Scott v. Majors

• Decision Date: 29 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. 980142-CA,980142-CA
• Citation: 980 P.2d 214
• Parties: 368 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 1999 UT App 139 Steve SCOTT, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Linda MAJORS, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

Page 214

980 P.2d 214

368 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 1999 UT App 139

Steve SCOTT, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Linda MAJORS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 980142-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

April 29, 1999.

Shawn D. Turner, Larson Kirkham & Turner, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.

Mary Ann Hansen, Orem, for Appellee.

Before WILKINS, P.J., and DAVIS and JACKSON, JJ.

OPINION

WILKINS, Presiding Judge:

¶1 Linda Majors appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment awarding ownership of real property along with attorney fees, costs and damages to Steve Scott. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 This case is before us a second time, see Scott v. Majors, No. 960536, slip op. (Utah Ct.App. April 10, 1997), and arises out of a real estate purchase contract (REPC) entered into in December 1994 between Linda Majors as seller and Steve Scott as successor buyer, for the sale of a condominium located in Park City, Utah. In February 1995, Scott brought suit seeking specific performance requiring Majors to comply with the contract and sell him the Park City property. Scott filed a motion for summary judgment. In January 1996, the trial court ruled that a valid contract existed and ordered specific performance, requiring Majors to convey the property to Scott under the terms of the REPC. In its order, the court deferred ruling on attorney fees, costs and damages. Majors appealed. We affirmed the trial court's decision in April 1997.

¶3 Thereafter, as part of an attempt to negotiate attorney fees, costs and damages, Scott asked Majors to sign a mutual release agreement he had prepared. This proposal required both parties to comply with the REPC pursuant to court order, discharged both parties from all other claims arising out of the REPC, and provided $5,000 to Scott as payment-in-full for costs, damages and attorney fees under the REPC. The amount was to be deducted from the sale proceeds. Majors did not agree and refused to sign the proposed mutual release document.

¶4 On July 2, 1997, as a result of the parties' failed negotiations, Scott filed a second motion for summary judgment seeking to establish the amount of costs, damages and attorney fees to which he was entitled from the original lawsuit. Eight days later, however, Majors filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 7 of Title 11, U.S.C. Scott was listed as a secured creditor. On October 31, 1997, Majors was discharged by order of the United States Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California. Scott then filed an amended motion for summary judgment again requesting costs, damages and attorney fees arising out of the state court action. On November 25, 1997, the bankruptcy court abandoned any claim of the bankruptcy trustee to the Park City property, in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1993). ¹ Title automatically reverted to Majors subject to Scott's existing judgment of specific performance. Scott filed a second motion in state court, seeking an order establishing terms and conditions of conveying the realty, in an effort to enforce his prior judgment against Majors and the property.

¶5 The trial court granted both motions. First, the trial court granted Scott's motion for summary judgment, ruling that under 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1993) and the equitable doctrine of recoupment, Scott could offset the contract sales price of $37,500 against his costs, damages and attorney fees of $35,563.24. Consequently, the trial court determined that Scott owed Majors $1,936.76 at closing. Second, the court ordered Majors to convey the property to Scott subject to the offset mentioned above. The court further ordered that if Majors refused to comply with the order, then Associated Title Company was directed, under Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to effectuate the closing. ²

¶6 Majors refused to comply with the trial court's order to convey the property, and instead filed a lis pendens. Because of the lis pendens, Associated Title declined to convey the property or issue title insurance. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 70, the trial court vested title to the property in Scott. The court also ordered partial disbursement of Major's remaining proceeds to pay the accrued but unpaid property taxes and court costs, and most of the remainder to Scott for additional attorney fees and costs. Majors ultimately received $28.80, and again appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶7 On appeal, Majors argues that the trial court committed reversible error by (1) considering Scott's motions for summary judgment without the required notice to submit for decision contemplated by Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration; (2) awarding ownership of the condominium to Scott; (3) allowing Scott to offset the contract purchase price against his costs, attorney fees and damages; and (4) determining that summary judgment was proper as to damages, costs and attorney fees.

¶8 Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). We give the trial court's legal conclusions no deference and review them for correctness. See Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). Moreover, we review the facts and all reasonable inferences arising from them in the light most favorable to the losing party, see Higgins, 855 P.2d at 233, in this case, Majors.

ANALYSIS

A. Rule 4-501

Certification

¶9 Majors argues the trial court erred in considering Scott's motions because Scott did not comply with Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501(1)(D). Majors asserts that under the plain language of that rule the court should not have ruled on these motions at all, and the matter should be remanded. "A trial court's interpretation of a rule in the Utah Code of Judicial Administration presents a question of law reviewed for correctness." Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah Ct.App.1994). When we interpret a rule, we analyze the rule's " ' "plain language and resort to other methods ... only if the language is ambiguous." ' " Id. at 701 (quoting Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283, 287 (Utah Ct.App.1994) ) (additional quotations omitted).

¶10 Rule 4-501(1)(d) provides:

Notice to Submit for Decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision.

Utah Code of Judicial Admin. R. 4-501(1)(d) (emphasis added).

¶11 Majors reads the last sentence of this rule to preclude the trial court from ruling on a matter that is not properly the subject of a "Notice to Submit for Decision." We disagree. While a court may refrain from addressing a matter that is not submitted for decision under Rule 4-501(1)(d), see Golding v. Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 902 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1995) (affirming court's refusal to address issue not submitted for decision under Rule 4-501(1)(d)), nothing in this rule or any other rule bars a court from deciding such a matter sua sponte. A correct reading of the unambiguous language of the last sentence of the rule is that the parties may not assume that a matter will be presented to the judge for decision by the clerks' office unless a party notifies the clerk of the court that the matter is fully briefed (or at least all parties have had ample opportunity to brief their arguments) and ready for decision.

¶12 The purpose of the Code of Judicial Administration is to bring order to the manner in which the courts operate. They are not intended to, nor do they, create or modify substantive rights of litigants, nor do they decrease the inherent power of the court to control matters pending before it. Cf. Hartford Leasing Corp., 888 P.2d at 702 (" '[a] trial judge is accorded broad discretion in determining how a [case] shall proceed in his or her courtroom.' " (quotation omitted)). Once a motion is properly made, and other parties to the litigation have had the opportunity provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure to respond, the court may act at its convenience to decide the matter. No notice to submit for decision under Rule 4-501 is required. Accordingly, under the plain language of Rule 4-501, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that it could rule on the pending motions.

B. Ownership of the Property

¶13 Majors also argues that the trial court erroneously awarded ownership of the property to Scott because Majors was not under any legal obligation to sell after Scott failed to purchase the property under the terms of the REPC. Essentially, Majors contends that Scott repudiated the contract by insisting he would close only if Majors consented to the terms of the mutual release agreement which she claims would have constituted a modification of the contract. ³

¶14 In our April 10, 1997 Memorandum Decision we affirmed the trial court's initial grant of summary judgment, holding that a valid contract existed between Majors and Scott, and affirming the judgment of specific performance against Majors. That decision became the law of the case, and we will not now rule otherwise. See C & J Indus. v. Bailey, 669 P.2d 855, 856 (Utah 1983) (stating "[t]he express ruling by this Court on all issues raised by prior appeal becomes the law of the case and is binding upon the parties, the trial court and this Court"). With that in mind, we address the effect of Scott's proposed mutual release agreement on Majors' obligations under the purchase agreement, because the release negotiation arose after our prior decision.

¶15 It is a basic contract principle that ...