Scott v. McAlister
| Decision Date | 09 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2019-000030,Opinion No. 5897 |
| Citation | 436 S.C. 324,871 S.E.2d 620 |
| Parties | Shawonder SCOTT, Appellant, v. Curtis MCALISTER, Aquana McAlister, Norma L. Cyrus, Tax Collector for Williamsburg County, the County of Williamsburg, an Unincorporated Subdivision of the State of South Carolina, Hartwell Pendergrass, Sr., and Hattie S. Pendergrass, Defendants, Of whom Norma L. Cyrus, Tax Collector for Williamsburg County, and the County of Williamsburg, an Unincorporated Subdivision of the State of South Carolina, are the Respondents. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Dwight Christopher Moore, of Moore Law Firm, LLC, of Sumter, for Appellant.
William E. Jenkinson, III and William Evan Reynolds, both of Jenkinson, Kellahan, Thompson & Reynolds, PA, of Kingstree, for Respondents.
Shawonder Scott appeals the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Norma L. Cyrus in her capacity as Tax Collector for Williamsburg County (Tax Collector) and Williamsburg County (collectively, Respondents). Scott contends Respondents violated section 12-51-40 of the South Carolina Code (2014 & Supp. 2021) by not providing her with notice of the delinquent taxes, tax sale, or redemption opportunity for property she claims she was renting to own. Scott asserts the circuit court erred by determining she lacked standing and Respondents did not owe her any duty because she was not the defaulting taxpayer of record, owner, or the grantee of record.1 We affirm.
In 1998, Scott and her uncle, McAlister, allegedly entered into an oral contract for the purchase of residential real estate located at 196 Gausetown Road in Kingstree, South Carolina (the Property) for $35,000. Scott took possession of the Property after providing an initial down payment of $4,000. According to Scott, she agreed to pay the remaining $31,000 in monthly installments of $300.
Conversely, McAlister contended Scott agreed to obtain a loan in order to make a second payment of $31,000. After Scott failed to make a second payment of $31,000, McAlister asserted he told her that she was no longer purchasing the Property and her additional payments were rent. However, McAlister maintained that he would have accepted the remaining balance "in 1998, 1999, or 2000 or at any time after that."2
Regardless of how the payments were characterized, both parties later agreed to reduce Scott's monthly payments to $2003 and arranged for Scott to pay the Property's taxes instead of rent if McAlister was unable to afford them.
In 2007, McAlister commenced eviction proceedings against Scott, alleging she failed to make her monthly payments, and the magistrate court issued an order of ejectment. Scott appealed, asserting she occupied the Property under a land purchase agreement, and the circuit court vacated the order of ejectment. In 2010, McAlister's daughter, Aquana, attempted to get Scott to sign a lease agreement. Scott denied she was renting the Property and refused to sign the document. McAlister then commenced a second ejection action in magistrate court. The Record does not indicate the result of the second eviction action.
Meanwhile, McAlister began living with Aquana in Columbia. While living in Columbia, McAlister suffered a heart attack and stroke. Pursuant to Aquana's telephone requests,4 Respondents changed the Property's mailing address on October 20, 2010, to a post office box in Columbia, and on June 29, 2011, to Aquana's address in Columbia. The Property's 2011 taxes and late payment penalties totaling $449.35 were never paid. In preparation for the Property's tax sale, Respondents conducted a title search that showed McAlister was the Property's sole owner and taxpayer. Pendergrass5 purchased the Property at a tax sale on December 3, 2012, and Respondents executed a tax deed conveying the Property to her for $800 on September 9, 2014.
Scott claimed she was unaware of the Property's mailing address changes, delinquent taxes, tax sale, or redemption opportunity until Pendergrass's husband, Hartwell, and a land surveyor entered the Property in 2014 after its conveyance. Shortly after, Scott drove McAlister from Columbia to Tax Collector's office in Williamsburg County, where they talked to Tax Collector. Tax Collector informed Scott and McAlister of the Property's mailing address changes,6 tax sale for delinquent 2011 taxes, and expired redemption opportunity.
