Scott v. Jayco, Inc.

• Docket Number: 1:19-cv-0315 JLT
• Decision Date: 18 December 2021
• Parties: KEVIN H. SCOTT and JACQUIE L. SCOTT, Plaintiffs, v. JAYCO INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

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KEVIN H. SCOTT and JACQUIE L. SCOTT, Plaintiffs,
v.
JAYCO INC., Defendant.

No. 1:19-cv-0315 JLT

United States District Court, E.D. California

December 18, 2021

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS (DOC. 70)

JENNIFER L. THURSTON CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The Scotts are California residents who purchased a new RV in Iowa. After a short time, they discovered the RV suffered from various defects and required repairs. Plaintiffs sought to hold Jayco, Inc. liable for damages and injunctive relief under California's Unfair Competition Act and Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and under federal law with the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The parties have settled the underlying claims and agreed Jayco shall pay attorney fees and costs in an amount to be determined by the Court. (See Doc. 70-3.)

Plaintiffs now seek an award of attorney fees in the amount of $170, 385.75 and costs in the amount of $1, 509.13. (Doc. 71 at 15.) Jayco opposes the motion, asserting the fees requested are excessive. (Doc. 72.) The Court found the matter suitable for decision without oral argument, and the motion was taken under submission pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED in part, with fees in the modified amount of $67, 634.35 and costs in the modified amount of $400.00.

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I. Background

In December 2016, “Plaintiffs purchased a new 2017 Jayco Seneca RV” online through RV One Superstores. (Doc. 1 at 4; see also Doc. 11-4 at 1-2.) On December 30, 2016, Mr. Scott travelled to Des Moines, Iowa and signed the purchase contract for the RV. (See Doc 11-4 at 2, ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs assert that after purchasing the RV, they discovered it suffered from numerous defects and repeatedly sought repairs. (Doc. 1 at 5-13.) Plaintiffs assert the they suffered “ongoing and recurring problems with fit and finish, and a myriad of mechanical issues.” (Id. at 12, ¶ 23.) According to Plaintiffs, Jayco “had multiple repair attempts on the RV, through its Dealer, and … refused and or failed to remedy, fix or remediate the serious issues.” (Id., ¶ 24.)

On June 22, 2018, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint asserting the following causes of action: (1) breach of an express warranty in violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; (2) breach of an implied warranty in violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; (3) unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; (4) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq.; and (5) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301. (See generally Doc. 1.) However, the parties stipulated that Plaintiffs' claims under the Song-Beverly Act be dismissed with prejudice on September 10, 2021. (Doc. 10.)

On July 15, 2021, the parties informed the Court that they had reached a settlement in the action. (Doc. 64.) They agreed on the substantive settlement terms, including that Plaintiffs would file a motion for fees and costs, which they have now done (Docs. 70, 71.)

II. Legal Standards

In general, “[t]he starting point for determining a reasonable fee is the ‘lodestar' figure, which is the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008); Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc., 1 Cal. 5th 480, 489 (2016) (a lodestar involves “multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate”).

When the parties are unable to “settle the amount of a fee, ” “the fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly

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rates.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 424, 437 (1983). Thus, the burden of proof is on fee applicants. Id.; see also Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2007). Any party opposing the fee request must make specific objections to the hours expended. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys. v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Assoc., 163 Cal.App.4th at 550, 564 (2008) (“[g]eneral arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice”). Thus, the burden shifts to opposing party to demonstrate the hours spent are duplicative or excessive. See id.; see also Gorman v. Tassajara Dev. Corp., 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 101 (2009) (“[t]he party opposing the fee award can be expected to identify the particular charges it considers objectionable”).

Courts are given discretion when calculating a fee award. Hensley, 416 U.S. at 437. However, the Supreme Court explained “it remains important ... for the district court to provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” Id. Thus, the Court should provide sufficient information on how it arrived at the total of compensable hours for which fees were awarded to allow for meaningful appellate review. Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 485 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Courts need not attempt to portray the discretionary analyses that leads to their numerical conclusions as elaborate mathematical equations, but they must provide sufficient insight into their exercises of discretion to enable [the appellate court] to discharge our reviewing function”).

