. INDEPENDENT ICE CO. et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

109 A. 117

135 Md. 343

SCOTT et al. v. INDEPENDENT ICE CO. et al.

No. 41.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

December 9, 1919

Appeal from Baltimore City Court; Henry Duffy, Judge.

Proceeding by Fredericka Scott and others, for an award under the Workmen's Compensation Law for the death of John Scott opposed by the Independent Ice Company, employer. From an order of the Baltimore city court confirming a decision of the Industrial Accident Commission refusing compensation applicants appeal. Judgment affirmed.

Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BURKE, THOMAS, PATTISON, URNER, and ADKINS, JJ.

Thomas Charles Williams and Eldridge Hood Young, both of Baltimore for appellants.

Walter L. Clark and C. M. Charest, both of Baltimore, for appellees.

BOYD C.J.

This is an appeal by the claimants from an order of the Baltimore city court, which affirmed a decision of the state Industrial Accident Commission disallowing compensation to them. It was agreed that John Scott was killed on July 26, 1918, while in the employ of the Independent Ice Company, and that the appellants, if dependents under the Workmen's Compensation Law (3 Code Pub. Gen. Laws, art. 101, §§ 1-64) are entitled to compensation. It was also agreed that, if Fredericka Scott were present, she would testify as follows: She and John Scott had been living together continuously in the city of Baltimore for the past eight years as husband and wife, although they were never married. As a result of that relation, two children were born to them, viz. Mildred Scott, aged three years in August, 1918, and Avon Scott, aged two months at that time. Since their birth, and at the time of his death, both children and Fredericka Scott had been living with John Scott as members of his family; he had acknowledged them to be his children, had supported them and Fredericka Scott, their mother, and the children had been entirely dependent on him for a living.

The only questions, therefore, which we are called upon to determine are: (a) Whether Fredericka Scott is entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law; and (b) whether Mildred Scott and Avon Scott, the illegitimate children, are entitled to compensation under that law.

Section 36 of article 101 of the Code, titled "Workmen's Compensation," and being a codification of Acts 1914, c. 800 and amendments thereto, begins:

"Each employé (or in case of death his family or dependents) entitled to receive compensation under this article shall receive the same in accordance with the following schedule, and except as in this article otherwise provided, such payment shall be in lieu of any and all rights of action whatsoever against any person whomsoever."

Then, after providing for compensation to the employé for disabilities, etc., the section provides that-

"In case the injury causes death within the period of two years, the benefits shall be in the amounts and to the persons following."

The compensation is then named for wholly dependent persons and partly dependent persons, after which the statute provides:

"The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employé: A wife or invalid husband ('invalid' meaning one physically or mentally incapacitated from earning), a child or children under the age of sixteen years (or over said age if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning) living with or dependent upon the parent at the time of the injury or death.

In all other cases, questions of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing at the time of the injury resulting in death of such employé, but no person shall be considered as dependent unless such person be a father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, stepchild or grandchild, or brother or sister of the deceased employé, including those otherwise specified in this section."

Section 61 of that article is:

"The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed shall have no application to this article; but this article shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose."

Although the rights, if any, of these three persons under this statute are somewhat interwoven, and a discussion of the claim of the mother may have some bearing on that of the children, and vice versa, we will consider them separately. (a) Whatever may be the law in some other states, there can be no doubt that "to constitute lawful marriage here there must be superadded to the civil contract some religious ceremony" (Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361), but in this case it is admitted that John Scott and Fredericka were never married, and hence we are not called upon to discuss that question. A wife is "a woman united to a man by marriage" (Bouvier's Law Dict.), or, as the definition is given in 30 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 522, "a woman who is united to a man in the lawful bonds of wedlock." If Fredericka had any foundation for her claim for compensation under this act, it would seem to be clear that it could only have been as "wife," but the appellants contend that, as she and her children were members of the family of, and supported by, John Scott they were entitled to compensation.

The only references we find to "family" in the act are in section 36 of article 101 of Code (section 35 of Acts 1914), the first paragraph of which is quoted above, and in the preamble, where the statute "declares that all phases of extrahazardous employments be, and they are hereby withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for workmen injured in extrahazardous employments and their families and dependents are hereby provided for, regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, except as provided in this act." There is also a provision in section 31 that nothing in the act shall affect certain existing contracts, "or any arrangement now existing between employers and employés, providing for the payment to such employés, their families, dependents or representatives of sick, accident or death benefits in addition to the compensation provided for by this act," etc. There is nothing in the act from which it can properly be contended that any person can recover compensation simply because such person is a member of the family of the employé, and was dependent upon him for support even if we give the word "family" the broad meaning contended for by appellants. The quotation taken from Bouvier in Pearre v. Smith, 110 Md. 531, 534, 73 A. 141, 142, referred to by appellants, that in common parlance the family "consists of those who live under the same roof with the pater familias," is undoubtedly a correct definition as applicable to many questions, although, as Judge Schmucker also said in that case, "it has a variety of meanings according to the connection in which it is used, and it should be so construed in each case as to give it the significance appropriate to its use." The first definition given by Bouvier is, "Father, mother and children," then, "All the individuals who live under the authority of another, including the servants of the family." The definition in 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 866, also referred to by Judge Schmucker, is: "A family is defined as a collective body of persons who form one household, under one head and one domestic government, including parents, children, and servants, and, as sometimes used, even lodgers or boarders." The "old family servant" in this state, as well as in other portions of the country, was, and still is to a limited extent, an important and respected member of the household and often in old age wholly dependent on the head of the family, but no one would claim that such or other servants, although dependent on the head of the house, could be entitled to compensation under such an act as this. Nor could it be said that a niece, cousin, or other relative not named in this act or friend who was dependent upon the employé, even for a good consideration, was entitled to compensation under this act because he or she was a member of the family. The answer to such a claim would plainly be that the statute states who shall be entitled to compensation in specific terms, and courts have no right to go beyond those terms because the parties before them seem to be deserving. The statute does not provide for substitutes-certainly not for a mistress in place of a wife.

Excepting in jurisdictions where common-law marriages are recognized, or there are statutes authorizing such claims, the decisions are for the most part in accord in holding that a woman living with an employé, as man and wife, when he died as the result of an injury, is not entitled to compensation under Workmen's Compensation Laws if not legally married to him although dependent upon him. Illustrations of the extent to which courts have gone in so holding may be found in Hall v. Industrial Commission, 165 Wis. 364, 162 N.W. 312, L. R. A. 1917D, 829, Armstrong v. Ind. Com., 161 Wis. 530, 154 N.W. 844, and Meton v. State Ind. Ins. Dept., 104 Wash. 652, 177 P. 696. Those were hard cases, as the parties believed they were legally married, but the courts could not give them relief, or refuse to be governed by the law, but had to administer the law as they found it, just as we had to do in Geisselman v. Geisselman, not yet officially reported, but to be found in 107 A. 185, where an innocent child had to suffer from the mistake of its parents.

Without deeming it necessary to cite other authorities on the asserted right of the mother to compensation under this act we are satisfied that she was not so entitled, and we have no hesitation in agreeing with the decision of the lower court as to her. We will now...