Scott v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole

• Decision Date: 28 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 397 M.D. 2020,397 M.D. 2020
• Citation: 256 A.3d 483
• Parties: Marie SCOTT, Normita Jackson, Marsha Scaggs, Reid Evans, Wyatt Evans, Tyreem Rivers, Petitioners v. PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Respondent
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

256 A.3d 483

Marie SCOTT, Normita Jackson, Marsha Scaggs, Reid Evans, Wyatt Evans, Tyreem Rivers, Petitioners

v.PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, Respondent

No. 397 M.D. 2020

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued February 8, 2021

Decided May 28, 2021

Bret Grote, Pittsburgh, for Petitioner.

Ronald M. Eisenberg, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Law Division, Philadelphia, for Respondent.

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge, HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge (P.), HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE BROBSON

Before the Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole¹ (Board) to a "Petition for Review in the Nature of a Complaint Seeking Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief" (Petition) filed by Marie Scott, Normita Jackson, Marsha Scaggs, Reid Evans, Wyatt Evans, and Tyreem Rivers (collectively, Petitioners). As discussed further herein, Petitioners are all serving mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without parole (LWOP) for felony murder and other crimes they committed as adults, and they seek, inter alia , to be considered eligible for parole. For the reasons that follow, we sustain the Board's preliminary objection asserting lack of jurisdiction and dismiss the Petition.

In the Petition, Petitioners aver that they are a group of individuals who were convicted of felony murder, among other crimes. See 18 Pa. C.S. § 2502(b) ("A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed while defendant was engaged as a principle [sic] or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony.").² Marie Scott's conviction stemmed from her role as the lookout in a robbery of a gas station during which her co-defendant killed the station attendant. (Petition ¶¶ 2, 23.) Brothers Reid and Wyatt Evans were convicted after they, along with a co-defendant, robbed their victim, who died of a heart attack several hours after the incident. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 36-37.) Marsha Scaggs was convicted based upon events in which her co-defendant shot and killed a man whom they suspected was a police informant seeking to purchase drugs, after Scaggs refused to do so at her co-defendant's command. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 51.) Normita Jackson was convicted following her participation in a robbery in which she invited the victim to her home, where her co-defendant ultimately shot and killed the victim. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 66.) Finally, Tyreem Rivers was convicted after he robbed an elderly victim, who died weeks later of pneumonia

she contracted in the hospital while being treated for injuries sustained when she fell during the robbery. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 78.)

As a result of their convictions, each Petitioner is serving a mandatory LWOP sentence, or, as Petitioners at times put it, "a mandatory death-by-incarceration sentence." (Id. ¶ 18.) In support of their characterization of their sentences, Petitioners point to Section 1102(b) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. § 1102(b), which provides that "a person who has been convicted of murder of the second degree ... shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment," and Section 6137(a)(1) of the Parole Code, 61 Pa. C.S. § 6137(a)(1), which provides that "[t]he [B]oard may ... release on parole any inmate to whom the power to parole is granted to the [B]oard by this chapter, except an inmate condemned to death or serving life imprisonment."³ (See Petition ¶ 18.)

Petitioners’ convictions were obtained decades ago, and the time each has served in incarceration ranges from 23 to 47 years. (Id. ¶¶ 2-7.) Their sentences notwithstanding, on May 19, 2020, Petitioners each submitted a parole application with the Board seeking parole review. (Id. ¶ 19.) The Board denied Petitioners’ applications on the basis that Petitioners were serving life sentences and, therefore, were not eligible for parole consideration pursuant to Section 6137(a) of the Parole Code. (Id. ¶ 20.) Following the Board's denial of Petitioners’ parole applications, Petitioners filed the Petition with this Court on July 8, 2020, raising two claims for relief under Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. I, § 13 (providing that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted").