In 2015, Scott filed a complaint alleging, inter alia , Respondents violated section 12-51-40 because they mailed notice to the Property's updated mailing address rather than its physical address and they failed to post notice on the Property.7 Scott contended Respondents’ violation of section 12-51-40 prevented her from receiving notice of the Property's delinquent taxes, tax sale, or redemption opportunity. As a result, Scott claimed "[s]he [was] denied the opportunity to pay the [Property's] delinquent taxes and protect her interest in the [P]roperty." Scott also claimed she suffered "harassment, humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety, mental anguish, emotional distress, inconvenience[,] and ... incur[red] legal fees and costs to protect her interest in the [P]roperty." Scott asserted she was entitled to a court order that voided the Property's tax sale, set aside the tax deed to Pendergrass, and awarded actual damages.8
The parties conducted discovery, which included depositions of Scott, the McAlisters, Tax Collector, another employee in Tax Collector's office, and an employee in Assessor's Office. Tax Collector claimed her office sent notices of the delinquent taxes to the Property's updated mailing address in Columbia first by regular mail, then by certified mail. After the certified mail was returned to Respondents as unclaimed, Tax Collector asserted an employee9 posted the required notice on the Property on August 14, 2012. However, McAlister claimed he never received the mailed notices,10 and both McAlister and Scott asserted the notice was never posted on the Property.
The parties’ discovery also produced a 2002 tax bill for $127.67 with a handwritten note dated November 8, 2004. The note, allegedly written by McAlister, stated Scott was the owner and taxpayer for the Property.11 However, the origin of the annotated tax bill is uncertain from the record. McAlister denied writing the note, particularly in light of his name being misspelled twice. Additionally, neither Scott nor the three Williamsburg County employees were asked to confirm if they had ever seen the annotated tax bill or whether it was in their files.
Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment on June 28, 2018. Respondents asserted they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 56 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure because the pleadings, depositions, and evidence lacked a genuine issue of material fact based on the South Carolina public duty doctrine and applicable South Carolina case law regarding that doctrine and its special duty exception. At the September 27, 2018 pretrial motions hearing, Respondents conceded they owed McAlister a special duty to provide him notice of the Property's tax sale; however, Respondents maintained they did not owe Scott that special duty because she was not the record taxpayer, owner, or grantee.
On December 11, 2018, the circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents after determining Scott lacked standing and Respondents did not owe her any duty under section 12-51-40 because she was not the record taxpayer, owner, or grantee for the property. The order did not address any other defendant.12 Scott contends that a favorable decision from this court would allow her to go back to trial and attempt to void the tax sale to Pendergrass and compel specific performance from McAlister upon a favorable jury verdict. This appeal followed.
"The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases which do not require the services of a fact finder." Wright v. PRG Real Est. Mgmt., Inc. , 426 S.C. 202, 211, 826 S.E.2d 285, 290 (2019) (quoting George v. Fabri , 345 S.C. 440, 452, 548 S.E.2d 868, 874 (2001) ). "When reviewing a grant of a summary judgment, appellate courts apply the same standard applied by the trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP." Id. (quoting Turner v. Milliman , 392 S.C. 116, 121-22, 708 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2011) ). "[A] circuit court shall grant summary judgment ‘if ... there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ " Id. () (quoting Rule 56(c), SCRCP ).
In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, "a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. (quoting George , 345 S.C. at 452, 548 S.E.2d at 874 ). "[I]n cases applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the non-moving party is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment." Hancock v. Mid-South Mgmt. Co. , 381 S.C. 326, 330, 673 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009). "A court considering summary judgment neither makes factual determinations nor considers the merits of competing testimony; however, summary judgment is completely appropriate when a properly supported motion sets forth facts that remain undisputed or are contested in a deficient manner." David v. McLeod Reg'l Med. Ctr. , 367 S.C. 242, 250, 626 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2006).
Scott asserts the circuit court erred by granting Respondents’ summary judgment motion because the Record reflected genuine issues of material fact when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to her. Scott contends the property interest she acquired through her contract with McAlister entitled her to notice of the Property's delinquent taxes, tax sale, and redemption opportunity pursuant to section 12-51-40. Scott maintains the Record contained at least a scintilla of...
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