Scott v. Reyes
| Decision Date | 09 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D04-4610.,No. 2D04-5345.,2D04-4610.,2D04-5345. |
| Citation | 913 So.2d 13 |
| Parties | Debra Jean SCOTT, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Elliott Stephen Scott, Appellant, v. Melissa Scott REYES, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Joseph W. Fleece, III, of Baskin Fleece, Clearwater, for Appellant, Individually.
Thomas J. Ellwanger, Bonita Kneeland Brown, and Gregory A. Richards, Jr., of Fowler White Boggs Banker P.A., Tampa, for Appellant as Personal Representative of the Estate of Elliott Stephen Scott.
Marie Tomassi and Karen E. Lewis of Trenam, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye, O'Neill & Mullis, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellee.
In this case we are asked to determine whether the "trust exception" to the requirements of the claims provisions of the Florida Probate Code is applicable to the claim of a former co-tenant based on the joint ownership of two accounts that the decedent reestablished in his sole name without the knowledge or consent of the co-tenant. Because the decedent's act of reestablishing the accounts in his name alone amounted to an assertion of beneficial ownership in the accounts before his death, we conclude that the trust exception is inapplicable. Consequently, the co-tenant was required to file a statement of claim in the probate proceeding for the decedent's estate within the time allowed under section 733.702, Florida Statutes (2002), or her claim arising from her previous joint ownership of the two accounts with the decedent would be barred. The co-tenant failed to timely file a statement of claim. Accordingly, we affirm the probate court's order that granted motions filed by one of the heirs to dismiss two petitions seeking to determine the "ownership" of the accounts as impermissible requests for court authorization to pay a time-barred claim. We also affirm the probate court's order denying the co-tenant's petition to extend the time for filing a claim because no abuse of discretion has been shown.
Elliott Stephen Scott (the Decedent) died intestate on June 4, 2003. The Decedent was survived by his wife of eighteen years, Deborah Jean Scott (Mrs. Scott). The Decedent was also survived by his adult daughter by a previous marriage, Melissa Scott Reyes (Ms. Reyes).
The facts pertinent to this appeal are alleged in the two petitions Mrs. Scott filed in the probate court seeking a determination of the status of the two accounts that she formerly held jointly with the Decedent. The probate court's order granted motions filed by Ms. Reyes and dismissed both of these petitions. For purposes of our review, we assume the facts alleged in these petitions to be true, and we construe them in the light most favorable to Mrs. Scott as the nonmoving party. See Blanton v. City of Pinellas Park, 887 So.2d 1224, 1226 (Fla.2004); Hosp. Constructors Ltd. v. Lefor, 749 So.2d 546, 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
During his lifetime, the Decedent and Mrs. Scott established two joint accounts that became the subject of contested proceedings in the probate court. The first of these accounts was a joint investment account at a brokerage firm (the Brokerage Account). The second account was a joint money market account, held as a tenancy by the entireties, at a local bank (the Money Market Account). In August 2002, the brokerage firm received a letter purportedly signed by Mrs. Scott with instructions to remove her name from the Brokerage Account. Without further inquiry or notice to Mrs. Scott, the brokerage firm complied with the letter's instructions and re-titled the Brokerage Account in the Decedent's name alone. In addition, shortly before his death, the Decedent withdrew all of the funds in the Money Market Account and deposited the proceeds in a new bank account titled in his sole name. The Decedent did not notify Mrs. Scott of the withdrawal of the funds from the Money Market Account or of the deposit of the funds in the new account.
