Scott v. Price

Decision Date16 March 1926
Docket Number16600.
Citation247 P. 103,123 Okla. 172,1926 OK 255
PartiesSCOTT v. PRICE et al.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied May 11, 1926.

Plaintiff's Rehearing Denied June 22, 1926.

Syllabus by the Court.

The filing of an amended petition which is complete in itself and does not refer to the original petition or any prior amendment, is an abandonment of all prior averments not contained in such amended petition.

The abandonment of an oil and gas mining lease rests upon the intention of the lessee to relinquish the premises.

Forfeiture of an oil and gas mining lease will be decreed for breach of an implied covenant to diligently operate the property when such forfeiture effectuates justice.

Where part of the leased premises has been developed and operated with reasonable diligence by drilling and operating one well and the other portion of the lease has not been, and cannot be, developed by the lessee, the lease will be canceled as to the undeveloped portion for breach of the implied covenant to diligently operate the property and permit the lessee to continue to operate the developed portion, where reason and justice require it.

Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 1.

Appeal from District Court, Murray County; A. C. Barrett, Judge.

Action by Ellis Price and another against W. J. Scott. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Remanded, with directions.

H. B Martin, of Tulsa, and H. W. Broadbent, of Sulphur, for plaintiff in error.

Young Haste & Powell and W. G. Long, all of Sulphur, P. G. Moore, of Davis, and Bowling & Farmer, of Pauls Valley, for defendants in error.

RAY, C.

This is an action by Ellis Price and Nina Price, husband and wife against William J. Scott to cancel an oil and gas lease executed by plaintiffs to the defendant, and for an accounting of the royalties accrued and accruing under the terms of the lease. The lease was executed December 26, 1916, for a period of five years, "and as much longer as oil, gas, or either of them shall be produced from said lands by lessee in paying quantities." By the terms of the lease the lessee was to deliver to the lessor a one-tenth part of all oil produced and saved from the premises as royalty, free of cost to the lessor, in the pipe line to which the well might be connected, or, at the lessee's election, to pay the lessor for the royalties the market price prevailing the day the oil was run into the pipe line or run into storage tanks.

The defendant joined issue by answer and cross-petition, and prayed judgment for certain sums alleged to be due from the plaintiffs to the defendant. Judgment was for plaintiffs canceling the lease, for possession, and for an accounting for the royalties. From this judgment the defendant, William J. Scott, has appealed.

No question arising upon the defendant's cross-petition is presented in his brief. The findings of fact and conclusions of law, in so far as they relate to, or affect, the question here under consideration, are as follows:

"(1) That on the 26th day of December, 1916, the plaintiffs, for a consideration of $1 cash in hand paid, and the covenants and agreements contained therein, to be kept and performed by the defendant, made, executed, and delivered to the defendant a certain oil and gas lease on the following described lands: [Description of lands], under which said lease the defendant should have and hold said lands and all the rights and privileges granted thereunder for the term of five years from the date thereof, and as much longer as oil, gas, or either of them should be produced from said lands in paying quantities.
(2) That thereafter the defendant went into possession of said lands under the terms of the lease, and commenced drilling and developing operations. That in the month of October, 1919, sand was encountered in said well on said leased land at a depth of 1,265 feet; that said well produced a very small quantity of gas, and produced a substance or liquid which might be denominated liquid asphalt. That the substance so produced was heavy and tenacious and incapable of being handled in pipe lines, noncombustible, and which had to be baled from the well. That said well would produce a maximum of 50 barrels of this substance per day, its exact capacity for production not having been definitely determined. That the market value of this substance at the well, when a market can be obtained therefor, is
50 cents per barrel. That the value of the product so obtained at said price is insufficient to pay the expenses of production.
(3) That the production of said well from the month of October, 1919, when said well was brought in, up to the date of trial on November 7, 1924, was 700 barrels, a portion of which was on the premises at said last-mentioned date.
(4) That the defendant has been unable from the time of the discovery of said well up to the time of the trial to find a market for the output of the well, but has only been able to sell same in comparatively small quantities and at irregular intervals. That defendant has diligently sought a market therefor, and has expended considerable sums of money and a large amount of time in experimenting therewith and advertising the same.
(5) That the defendant has not operated said well regularly and constantly since its discovery, but has operated the same intermittently for short periods when it was possible to dispose of the product, and has produced, and sought to produce, only such quantities as were necessary in order to consummate the sales which he was able to make, and for the purposes of advertisement and experiment.
(6) That the defendant has not paid to the plaintiffs any sum for rental or royalty since the operation of said lease began, except the $1 paid at the time of the delivery of the lease, and the sum of $2 at another time, when plaintiffs sold for defendant a small quantity of the product locally.
(7) That the defendant has expended large sums of money in drilling the well and in making permanent improvements on the lease, including a pipe line from the well to the railway switch, about a quarter of a mile away, in obtaining the building of said switch and erecting a dwelling and other buildings.
(8) That the defendant has resided on, and been in possession and control of, the premises constantly since the time of the execution of the lease. * * *

Conclusions of Law.

(1) The court finds that the oil and gas lease involved in this suit expired by its own limitations on the 26th day of December, 1921, oil and gas, or either of them, not having been discovered in paying quantities on said lease within the period prescribed by the terms of the lease.
(2) That said lease is subject to forfeiture by reason of the breach by defendant of the express and implied covenants thereof to diligently operate and develop same.
(3) That the defendant has not abandoned said lease. * * *
(7) That judgment should be rendered for the plaintiffs and against the defendant canceling said lease and removing the same as a cloud upon plaintiff's title, for the restitution of said lands and premises to the plaintiffs and for an accounting."

On these findings of fact and conclusions of law judgment was for plaintiffs canceling the lease, for possession, and for an accounting of the royalties.

The contention of the defendant that the conclusion of the trial court that the lease expired by its own limitations was not within the issues must be sustained. Plaintiffs, to sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the lease expired by its own limitations for failure to discover oil or gas in paying quantities within the life of the lease, say that the original petition, construed together with certain allegations of the amended petition, sufficiently alleged that oil or gas was not discovered in paying quantities during the life of the lease to justify the cancellation of the lease upon that ground. The difficulty of that argument is that the amended petition, on which the case was tried was complete in itself, and contained no reference to the original petition. The effect of the original petition was destroyed by the filing of the amended petition which was complete in itself, and did not refer to, or adopt, the original as a part of it. Gaar, Scott & Co. v Rogers, 46 Okl. 67, 148 P. 161. In the amended petition it was alleged, in substance, that within the life of...

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