In their first claim, titled "Violation of Right to Be Free from Cruel Punishments Under Article I, [Section] 13," Petitioners assert that LWOP sentences have been recognized as among the most severe forms of punishment; are disproportionate; fail to serve legitimate penological interests when applied to defendants who have lessened culpability because they did not kill or intend to kill as part of their crime of conviction; and constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.⁴ (Petition ¶¶ 135-37.) Claiming that Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution "provides at least as much protection as the Eighth Amendment," Petitioners further submit that "[their LWOP] sentences for felony murder convictions, where they did not kill or intend to kill as part of their crime of conviction, constitute cruel punishment in violation of Art[icle] I, Section 13." (Id. ¶¶ 134, 138.) Additionally, Petitioners assert that the Board violates Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by enforcing Section 6137 of the Parole Code, thereby denying them the opportunity to be considered for parole due to their life sentences and "effectuating their death-by-incarceration."⁵ (Id. ¶¶ 133, 139.)

In their second claim, titled "Violation of Right to Be Free from Cruel Punishments Under Article I, [Section] 13— Edmunds Factors," Petitioners again assert that "[their] death-by-incarceration sentences for felony murder convictions, where they did not kill or intend to kill as part of their crime of conviction, constitute cruel punishments in violation of Art[icle] I, [Section] 13." (Id. ¶ 143.) While Petitioners base their first claim on the argument that the Pennsylvania Constitution's protections are coextensive with the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Petitioners base their second claim on the assertion that "Art[icle] I, [Section] 13 provides greater protection than the Eighth Amendment" under the factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Edmunds , 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991),⁶ and in light of important policy considerations attendant to "death-by-incarceration sentences in Pennsylvania." (Id. ¶¶ 141-42.) As they did in their first claim, Petitioners again assert in their second claim that the Board violates Article I, Section 13 by enforcing Section 6137 of the Parole Code, thereby denying them the opportunity to be considered for parole due to their life sentences and "effectuating their death-by-incarceration." (Id. ¶¶ 140, 144.)

In their prayer for relief, Petitioners seek a declaration from this Court that Section 6137 of the Parole Code is "unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution as applied to individuals serving life sentences for felony murder convictions." (Id. ¶ 145.) Petitioners also seek an evidentiary hearing to develop a record with respect to whether application of Section 6137 to those who did not take a life or intend to take a life is unjustified. (Id. ¶¶ 147-48.) Petitioners further request that the Court order the Board "to develop plans for review of these cases, including the minimum number of years that must be served prior to consideration for parole, the criteria governing such parole reviews, and the procedural protections that will be in place to ensure a meaningful opportunity for release." (Id. ¶ 146.) Finally, Petitioners request an order directing the Board to review each of Petitioners’ cases for consideration of parole. (Id. ¶ 149.)

As noted, the Board filed preliminary objections to the Petition, asserting that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter and that the Board is an improper party. The Board also demurs on two bases, asserting that Petitioners’ challenge is stale and their claims fail on the merits.

In ruling on preliminary objections, we accept as true all well-pleaded material allegations in the petition for review and any reasonable inferences that we may draw from the averments. Meier v. Maleski , 167 Pa.Cmwlth. 458, 648 A.2d 595, 600 (1994). The Court, however, is not bound by legal conclusions, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion encompassed in the petition for review. Id. We may sustain preliminary objections only when the law makes clear that the petitioner cannot succeed on the claim, and we must resolve any doubt in favor of the petitioner. Id. "We review preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer under the above guidelines and may sustain a demurrer only when a petitioner has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted." Armstrong Cnty. Mem'l Hosp. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare , 67 A.3d 160, 170 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).

The Board first argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioners’ claims pursuant to Section 761(a)(1)(i) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i), which provides that this Court does not have jurisdiction over "[a]ctions or proceedings in the nature of applications for a writ of habeas corpus or post-conviction relief not ancillary to proceedings within the appellate jurisdiction of the [C]ourt." The Board submits that Petitioners are challenging the legality of their sentences and, thus, Petitioners’ claims are cognizable under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9541 -46. The Board further argues that, to the extent that Petitioners purport to limit their challenge to Section 6137(a) of the Parole Code and their ineligibility for parole, Section 6137(a) makes clear that eligibility for parole is itself a function or element of a criminal sentence, as it is determined by the court at...