Scott v. Land Span Motor, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 December 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 3:90-2862-19.
• Citation: 781 F. Supp. 1115
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Blanche K. SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. LAND SPAN MOTOR, INC., Defendant.

781 F. Supp. 1115

Blanche K. SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. LAND SPAN MOTOR, INC., Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 3:90-2862-19.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Columbia Division.

December 20, 1991.

H. Ronald Stanley, Columbia, S.C., Dennis N. Cannon, Jr., Camden, S.C., for Blanche K. Scott.

F. Earl Ellis, Jr., David L. Morrison, Nauful & Ellis, Columbia, S.C., for Land Span Motor, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SHEDD, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV) and/or New Trial. This case, which involves a claim of negligence arising out of an automobile accident, was tried before a jury on November 5-8, 1991. At the close of the evidence, the Court directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff on the issue of liability and submitted the case to the jury for a determination of damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $84,000 actual damages.¹ Thereafter, the Court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff in this amount.

Defendant's motion is based on three grounds. First, defendant asserts that plaintiff's claims of economic loss are barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel and, therefore, the economic loss portion of the judgment should be set aside. Second, defendant maintains that the Court erred in directing a verdict in favor of plaintiff as to liability on the negligence claim. Last, defendant argues that there is insufficient evidence of causation relating plaintiff's injuries to the automobile accident at issue in this case or, alternatively, that the verdict amount is grossly excessive when compared with the damages that were proximately caused by defendant's negligence. Because the Court finds these arguments unpersuasive, it will deny defendant's motion.

FACTS

The following pertinent facts were presented at trial. On January 15, 1987, at approximately 10:15 a.m., plaintiff was driving her automobile on Broad Street, which is a major thoroughfare in Camden, South Carolina, when she was struck by a tractor-trailer truck driven by Thomas Mure, an agent of defendant. Mr. Mure had stopped his truck on Broad Street and had gone into a nearby post office to determine where he should take his truck to deliver the goods that he was transporting. After receiving instructions, Mr. Mure returned to his truck and attempted to back it across Broad Street. Although Mr. Mure made some effort to ensure that there were no vehicles behind his truck, he admitted that there was a blind spot directly behind his truck when he began backing it. Mr. Mure backed his truck into plaintiff's automobile, which was behind the truck and apparently in Mr. Mure's blind spot. Plaintiff injured her hand in this accident and she has experienced problems with it ever since.

On August 8, 1988, plaintiff was placed on a 90-day disability leave of absence by her then-employer, DuPont. DuPont's stated reason for placing plaintiff on leave was her inability to perform her job due to her hand injury. DuPont informed plaintiff that she would be required to prove that she was physically able to work at the end of the 90-day period or she would be terminated. Plaintiff produced reports from several doctors clearing her to return to work; however, DuPont determined that plaintiff was unable to do so. DuPont therefore terminated plaintiff.

On the day that she was placed on leave by DuPont, plaintiff slipped and fell as she was leaving the plant. Plaintiff filed a Workers' Compensation claim seeking to recover benefits for the injury she sustained in this slip and fall incident. During the course of this claim, DuPont deposed plaintiff. It is apparent from reviewing the deposition transcript that DuPont spent a great deal of time in this deposition attempting to prove that plaintiff's disability was the result of her hand injury, which was not work-related and thus not a compensable injury, rather than being the result of her slip and fall, which was work-related. In this deposition plaintiff testified that she was able to work, albeit with restriction, prior to her slip and fall accident. Plaintiff ultimately settled her claim with DuPont and the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission) approved this settlement.

In April 1989, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission (SCHAC) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), asserting that DuPont terminated her because of her age. Plaintiff signed this charge and a SCHAC employee notarized plaintiff's statement. Plaintiff indicated in this charge that DuPont stated two reasons for terminating her: (1) DuPont "alleged my job duties conflicted with restrictions set by my doctor," and (2) DuPont "alleged inability to perform my job duties." Plaintiff then asserted that DuPont's stated reasons for her termination were "untrue and pretextual" because her termination "discounted my release by my doctor, which placed no restrictions on my ability to perform my job." In October 1989, SCHAC issued a finding of no cause on plaintiff's charge and, in February 1990, EEOC issued a similar finding. Plaintiff did not pursue litigation against DuPont.

As noted above, according to the jury's answer to the interrogatory, plaintiff recovered $57,000 of lost wages as a result of defendant's negligence. Central to plaintiff's claim for lost wages were her assertions at trial that defendant's negligence led to her physical disability, that she was terminated from her last employer (DuPont) because of her inability to work due to the disability, and that she is now unable to work because of her disability. In support of her claim, plaintiff specifically testified as follows:

Q: by defense counsel Ms. Scott, why were you terminated by DuPont?

A: by plaintiff Unable to do the job with my right hand.

Q: Were you able to do the job?

A: I felt I was.

Q: DuPont terminated you because you were unable to do the job?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you believe that's why DuPont terminated you?

A: Yes, sir. Because they preached safety.

THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Rule 50(b), a party may move for JNOV at the close of all of the evidence if that party also moved for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by his opponent. When ruling on a motion for JNOV, the trial court must determine whether there is any substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Evington v. Forbes, 742 F.2d 834, 835 (4th Cir.1984). In making this determination, the trial court must consider the record as a whole and in the light most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. Id. If there is evidence opposed to the motion of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment could reasonably return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party, then the motion should be denied. Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transp. Co., 623 F.2d 888, 891 (4th Cir.1980). However, where the non-moving party has the ultimate burden of proof and fails to produce sufficient evidence in support of an essential element of the cause of action, then the court should render judgment in favor of the moving party as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In making this determination, the court does not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 895 F.2d 159, 162 (4th Cir.1990), modified on other grounds, 928 F.2d 86 (en banc).

Under Rule 59, which governs the procedure for granting a new trial, the Court may grant such relief "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the Courts of the United States...." Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(a). The standard for granting such relief has been articulated by the Fourth Circuit as follows:

On such a motion for a new trial it is the duty of the judge to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, if he is of the opinion that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence which is false, or will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict.

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Wanzer, 897 F.2d 703, 708 (4th Cir.1990) (citation omitted). In determining whether a new trial is warranted, the Court is permitted to weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of the witnesses. Abasiekong v. City of Shelby, 744 F.2d 1055, 1059 (4th Cir.1984).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Defendant first argues that plaintiff's claim of economic loss (i.e., lost wages) is barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel and should therefore be set aside. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine which operates to preclude a party in certain circumstances from adopting a position which conflicts with one previously taken in the same or related litigation. Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir.1982). The doctrine, which "`is designed to protect the integrity of the courts and the judicial process,'" United Va. Bank/Seaboard Nat'l v. B.F. Saul Real Estate Inv. Trust, 641 F.2d 185, 190 (4th Cir.1981) (citation omitted); is an extraordinary one which should be applied with caution, Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc. v. Eastern Auto Distribs., Inc., 892 F.2d 355, 356 n. 3 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 3242, 111 L.Ed.2d 752 (1990); because it "precludes a contradictory position without examining the truth of either statement." Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir.1990).

The application of judicial estoppel is controlled by federal law, Allen, 667 F.2d at 1167 n. 4, and is within the court's sound discretion. Matter of Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 642 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 48, 112 L.Ed.2d 24 (1990). While judicial estoppel is recognized in several federal circuits, "no single...