After the Decedent's death, Mrs. Scott discovered that the Brokerage Account had been re-titled in the Decedent's name alone as a result of the removal of her name from the account. She also learned that the Decedent had transferred the funds from the Money Market Account into a new account in his sole name. The brokerage account was valued at approximately $544,000 at the date of the Decedent's death. Mrs. Scott's petitions did not allege the amount of the funds transferred from the Money Market Account to the new account in the Decedent's name alone. Mrs. Scott denied signing the letter of instructions or authorizing anyone to sign her name to it. She hired a document examiner to compare the signature on the letter of instructions that had been delivered to the brokerage firm with known specimens of her signature. The document examiner concluded that the signature on the letter to the brokerage firm was a forgery.1
Mrs. Scott filed a petition for administration of the Decedent's estate in the Pasco County Circuit Court, and letters of administration were issued to her. The date of the first publication of notice to creditors for the Decedent's estate was July 31, 2003. In accordance with section 733.702, creditors of the Decedent were required to file their claims within the later of three months of the first publication of the notice, i.e., on or before October 31, 2003, or as to reasonably ascertainable creditors, thirty days after service on the creditor. Mrs. Scott did not timely file a claim in the estate based on her previous joint ownership of the two accounts with the Decedent and his reestablishment of the accounts in his sole name.
On February 5, 2004, Mrs. Scott, in her capacity as personal representative, filed a "Petition for Court Order Pursuant to Florida Statutes, Sections 733.603 and 733.610." This petition recited the facts concerning Mrs. Scott's previous joint ownership of the two accounts with the Decedent and the reestablishment of the accounts in his name. As personal representative of the estate, Mrs. Scott requested the entry of "an Order determining whether the Brokerage Account and the Money Market Account are probate or nonprobate assets."
On April 21, 2004, separate counsel filed a notice of appearance for Mrs. Scott individually. The next day, Mrs. Scott—acting in her individual capacity—filed a "Petition for Declaration of Rights" in the estate administration proceeding. Invoking section 86.041, Florida Statutes (2003), Mrs. Scott's individual petition requested the entry of "an Order determining and declaring the ownership interest in the money market account and the brokerage account, directing the personal representative to act in accordance with this Court's determination and declaration of those rights."
Ms. Reyes moved to dismiss both petitions on the ground that Mrs. Scott had failed to file a creditor's claim as required by section 733.702(1), and that any claim she might have had based on the ownership of the two accounts was therefore barred. Ms. Reyes characterized each of the petitions as a "thinly veiled attempt to circumvent the Florida Probate Code." On June 4, 2004, Mrs. Scott—acting in her individual capacity—filed a petition requesting an extension of time to file a creditor's claim if the probate court ruled "that a claim is a prerequisite to a determination of ownership of the accounts in question."
The probate court held a hearing on all three petitions. At the hearing, Mrs. Scott conceded that she had not filed a claim within the claims period, but she argued that it was not necessary for her to file a claim to assert her ownership interest in the two accounts. After the hearing, the probate court entered an order that made the following findings of fact:
1. The matters raised in the Petition for Court Order Pursuant to Florida Statutes Sections 733.603 and 733.610 and Petition for Declaration of Rights which are subject to the motions to dismiss should have been raised in a Statement of Claim and no cause of action exists for such Petitions;
2. No claim by Debra Scott was timely filed herein; and
3. There is no basis for extending the time for filing such a claim set forth in the Petition to Extend[.]
Based on these findings, the probate court not only dismissed both of the petitions seeking a determination of the ownership of the accounts but also denied Mrs. Scott's petition for an extension of time to file a claim. Mrs. Scott has taken an appeal from this order both in her capacity as personal representative and individually.
Our review of the probate court's order dismissing Mrs. Scott's two petitions seeking a determination of the status of the two accounts is de novo. Blanton, 887 So.2d at 1226; Belcher Ctr. LLC v. Belcher Ctr., Inc., 883 So.2d 338, 339 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). On the other hand, we consider the probate court's order denying Mrs. Scott's petition for an extension of time to file a claim under an abuse of discretion standard. Miller v. Estate of Baer, 837 So.2d 448, 450 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Scutieri v. Estate of Revitz, 510 So.2d 1003, 1004 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
Generally speaking, the provisions of section 733.702 bar any claim or demand against a decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent which is not
filed in the probate proceeding on or before the later of the date that is 3 months after the time of the first publication of the notice to creditors or, as to any creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice to creditors, 30 days after the date of service on the creditor, even though the personal representative has recognized the claim or demand by paying a part of it or interest on it or otherwise.
§ 733.702(1); see Fla. Prob. R. 5.490. The requirements of section 733.702 apply to claims that are unmatured, contingent, or unliquidated as well as to claims for...
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