III. Discussion and Analysis

Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, “Jayco agrees to pay Plaintiff's (sic) attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined by the Court, by way of noticed motion, to have been reasonably incurred by Plaintiffs in the commencement and prosecution of this action.” (Doc. 70-3 at 6, ¶ 1(b), emphasis omitted.) Thus, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs are entitled to fees in the action. Rather, Jayco challenges the number of hours “reasonably incurred” and the hourly rates sought by counsel and the administrative professionals. (See generally Doc. 72.)

Plaintiffs seek an award of “$106, 090.55 in fees, plus an additional $7, 5000 for bringing this Motion, reviewing Jayco's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion, drafting Plaintiffs' Reply, preparing and attending any relating hearing, preparing any needed filings to satisfy the order, for time to wrap up the settlement and ultimately collect any amount awarded by this Court.” (Doc. 71 at 6.) Plaintiffs request

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multiplier to enhance the lodestar in the amount of 1.5, for the total amount of $170, 385.75. (Id. at 6, 15.) Finally, Plaintiffs seek costs and expenses in the amount of $1, 509.13. (Id.)

A. Hours expended

A fee applicant must provide records documenting the tasks completed and the amount of time spent. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 424 (1983); see also Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 (2001) (party must provide records sufficient for the court to “carefully review … [the] hours expended” to determine whether the time reported was reasonable). “Where the documentation of hours in inadequate, the district court may reduce hours accordingly.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; see also Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1131-32.

Plaintiffs seek fees for 270.3 hours of work in the action, plus anticipated time for future work on this motion.^[1] (Doc. 70-1 at 12-13; Doc. 71 at 7-8, 15.) This time includes work by attorneys Jon Jacobs, Terry Baker, Chad David, Rene Dupart, Jon Feeley, Elana Midda, and Nicolas, Dillavou; as well as paralegals Lisa Tyler, Gabriela Torres, Kimberly Riley, Kayla Goettman, Cindy Lewandowski, and Shaina Cateldge. (Id.) Jayco contends the time reported reflects overstaffing of the work with “transient timekeepers.” (Doc. 72 at 3, 7-9.) In addition, Jayco objects the hours reported includes “numerous clerical entries, which should be considered as overhead” and “impossibly vague billing entries” that should be excluded from the fee award. (Id. at 3-4, 9-12.) Finally, Jayco argues the time sheets reflect overbilling with tasks that should not take six minutes to complete. (Id. at 12.)

1. Exhibits in opposition

Jayco enlisted James Schratz to “provide an audit and opinion regarding the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees requested” by Plaintiffs. (See Doc. 72-1 at 1, ¶ 1.) According to Mr. Schratz, he “reviewed Plaintiffs' Fee Motion and accompanying declarations and exhibits in support thereof, including billing records covering the time period from February 9, 2018 through August 27, 2021, ” as well as “various pleading and written discovery provided by Jayco, Inc.'s counsel.” (Id. at 14, ¶ 46.) Based upon his review, Jayco compiled billing entries that were challenged for overstaffing with

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“transient timekeepers” in “Exhibit 8, ” clerical tasks in “Exhibit 11, ” and vague billing entries in “Exhibit 12.”

Significantly, whether fees should be awarded-and the reasonableness of the fees requested- are matters of law for the Court to decide. See Hensley, 416 U.S. at 437. Thus, the Court declines to simply adopt the opinions of Mr. Schratz related to the reasonableness of the fees requested by Plaintiffs' counsel. The Court has reviewed each exhibit, as discussed below, and used the exhibits to identify the more than 400 billing entries challenged by Jayco in support of the assertion that the hours billed by Plaintiffs' counsel should be reduced for overstaffing, clerical tasks, and vagueness.^[2]

2. Overstaffing

Jayco observes that while Plaintiffs' counsel “professes expertise in consumer warrant law, ” the firm “collectively staffed this matter with 13 different timekeepers consisting of 7 attorneys and 6 paralegals.” (Doc. 72 at 7.) Jayco contends “at least 9 of the 13 timekeepers are transient or excessive timekeepers that each billed less than 20 hours for the entire case, ” for which Plaintiffs requested fees in the amount of $15, 569.50. (Id.) In addition, Jayco observes that...