Scott v. McCain, 20836
Decision Date | 13 December 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 20836,20836 |
Citation | 272 S.C. 198,250 S.E.2d 118 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | R. C. SCOTT (and six other respondents in six separate cases identical to his, to-wit, Everette W. Noel, Avory Bland, Jr., Herman E. Cain, Mark S. Adams, J. Raymond Cook and Virgil Wall), Respondent, v. Thomas C. McCAIN, Appellant. |
Laughlin McDonald, Atlanta, Ga., for appellant.
J. Roy Berry, Johnston, W. Ray Berry, Columbia, and Joe F. Anderson, Edgefield, for respondent.
Respondent R. C. Scott brought this libel action against appellant Thomas C. McCain to recover actual and punitive damages. This appeal is from the order of the lower court overruling McCain's demurrer to the complaint and permitting Scott to amend the complaint. We reverse that part of the lower court's order that overrules the demurrer, and affirm that part that permits Scott to amend the complaint.
Scott's complaint is identical to and representative of the complaints of Everette W. Noel, Avory Bland, Jr., Herman E. Cain, Mark S. Adams, J. Raymond Cook and Virgil Wall. Scott, Noel, Bland, Adams, Cook and Wall are members of the Edgefield County School District Board of Trustees. Cain is the Chief School Administrator of the Edgefield County School District. McCain's demurrers to each of these complaints were also overruled by the lower court.
On appeal from an order overruling a demurrer this Court is required to assume the allegations of the complaint are true. The complaint will be held sufficient if it states any cause of action or if it appears respondent is entitled to any relief whatsoever. Williams v. Streb, S.C., 243 S.E.2d 926 (1978); Baldwin v. Sanders, 266 S.C. 394, 223 S.E.2d 602 (1976).
Scott's complaint alleges as follows:
1) That plaintiff is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Edgefield County School District;
2) That defendant is a resident of Edgefield County;
3) That defendant did "wilfully and maliciously print, or cause to be printed, a certain libelous pamphlet;"
4) That the aforesaid pamphlet falsely accused the plaintiff with wrongdoing in connection with plaintiff's position as a member of the Board of Trustees of Edgefield County School District; and
5) That the pamphlet was libelous per se and damaged plaintiff in the sum of $35,000 actual and punitive damages.
The following definition of "libel" is taken from Fulton v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 220 S.C. 287, 67 S.E.2d 425 (1951):
A libel is a malicious defamation, expressed either by writing or printing, or by signs, pictures, effigies, or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty or integrity or reputation, or publish the natural or alleged defects, of one who is alive, and thereby to expose him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided, or to injure him in his office, business, or occupation. 67 S.E.2d at 430.
Malice is a necessary element of libel and may be either implied or actual. Jones v. Garner, 250 S.C. 479, 158 S.E.2d 909 (1968).
When a libel action is brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit the public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless the libelous statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964); Stevens v. Sun Publishing Co., 270 S.C. 65, 240 S.E.2d 812 (1978); Oswalt v. State-Record Company, 250 S.C. 429, 158 S.E.2d 204 (1967).
Scott, a public official, brought this libel action against a critic of his official conduct. To withstand a demurrer, his complaint must allege that the acts of the critic were committed with "actual malice" as that term is defined in New York Times v. Sullivan, supra. Scott's complaint only alleges that McCain published the libelous pamphlets "wilfully and maliciously." This allegation does not satisfy the New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, standard. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966) ( ) Roketenetz v. Woburn Daily Times, Inc., 1 Mass.App. 156, 294 N.E.2d 579 (1973) ( ); Ewald v. Roelofs, 120 Ill.App.2d 30, 256 N.E.2d 89 (1970) ( ).
Scott's complaint does not allege that the libelous pamphlets were published with knowledge they were false or with a reckless disregard for whether they were false or not. This omission is fatal to the complaint.
The lower court erred by overruling McCain's demurrer.
We have held that a defective complaint cannot be amended to state a new or different cause of action after the statute of limitations has run....
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...agreed she was a public official as a school board member, and thus, the actual malice standard applies. See Scott v. McCain, 272 S.C. 198, 200-01, 250 S.E.2d 118, 120 (1978) (noting a school board member is a public official). According to Murphy, Gantt acted with actual malice when he "an......
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Murphy v. Richland Lexington School District 5 Board of Trustees
... ... and thus, the actual malice standard applies. See Scott ... v. McCain , 272 S.C. 198, 200-01, 250 S.E.2d 118, 120 ... (1978) (noting a school ... ...