Kendall v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City
| Decision Date | 15 November 1950 |
| Docket Number | 31. |
| Parties | KENDALL v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF BALTIMORE CITY et al. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Maurice J. Pressman, Baltimore (Schonfield & Schonfield Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants.
Thomas G Andrew and Walter R. Tabler, Jr., both of Baltimore, for appellees.
Before MARBURY, C. J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.
The question presented in this case, arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, is whether the claimant, who cohabited with the deceased workman for then years prior to his fatal injury although not married to him, is legally qualified as a dependent upon a showing that she was in fact supported by him. He claim was disallowed by the State Industrial Accident Commission, and its action was affirmed by the Court of Common Pleas, sitting without a jury.
The testimony disclosed that the claimant was married in 1907; her husband died in 1937 leaving her with five children. She met the deceased, John Daniels, in 1939. He had been divorced. He seems to have proposed marriage, but the appellant declined on account of religious scruples. There was no other impediment to the marriage. In any event, he moved to her apartment, where he occupied a couch and she prepared his meals. Subsequently they moved to another apartment and then to a house which he had purhcased; she gave up her job as a telephone operator, and he supported her and her two minor children for some years. In October, 1948, she obtained employment as house mother at an orphanage, but e continued to give her $15.00 or $20.00 a week until February 18, 1949 wheh he was fatally injured. During this whole period they lived together as man and wife. Although she used the name 'Mrs. Kendall', she was generally known in the neighborhood as Mrs. Daniels. A married daughter of the claimant introduced Daniels as her step-father. On the other hand, there was testimony that Daniels was known as a single man, and that he said on one occasion that Mrs. Kendall was 'just taking care of the house for me.'
Code, Article 101, section 35(7) sets up a schedule of benefits, in case of injury causing death, in favor of 'wholly dependent persons at the time of death,' and in favor of 'party dependent persons'. Prior to June 1, 1947, the statute provided that 'The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: A wife or invalid husband * * *, a child or children under the age of sixteen years * * * living with or dependent upon the parent at the time of the injury or death.
'In all other cases, questions of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing at the time of the injury resulting in death of such employee, but no person shall be considered as dependent unless such person be a father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, stepchild, or grandchild, or brother or sister of the deceased employee, including those otherwise specified in this section'. Code 1939, art. 101, § 48(4).
By Chapter 895, Acts of 1947, the section was amended by substituting for the passage quoted the following: 'In all cases, questions of dependency, in whole, or in part, shall be determined by the Commission in accordance with the facts in each particular case existent at the time of the injury resulting in death of such employee.' The obvious effect of this amendment was to eliminate the presumption of total dependency in the case of a wife, invalid husband or child, and to eliminate the requirement that the claimant be related to the deceased employee, by blood or marriage, in one of the specified categories.
The appellees contend that the word 'dependency' implies a legal or moral obligation to support, and since the deceased employee was under no such obligation to the claimant, she is not covered by the statute. They cite a passage from Meyler v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 179 Md. 211, 215, 17 A.2d 762, 764, where it was said: See also, as to probability of continuing support, Harvey v. George J. Roche & Sons, 148 Md. 363, 370, 129 A. 359. In the Meyler case the question was whether a stepdaughter, who lived at home and took care of her invalid mother, was a dependent of her stepfather. He gave her $18.00 a week for the expenses of the household. It was held that she was not 'merely a maid and nurse for her mother under a contract,' and the evidence was legally sufficient to show that she was a dependent, citing Mech v. Storrs, 169 Md. 150, 179 A. 525, where a sister performed housework by arrangement with a brother. In each case the specified relationship gave rise to a moral (if not legal) obligation to support, and the fact that services were rendered did not defeat the claim of dependency. In the Downton case, it was held that the presumption of dependency arising from the specified relationship of husband and wife, which created a legal obligation to support, was rebuttable and not conclusive.
In the Meyler case the court also said, 179 Md. at page 215, 17 A.2d at page 764: In the Kotwall case 'dependent' was defined as 'one who looks to another for support and maintenance; one who is in fact dependent--one who relies on another for the reasonable necessities of life.' It was also said that 'actual dependency is a pure question of fact.' See also States Engineering Co. v. Harris, 157 Md. 487, 146 A. 392; Larkin v. Smith, 183 Md. 274, 280, 37 A.2d 340; and Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard v. Rosenthal, 185 Md. 416, 421, 45 A.2d 79. We find no support in any of these cases for the contention that a legal or moral obligation is implicit in the word 'dependent'. When the legislature eliminated the enumerated instances of relationship by blood or marriage to which recovery had been limited, we think it left as the only requirement a finding of fact that the claimant was subsisting, and would probably continue to subsist, in whole or in part upon the earnings of the workman at the time of the injury. Thus, for example, a person supported merely through charitable motives, without legal or moral obligation, would be eligible under the statute as amended. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. State Highway Comm. v. McGuire, 188 Va. 444, 50 S.E.2d 284.
The appellees rely strongly upon Scott v. Independent Ice Co., 135 Md. 343, 346, 109 A. 117, 118. In that case it was held that a woman living with a workman as his wife, although not legally married to him, was not entitled to compensation, although she was 'a member of the family of the employee and was dependent upon him for support.' It was also held that his illegitimate children were not entitled to compensation. But in each instance the court clearly recognized that the claimants were in fact dependent. The decision was rested upon the premise that 'common law' marriage is not recognized in Maryland so that she could not bring herself within the category of 'wife' and that the category of 'children' did not include illegitimate children. The court said, 135 Md. at page 347, 109 A. at page 118: 'the statute states who shall be entitled to compensation in specific terms, and the courts have no right to go beyond those terms'.
It may be noted that neither the Commission nor the lower court in the instant case expressed any doubt that the claimant was in fact dependent. Commissioner Menchine said: 'In spite of a finding of fact that this claimant regularly and substantially was supported by the decedent for a long period of time continuing to his death, the claim will be disallowed upon the ground that the public policy of the State forbids its grant'. Judge France said: 'I find that she was partially dependent on him at the time of her death.' Unless this finding was clearly erroneous we are not at liberty to disturb it. We think it was clearly supported by the testimony. Judge France affirmed the Commission's order on the sole ground that to allow it 'would be contrary to the public policy of the state and place the stamp of approval on a 'common law marriage' which never has been recognized in the State of Maryland.'
But we find nothing in the statute to disqualify a claimant who in fact relies upon a workman for support. The present claim does not rest upon any showing of relationship to the decedent legal or otherwise nor does recovery depend upon the enforcement of any contract. Cf. Maskell v. Hill, 189 Md. 327, 332 55 A.2d 842, and Lynch v. Rogers, 177 Md. 478, 488, 10 A.2d 619. In Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 186 Md. 371, 376, 46 A.2d 619, 621, it was contended that a widow, who deserted her husband and lived in adultery with another man, forfeited her right to inherit from her lawful husband. But we said: ...
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